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Resumen en Castellano
El trabajo de investigacio´n realizado para la obtencio´n del grado de Doctor en
Economı´a se compone de tres trabajos en dos a´reas de Economı´a Financiera, Finanzas
Corporativas y Valoracio´n de Activos, con fundamentos teo´ricos de la Microeconomı´a.
El primer cap´ıtulo analiza el papel de los directores “interlocking” (directores presentes
en los consejos de administracio´n de dos empresas diferentes de manera simultanea)
como transmisores de informacio´n durante la seleccio´n de potenciales empresas objetivo
en los procesos de fusion y adquisicion. El segundo cap´ıtulo es un trabajo conjunto con
Jose´ M. Mar´ın. En este cap´ıtulo analizamos el contenido de la informacio´n de los “draw-
downs” (depreciacio´n del fondo desde su ma´ximo histo´rico) de hedge funds (fondos de
inversio´n libre) y sus implicaciones en la cartera. El tercer cap´ıtulo analiza el papel de
las reuniones de los consejos de administracio´n en la adquisicio´n de informacio´n de los
directores externos.
Cap´ıtulo 1: Directores Interlocking y Seleccion de Empresas Objetivo en
las Fusiones y Adquisiciones
Este cap´ıtulo investiga el papel de los directores “interlocking” en la resolucio´n de los
problemas de informacio´n asimetr´ıa en las fusiones y adquisiciones. Desarrollo un modelo
de informacio´n privada que predice que tener un director interlocking con el adquirente
aumenta la probabilidad de ser seleccionado entre los potenciales adquiridos. De acuerdo
con el modelo, se demuestra que las empresas interlocking tienen ma´s probabilidades
de ser seleccionados como adquiridos, en particular cuando hay una mayor asimetr´ıa
de la informacio´n en parte del adquirido, o cuando el adquirente esta financieramente
limitado. Adema´s, el modelo predice que la empresa interlocking que no esta seleccionada
tendra rendimientos bajos. De acuerdo con esta prediccio´n, documento que las empresas
interlocking no seleccionadas tienen bajos rendimientos posteriores con respecto a sus
pares. Por u´ltimo, se muestra que ese feno´meno de la mayor probabilidad de adquirir
una empresa interlocking no se debe a explicaciones alternativas, como la centralidad
de la red, o atrincheramiento de los gestores. En general, la evidencia sugiere que los
directores interlocking mitigan ineficiencias que surgen de asimetr´ıas de informacio´n en
las fusiones y adquisiciones.
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Cap´ıtulo 2: Ana´lisis de los Drawdowns de los Hedge Funds: Calidad de
la Gestio´n, Aseguramiento al Mercado y Seleccio´n Darwiniana
En este cap´ıtulo analizamos el estado de “drawdown” de los hedge funds como una
caracter´ıstica de los hedge funds relacionada con su rendimiento-riesgo. El “estado de
drawdown” de un hedge fund es definido como el decil al que pertenece el drawdown
del fondo en la distribucio´n de la industria (en un momento dado en el tiempo). La
teor´ıa econo´mica sugiere que tanto el nivel actual como la evolucio´n pasada del estado
de drawdown de un fondo son caracter´ısticas relacionadas con varias variables claves de
los fondos, incluyendo el talento del gestor y el nivel de seguimiento por parte de los
inversores, y, por tanto, son predictivas del rendimiento futuro del fondo. El ana´lisis da
lugar a cuatro resultados completamente novedosos sobre los hedge funds. En primer
lugar, el uso extensivo de estrategias de aseguramiento al mercado hace que carteras
de los fondos que exhiben pequen˜os drawdowns tengan rendimientos bajos, en general,
y muy pobres, en tiempos de crisis. En segundo lugar, el mercado opera un proceso
de seleccio´n darwinista segu´n el cual los fondos que sufren grandes drawdowns durante
un per´ıodo de tiempo prolongado (los supervivientes) tiendan a estar administrados por
gestores talentosos que producen rendimientos futuros excepcionales. En tercer lugar,
el ana´lisis aflora una nueva dimensio´n del riesgo que surge como un rasgo distintivo de
los hedge funds: alto riesgo condicional a supervivencia es equivalente a rendimiento
excepcional. En cuarto lugar, el ana´lisis del estado de drawdown plantea serias dudas
sobre el papel jugado por otras caracter´ısticas de los hedge funds –como la Delta Total–
sobre el rendimiento de los fondos y hace dudar sobre la validez de algunas de las
medidas de evaluacio´n de la calidad de la gestio´n –como el ratio de Calmar y el de
Sterling– ampliamente utilizados por los profesionales.
Cap´ıtulo 3: ¿Que´ Aprenda Directores Externos en las Reuniones de los
Consejos de Administracio´n?
Este trabajo analiza el contenido de la informacio´n que los directores externos adquieren
en las reuniones de los consejos de administracio´n. Encuentro que los directores exter-
nos significativamente incrementan sus transacciones en acciones de la empresa despue´s
de las reuniones. Los directores externos obtienen rendimientos anormales de sus com-
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pras cuando estas se realizan justo antes o despue´s de las reuniones del consejo. El
rendimiento es significativamente mayor en los casos donde la transaccio´n se inicia de-
spue´s de la reunio´n. Los directores externos que compran acciones de la compan˜´ıa antes
de las reuniones no tienen mejor rendimiento que los ejecutivos, mientras los que com-
pran despue´s de las reuniones obtienen mayores rendimientos en comparacio´n con sus
homo´logos ejecutivos. Sin embargo, de acuerdo con la literatura, las transacciones de
venta, a diferencia de las de compra, no parecen ser causadas por una mejor informacio´n.
En general, los resultados sugieren que las reuniones del consejo son importantes para
la adquisicio´n de informacio´n de los directores externos, y, por tanto, un elemento im-
portante de sus funciones de supervisio´n y asesoramiento a los directivos.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three papers on information transmission and processing in
financial markets. It combines topics from two areas of Financial Economics, Corporate
Finance and Asset Pricing, with theoretical grounds from Microeconomics. The first
chapter analyzes the role of interlocking directors as information transmitters in target
selection in mergers and acquisitions. The second chapter analyzes the information
content of hedge fund drawdowns and its portfolio implications. The third chapter
analyzes the role of board meetings in outside directors’ information acquisition.
In the first chapter, entitled Interlocking Directors and Target Selection in Mergers
and Acquisitions, I analyze the role of interlocking directors in resolving the problems
that arise from information asymmetry between the parties involved in M&As. Inter-
locking directors are directors that sit on the boards of both the target and the acquirer
at the time of the deal announcement. Due to their position, these directors are privy
to important information on both firms, and therefore, stand as a distinguished channel
of private information transmission. This is a central feature in the model I develop.
To motivate my empirical tests, I develop a simple model of target selection within an
information asymmetry context. In this model, the acquirer receives private information
on one of the targets. Empirically, this corresponds to acquirers obtaining target-specific
information through interlocking directors. The model has two basic predictions that
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are testable. 1. The firms that have an interlocking director with the acquirer are more
likely to be selected as targets. This prediction has strong empirical support; interlocking
directors raise the likelihood of becoming a target by 12.18 percentage points. The effect
is particularly strong for targets that experience poor past performance, that are small,
that are risky, or that belong to a different industry; which are precisely the targets
that invoke greater information asymmetry problems for the acquirer. Similarly, acquir-
ers that have high financial leverage, or insufficient cash holdings, or limited liquidity
are further biased towards interlocking targets. This is consistent with these acquirers’
willingness to use stock as the payment method, which leads to information asymmetry
problems that operates against targets. To the extent that the above cases are those
where target or acquirer-specific information is more valuable, results indicate that in-
terlocking directors have a significant role in transmitting private information that is
critical to target choice.
Modeling target selection as a function of private information provides another pre-
diction which is, perhaps, even more interesting. 2. If the acquirer selects a non-
interlocking firm in the presence of an interlocking potential target, this non-selected
interlocking firm will under-perform its peers through time. The intuition is that this
case occurs only when the private information of the acquirer corresponds to negative
news on this target. By comparing the post-deal accounting performance of the non-
selected interlocking firms with that of their peers, I find empirical support for their
poor performance. I also document that the portfolios of non-selected interlocking firms
under-perform a number of alternative portfolios.
The second chapter is a joint work with Jose´ M. Mar´ın. In this chapter, entitled
On the Economics of Hedge Fund Drawdown Status: Performance, Insurance Selling,
and Darwinian Selection, we analyze information transmission and processing in the
world of hedge funds, with a focus on drawdowns. Drawdowns are losses from the peak
point of any investment. In a strong contradiction to simple intuition and industry per-
formance evaluation trends, we find that hedge funds that survive prolonged periods of
large drawdowns are managed by truly talented managers who deliver outstanding per-
formance. We explain this phenomenon by the market’s Darwinian selection mechanism
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where investors keep the funds managed by talented managers alive, and let the others
die. The essence of Darwinian mechanism lies in two features: 1. Better information
transmission from the fund managers to the investors, as these managers would be will-
ing to disclose more on their investment philosophy to rationalize the large drawdown.
Not doing so would probably result in the exit of investors and the death of the fund.
2. Better information processing of fund investors, as it is most worthwhile to analyze
extra relevant information about the manager’s investment philosophy after large draw-
downs. The reason is the high water mark clause specific to the hedge fund world that
prevents investors from paying fees until the fund returns to the its peak investment
point. Investors who stay in the fund would save a lot of fees, but this is reasonable only
when the expected return of the fund is positive; that is, when the manager is talented.
Consequently, an investment strategy that forms a portfolio of highest drawdown funds
delivers a monthly risk-adjusted return of 1.23 percent.
On the contrary to the outstanding performance of the highest drawdown funds, we
document the poor performance of the lowest drawdown funds in this study. This is
driven by the heavy presence of insurance sellers in low drawdown portfolios. These
are funds managed by untalented traders who specialize in strategies akin to selling
insurance, which share the property of delivering positive returns in normal times but
have the hidden cost of large losses during crises periods. As a result, we find that low
drawdown funds are weak performers, in general, and bad performers in times of turmoil.
In the third chapter, entitled What Do Outside Directors Learn At Board Meetings?,
I analyze the information content of annual board meetings from the point of view of
outside directors. Board meetings are important events for not only the decisions taken
during them, but also for the substantial information gathering taking place in advance.
To assess their information value, I study the extent of insider trading around board
meetings, along with traders’ performance. Three observations arise from the study:
1. Outside directors significantly increase their trade after the board meetings. 2. The
abnormal returns to outside directors purchases are positive around the board meetings,
and significantly higher for cases where the trade is initiated after the meeting. 3. Outside
directors who purchase company stock before the board meetings do not have better
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performance than the executives, whereas those who trade after the board meetings gain
significantly higher market adjusted returns as compared to their executive counterparts.
These results are consistent with the view that board meetings are important in outside
directors’ information acquisition: Outsider directors do learn a lot about their firms at
annual board meetings. Consequently, meetings are useful in bridging the information
gap between the inside and outside members of the board.
Consistent with the literature, insider sales provide modest evidence on that they
are information driven. Outside directors who sell their company stock after the board
meetings perform better than those who sell before, even though the effect is small and
not highly significant. Overall, the results in this study suggest that board meetings pro-
vide valuable information to outside directors, and therefore, are an important element
of their advising and monitoring duties.
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Chapter 2
Interlocking Directors and Target
Selection in Mergers and
Acquisitions
2.1 Introduction
The board of directors plays a very important role in mergers and acquisitions. Both
the target firm’s and acquirer firm’s board of directors are decisive at the stages of
selection, bidding and deal consummation. It is a very interesting phenomenon that in
many deals, some board members contemporaneously sit on the boards of the target
firm and the acquirer firm, yet our knowledge of these interlocking directors’ effect is
quite limited. This paper explores the role of interlocking directors in target selection
in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within an information asymmetry context.
A well documented friction in the M&A market, inspired by Akerlof (1970) and
put forward by Hansen (1987), is information asymmetry regarding the target value:
Target knows more about its value than the bidder. This results in an adverse selection
problem, where bids are only accepted by targets with values less than or equal to the
bid. Consequently, bidder faces an overpayment cost that is increasing in the value of
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the bid. Fishman (1989) notes that this leads to an efficiency problem because value-
increasing bidders may be deterred from making offers.
Dual to the target-side information asymmetry, M&As induce information asym-
metry regarding the bidder value: Bidder knows more about its value than the target
(Hansen 1987). When bidder uses its equity to finance the acquisition, this results in
an adverse selection problem. The reason is that raising equity to finance investments
might be perceived by outside markets as an attempt to sell a lemon since firms would
prefer to use their stock when it is overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984). Hence, the use
of equity rather than cash as means of payment would indicate a low valuation of the
bidder stock, resulting in, as Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) puts it, a bidder
undervaluation cost.
Interlocking directors sit on the boards of the target and the acquirer firm during the
acquisition process. Due to their position, they are privy to important information both
about the target and about the acquirer firm. This access to information, along with the
availability of direct communication with other decision makers (board members), makes
interlocking directors a distinguished channel of information transmission between the
parties involved in M&As. A straightforward question arises from this discussion: Do
interlocking directors, by communicating their privileged information during the M&A
process, help resolve the information asymmetry problems explained above? This paper
attempts to answer this question.
I start by developing a simple model of target selection based on asymmetric informa-
tion. The model’s first prediction is that in most cases, the bidder will select the target
on which she has private information. To test this implication, I examine the extent
to which bidders (acquirers) select the interlocking firms in actual M&As. I define the
interlocking firms as all potential target firms that have at least one current director that
is contemporaneously sitting on the board of the acquirer. I presume that these directors
serve as a channel of private information transmission. Consistent with the model, I find
that firms that have an interlocking director with the acquirer (interlocking firms) are
more likely to be selected among potential target firms. The economic significance of the
relation between interlocking directors and target selection is substantial. Conditioning
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on firms with similar industry and size characteristics, having an interlocking director
with the acquirer raises the likelihood of becoming a target by 12 percent. The effect
is robust across various industry classifications and firm characteristics that are used to
define the set of potential targets.
As a next step, I document that interlocking director effect is more pronounced when
information asymmetry in the target environment is greater, which implies a greater
overpayment cost for the bidder. The increase in the probability of becoming a target
is higher when targets are smaller, when targets experience worse past performance, or
when targets have higher standard deviation of monthly stock returns. To the extent
that private information is likely to be more valuable for targets with greater infor-
mation asymmetries, this finding suggests that interlocking directors are better able to
exploit their informational advantage when targets have opaque information environ-
ments. Interlocking director effect is also more pronounced when the bidder and the
target are from different industries, which implies greater information asymmetry be-
tween the bidder and the target, but not necessarily a more opaque environment for the
target. Moreover, I find that target premium paid by the acquirer is significantly smaller
in interlocking deals. All these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that inter-
locking directors help resolve informational asymmetry problems regarding the target
value.
In addition to target-specific information, interlocking directors may play a role in
transmitting bidder-specific information. The method of payment (cash versus equity)
in M&As has important consequences for the information revealed by the bidder and
the target; hence for the deal outcome.1 Many factors play a role in determining the
method of payment in acquisitions. Cash offers may mitigate the adverse selection
problem caused by acquirer’s private information on her own stock. However, they may
also exacerbate the adverse selection problem caused by target’s information advantage
in target valuation. Equity payment offers an advantage in limiting the overpayment cost
by making the target partake in the bidder’s gains and losses, whereas also introducing
a bidder undervaluation cost.2 Tax issues are important factors as well, the amount of
1See Hirshleifer (1995) for an in-depth analysis.
2The bidder faces a tradeoff between the likelihood of paying too much, or of offering too little and
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equity and cash effects the tax shield and timing of the acquisition. For all these reasons,
it is not clear which method of payment the acquirer would prefer in M&As. However,
financially constrained firms are unlikely to easily raise capital, hence might be obliged
to choose equity financing. If we believe that these constrained firms will necessarily use
their stock to finance acquisitions, we would expect such firms to select a target that
knows better about its valuation so as to avoid the bidder undervaluation cost. Indeed,
I find that acquirers are more likely to select interlocking targets when they are highly
leveraged, or cash-strapped, or constrained in liquidity. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that interlocking directors help resolve informational asymmetry problems
regarding the acquirer value.
Modeling target selection as a function of private information provides a second pre-
diction. According to the model, if the private information on an interlocking potential
target is negative, the bidder will select the non-interlocking target as long as the syn-
ergy value is above some threshold. Therefore, in an actual merger, if a non-interlocking
target is selected when an interlocking potential target firm exists, we can infer that the
private information regarding the interlocking firm is negative; or, at least, weaker than
that for the other potential target firms. We would expect the negative news about the
interlocking firm to come out after some time. I test this hypothesis and find support
for this prediction as well. I document that interlocking firms, that are not selected in
deals where a non-interlocking target is selected, have worse post-deal announcement
performance with respect to their peers. This is observed through a deterioration in the
accounting and stock market performance of the non-selected interlocking firms. This
provides further evidence on the idea that informational superiority of the interlocking
director benefits the bidder in selecting an appropriate target.
As a final step, I test for alternative explanations that could generate similar empirical
patterns and show that the main results still hold. For example, an interlocking firm may
be more likely to be chosen as a target simply because this firm is more central in the
network of directors; hence the existence of interlocks. More central firms, due to their
being rejected. Equity makes the terms contingent on the target’s value, hence target shares some of
the overpayment cost with the bidder.
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busy directors, may under-perform (Fich and Shivdasani 2006) and tend to become
takeover targets (Barber, Palmer, and Wallace 1995; Cremers, Nair, and John 2009;
Hasbrouck 1985; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). If this were the first order effect,
then controlling for busy directors would make the interlocking director effect disappear.
Another possible explanation of the empirical facts may come from the entrenchment
theory (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). According
to this theory, the interlocking directors might facilitate merger process not because of
informational reasons, but because they act as negotiators so as to prevent anti-takeover
defenses. If this were the case, first, we would expect a strong presence of anti-takeover
defense measures in these potential targets. Second, under this explanation, interlocking
director effect would be stronger for highly entrenched target firms. Finally, we would
expect that controlling for corporate governance variables weakens the results regarding
the interlocking directors. I show that these alternative explanations are not supported
by the data.
This paper contributes to the literature by shedding new light on the role of the
interlocking directors in M&As. The literature has traditionally focused on the effect of
network centrality on firm actions and performance, where network centrality is defined
with respect to interlocking directors. For example, ? show that central firms do better
performing acquisitions. They also find that central firms are more likely to use cash,
to make an acquisition, and to be acquired. Stuart and Yim (2010) document that
firms that have interlocking directors with firms that previously experienced a private
equity deal are more likely to receive private equity offers. Similarly, Bouwman and
Xuan (2010) find that a firm is more likely to engage in M&As, among other financial
activities, if it has interlocking directors with firms that engage in the same activity.
However, these papers focus on the transmission of experience and know-how through
interlocking directors; they do not consider target or acquirer-specific information as
they do not look at the direct connection between the actual target and acquirer. This
paper, on the contrary, considers the transmission of firm-specific information that is
critical to target choice.
This paper further contributes to the M&A literature by introducing a model of
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target selection in a private information context. The theoretical literature on merger
decisions is ample; numerous studies extend the traditional theories of mergers based on
transaction costs (Coase 1937), hubris (Roll 1986), agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen
1986), and managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Recent studies develop
models that combine different theories. For instance, Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2007)
combine elements from agency theory and q theory (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002) to
argue that mergers can be used as defensive mechanisms to avoid being acquired or
as positioning mechanisms to become attractive takeover targets. Rhodes-Kropf and
Robinson (2008) revisit property rights theory (Hart and Moore 1990) and use search,
scarcity, and asset complementarity to explain merger decisions. Nevertheless, the sig-
nificance of private information in merger decisions has been overlooked.3 In my model,
one party (the acquirer) has private information on the valuation of the other party (one
of the targets). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that models target
selection in such private information context, and provides empirical evidence on it.
Finally, this paper contributes to the growing literature on takeover premiums. Song
and Walkling (2000) demonstrate the increase in firms’ stock prices following the acquisi-
tion of their rivals and attribute this to the increased expectation that they will be taken
over themselves. Consistent with this, I find that the portfolios of potential target firms
experience price increases and obtain economically and statistically significant alphas.
In that, my paper is related to Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) who show that antici-
pated takeovers affect the correlation of a stock’s return with the market return. They
construct a quintile-spread portfolio that buys firms with a high takeover vulnerability
and sells firms with a low takeover vulnerability and demonstrate the abnormal returns
associated with it. The alphas reported in this paper are consistent with what they
obtain from the quintile-spread portfolio (an annualized 14-19% vs. 12%). However,
whereas Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) determine firms from probit regressions run
each year using all available firms, I focus on the firms that are similar to the actual
targets during portfolio formation.
3I refer to private information on the counterparty. The literature mostly attributes private informa-
tion to the party itself, i.e., firms have private information on their own stand-alone values or synergy
contributions; agents have private information on their own abilities, projects or firms.
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The most relevant study to this paper is that of Cai and Sevilir (2012) who exam-
ine the performance of completed M&A transactions between firms with interlocking
directors. Unlike the previously mentioned studies, they analyze the transactions where
there is a direct board connection between the parties involved in M&A. They find that
acquirers significantly obtain higher announcement returns in interlocking deals; and re-
late this to the acquirer’s ability to pay lower takeover premiums and lower advisory fees
in such transactions. Although Cai and Sevilir (2012) suggest that acquirer’s informa-
tion advantage can explain the empirical facts, they do not have information asymmetry
variables in their study. My finding that higher information asymmetry regarding the
target value significantly increases the effect of the interlocking directors complements
their study.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I build a model of target selection and
derive its empirical implementation. This is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 de-
scribes the data and offers some descriptive evidence. Section 2.4 analyzes the impact
of interlocking directors on the probability of becoming a target, with an emphasis on
information asymmetry. Section 2.5 discusses the effect of interlocking directors on deal
structure. The performance of non-selected interlocking firms are analyzed in Section
2.6. Robustness checks are provided in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Research Design
2.2.1 The Model
In this section, I present a simple model that motivates my empirical tests. The
model is based on the idea that the interlocking directors provide an important channel
for information transmission between the parties involved in M&As.
The model has three strategic players: One bidder and two potential targets. Targets
can be of two possible types. One type, which I refer to as high-value target, has a stand-
alone value of vH , while the other type, referred to as low-value target, has a stand-alone
value of vL, where vL < vH . The likelihood that the target is of high-value type is q. I
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assume that the merger creates a synergy value of w > 0, which does not depend on the
type of the target.
The sequence of events is as follows. At t = 0, targets’ types are determined inde-
pendently from each other and targets learn their own types. At t = 1, bidder receives a
private signal on the type of one of the targets, which I refer to as the acquainted target.
Similarly, since the bidder does not have private information on the other target, I will
label it as the unacquainted target. The signal, η ∈ h, l has quality 1/2 < φ < 1, defined
as φ = Pr(η = h|vH) = Pr(η = l|vL).4 I assume that making an offer is costless; but
the bidder can make at most one acquisition offer. At t = 2, bidder submits a take it or
leave it offer with price p to one of the targets; or does not make an offer. If the bidder
does not submit an offer, the game ends. If the bidder submits an offer, at t = 3, the
selected target’s board accepts or rejects the offer, and the game ends.
First, note that bidder’s ex-ante valuations of both targets is the same: E[v1] =
E[v2] = v = qvH +(1−q)vL. Upon observing the private signal, bidder forms a posterior
on the type of the acquainted target by Bayesian updating. Specifically:
Prob(v1 = vH |η = h) = qφqφ+(1−q)(1−φ) = ΦH
Prob(v1 = vL|η = h) = 1− ΦH
Prob(v1 = vL|η = l) = (1−q)φ(1−q)φ+(q)(1−φ) = ΦL.
Prob(v1 = vH |η = l) = 1− ΦL
If the bidder offers p < vL, no potential target will accept the offer. So, we can
restrict our attention to offer prices where p ≥ vL without loss of generality. Note also
that the synergy value is positive, so the bidder will always submit an offer, even though
the offer price may be low.
To solve the model, I proceed by backward induction and obtain the expected profits
from optimum offers to each potential target. It is straightforward to start with the un-
4The signal is imperfect, i.e. φ < 1. In the case of perfect signal, the acquirer always selects the
acquainted target, makes an offer equivalent to the stand-alone value of the target and obtains profits
equal to the synergy value.
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acquainted target as the bidder does not receive any private signal regarding this target,
hence there is no Bayesian updating. The profit maximizing bid for the unacquainted
target and expected profits are summarized in the below lemma.
Lemma 1. If the bidder selects the unacquainted target:
(i) If wvH−vL ≥
(1−q)
q , the bidder will offer p = vH and obtain expected profits of
w − [(1− q)(vH − vL)].
(ii) Otherwise the bidder will offer p = vL and obtain expected profits of (1− q)w.
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Intuitively, the bidder has to compare the benefits and the costs of bidding. A
high bid induces high probability of success, hence higher expected synergy gains (w).
However, it also implies high expected overpayment cost (vH − vL) since bids are only
accepted by targets with values less than or equal to the bid. When the synergy value is
high relative to the cost of overbidding, the acquisition is attractive for the bidder. The
bidder is less cautious about overbidding, and submits a high value offer to realize the
synergy gains. When the synergy value is relatively low, overbidding is too costly; and
the bidder submits a low value offer.
Note that I characterize the optimum offer with respect to the ratio of the synergy
value to the difference between high and low valuations, i.e. wvH−vL . This variable
captures the attractiveness of the acquisition from the bidder’s point of view. A bidder
will bid more aggressively as the synergy value increases; or as the cost of overbidding
decreases.
The analysis is more complicated for the acquainted target since the bidder receives a
private signal regarding this target. After the Bayesian updating, the bidder will submit
an offer depending on the signal. The profit maximizing bid for the acquainted target
and expected profits are summarized in the below lemma.
Lemma 2. If the bidder selects the acquainted target and the signal is high (η = h):
(i) If wvH−vL ≥
(1−ΦH)
ΦH
, the bidder will offer p = vH and obtain expected profits of
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w − [(1− ΦH)(vH − vL)], where ΦH = qφqφ+(1−q)(1−φ) .
(ii) Otherwise the bidder will offer p = vL and obtain expected profits of (1− ΦH)w.
If the bidder selects the acquainted target and the signal is low (η = l):
(i) If wvH−vL ≥
ΦL
(1−ΦL) , the bidder will offer p = vH and obtain expected profits of
w − [ΦL(vH − vL)], where ΦL = (1−q)φ(1−q)φ+(q)(1−φ) .
(ii) Otherwise the bidder will offer p = vL and obtain expected profits of ΦLw.
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
The intuition is identical to the previous case, except that the private signal changes
the levels of thresholds. The solution, i.e. target selection and the offer value, will be
determined by a comparison of the expected profits of the bidder established in the above
lemmas. I present the summary of results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the bidder receives a high signal (η = h):
(i) If wvH−vL ≥
1−ΦH
q , the bidder will offer p = vH to the acquainted target and obtain
expected profits of w − [(1− ΦH)(vH − vL)], where 1−ΦHq = (1−q)(1−φ)q[qφ+(1−q)(1−φ)] .
(ii) Otherwise the bidder will offer p = vL to the unacquainted target and obtain expected
profits of (1− q)w.
If the bidder receives a low signal (η = l):
(i) If wvH−vL ≥
1−q
1−ΦL , the bidder will offer p = vH to the unacquainted target and obtain
expected profits of w − [(1− q)(vH − vL)], where 1−q1−ΦL =
(1−q)[(1−q)φ+q(1−φ)]
q(1−φ) .
(ii) Otherwise the bidder will offer p = vL to the acquainted target and obtain expected
profits of ΦLw.
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
The following table illustrates the model’s predictions on target selection.
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Level of attractiveness of the acquisition for the bidder ( wvH−vL )
Low Medium High
(0→ 1−ΦHq ) (1−ΦHq → 1−q1−ΦL ) (
1−q
1−ΦL →∞)
Low signal Acquainted target Acquainted target Unacquainted target
(η = l)
High signal Unacquainted target Acquainted target Acquainted target
(η = h)
In most of the cases, the bidder will find it more profitable to submit a bid for the
acquainted target. The reason is that the bidder has valuable private information on
the value of the acquainted target. The bidder will exploit this information in a way to
maximize the expected value of the profits, which depends on the probability that the
target accepts the offer. If the signal is high, the bidder will submit a high value offer;
and if the signal is low, the bidder will submit a low value offer.
Only when there is a strong contradiction between the level of attractiveness of the
acquisition and that of the signal, will the bidder make an offer to the unacquainted
target. One case is when the acquisition is highly attractive, but the bidder receives a
low signal on the valuation of the acquainted target. In this case, the synergy value is
high enough to compensate for the possibility of overbidding so that the bidder wants
to make a high value offer. However, as signal reveals that the acquainted target has a
lower probability of being a high-value target, the bidder will find it more profitable to
make an offer to the unacquainted target. Alternatively, upon receiving a high signal
when the acquisition attractiveness is very low, the bidder will select the unacquainted
target. In this case, the bidder will tend to make a low value offer so as to avoid relatively
very high overbidding costs, and the probability of offer acceptance is higher for an offer
to the unacquainted target.
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2.2.2 Empirical Implementation
In this section, I describe the empirical research motivated by the model. As noted
in the previous section, the model predicts that in most cases, the bidder selects the
acquainted target to make an offer. Empirically, this corresponds to bidders selecting
interlocking firms, as in such cases bidders are privy to important information on targets
through interlocking directors. The only cases where the bidder selects the unacquainted
target correspond to strong contradictions in the attractiveness of the acquisition and
bidder’s private information. Given this, I put forward the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. A bidder is more likely to select an interlocking firm among potential
target firms.
Next, I examine whether interlocking director effect is particularly strong for target
firms with higher information asymmetries. Note that the noisy signal received by the
acquirer reduces the information asymmetry between the target and the acquirer. When
the impact of information asymmetry in target environment is more relevant, i.e. for
example when vH−vL is larger, the value of this private information will be higher. Given
that interlocking directors can serve as transmitters of private information, hypothesis
2 follows.
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of interlocking directors on target selection will be
stronger when the information asymmetry regarding the target firm is high.
Even though the model refers to information asymmetry regarding target value, the
M&A literature is also concerned with information asymmetry regarding acquirer value.
My third hypothesis considers this line of research. Following insights from the literature,
I conjecture that financially constrained firms are likely to be obliged to use their stock
for acquisitions. In these situations, as bidder undervaluation costs will arise, being able
to transmit private information on her own value to the target will benefit the bidder.
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Considering interlocking directors as transmitters of such information offers the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of interlocking directors on target selection will be
stronger when the bidder is financially constrained.
My final hypothesis relates directly to the predictions of the model regarding the non-
selected targets. Note that the model provides two cases where the bidder selects the
unacquainted target. One of these cases is where the attractiveness of the acquisition
is very high, however, the signal is low. The second case is where the signal is high
but attractiveness of the acquisition is so low that the bidder avoids submitting a high
value bid. Empirically, we observe situations where an interlocking firm looses against
a non-interlocking firm in target selection. In terms of the model, either one of the two
cases must hold for these situations. Given that making a bid requires the bidder to
incur further costs due to advisory, reputational or other related issues; empirically, it is
unlikely that the bidder submits a bid when the attractiveness of the acquisition is very
low. Therefore, I conjecture that the selection of the non-interlocking firm is most likely
to correspond to the case where the bidder receives a signal pointing to a low valuation
of the acquainted target firm. As one would expect the negative news on the acquainted
firm to come out by time, the last hypothesis follows.
Hypothesis 4. Among the potential target firms, if the bidder selects a non-interlocking
firm, the non-selected interlocking firm will under-perform its peers throughout time.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 M&A and Directors Data
I obtain the initial M&A sample from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Mergers
and Acquisitions Database. Data regarding board of directors come from the Compact
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Table 2.1: Sample Selection
This table records the detailed sample selection process. I obtain the initial M&A sample from
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database; data regarding directors from
the Compact Disclosure CD-ROMs and Riskmetrics Directors database; the stock price data from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily files and company financial data from Compustat
annual files.
No. of Obs. Query Description
After Query
Machine search in SDC
SDC Domestic M&As announced between 1/1/1996 and 12/31/2005
41,100 Deal type included: disclosed value M&As, leveraged buyouts and tender offers
40,050 Percent of shares acquirer is seeking to own after transaction: 50% or higher
40,050 Target Nation: United States
6,531 Target Public Status: Public
5,817 Acquirer Nation: United States
3,906 Acquirer Public Status: Public
3,734 Deal value is $ 5 million or higher
Manual filtering of data
Exclude:
3,681 Deal is intended or still pending
3,632 Self tender, division sale, bankruptcy process deals
3,505 Bidder is already a majority owner
3,412 Bidder and target have common parent company
3,408 Duplicate entries
Merging with other databases
2,752 Both bidder and target are identified in CRSP database, matched by CUSIP or
ticker and company name
2,349 Both bidder and target are identified in directors data set, matched by CUSIP or
ticker and company name
2,096 Target has control variables available in the prior fiscal year end, obtained by
using Compustat annual files
2,088 Target has lag return and volatility data available in prior six months, obtained by
using CRSP daily files; final sample
Disclosure CD-ROMs and Riskmetrics Directors database. I obtain the stock price data
from University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily files;
and company financial data from Compustat annual files. Table 2.1 records the detailed
sample selection process.
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Due to data limitation with respect to company directors, I set the sample period
from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2005 by the announcement date.5 I require that
all M&As are between U.S. public companies and that the acquirer is seeking to own
at least 50% of the shares of the target company after the transaction. I only consider
deals with a minimum of $ 5 million transaction value. I exclude the deals that are
intended (where there is no actual bid) or deals that are still pending. I further exclude
self tenders, division sales and bankruptcy process deals because these are not M&As in
the traditional sense. I do not consider deals where the acquirer is already a majority
owner as in these deals, target is already under the control of the acquirer. Similarly, I
exclude the deals where the target and the acquirer belong to the same parent company.
Finally, I delete the duplicate entries.6 This process results in a sample of 3,408 M&As.7
Even though both the target and the acquirer are identified as public by SDC
database, many companies in this M&A sample do not have data available at CRSP
on the deal announcement date.8 This is mainly due to the stock of the company being
delisted from the stock exchange before the announcement date. To eliminate companies
that do not have available stock market data, I merge my M&A sample with CRSP daily
files. I end up with a sample of 2,752 M&As. Note that this is also a required step to
later identify the U.S. public companies that are potential targets.
At this stage, I would like to identify interlocking directors between any two com-
panies, not only for the companies in the M&A sample, but also for other similar U.S.
public companies. This would enable me to match each actual bidder from the M&A
sample with potential targets and assess board connections. For this purpose, I create
a comprehensive data set of directors using two different sources.
My basic source of directors data is Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Compact D/SEC
(popularly known as Compact Disclosure) CD-ROMs. These CD-ROMS are updated
5I obtain data on directors from Compact Disclosure and Riskmetrics Directors databases. The
intersection of these databases covers the period 1996-2005.
6There are four duplicate entries (SDC deal numbers: 555019020, 575222020, 656812020 and
1433365020) which are previous versions of correctly updated entries.
7My sample selection closely follows Luo (2005).
8If the deal announcement takes place on a public holiday, I replace the announcement date with the
subsequent day when the markets are open.
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each month, and include financials and text information extracted from 10-K reports,
proxy statements and other company filings. This database covers all companies that
file with the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and that have assets in
excess of $5 million. The relevant variables for my analysis are the name, age and title
of company directors. Additionally, this database provides the same type of data on
company officers, and for the reasons that will become clear in the following paragraphs,
I include also officers data in my study. Compact Disclosure extracts information on
directors mainly from proxy statements whereas information on officers come from 10-
Ks. Since 10-K and proxies are required to be filed annually by companies, I use the
June CD-ROMs to produce my data set.9 Unfortunately the publication of Compact
Disclosure CD-ROMs has been ceased in 2006, hence I set my sample period end as
December 31, 2005.
My second source of directors data is Riskmetrics Directors database. This database
covers mainly S&P 1500 companies from the year 1996 onwards and provides data on
the identity and characteristics of board directors. Riskmetrics obtains information from
annual board meetings of companies. Because they are large public companies that file
with the SEC, the companies in Riskmetrics Directors database are covered by Compact
Disclosure CD-ROMs. However, not all directors of Riskmetrics database are included
in Compact Disclosure database as the latter database do not list all directors after
some threshold number. Supplementing Compact Disclosure data with Riskmetrics data
enables me to correctly classify many companies as interlocking whereas otherwise would
have been classified as non-interlocking.10 However, due to the fact that Riskmetrics
provides data starting from 1996, I set my M&A sample period beginning as January
9This is the commonly used approach in the literature for producing data sets using Compact Dis-
closure CD-ROMs. For instance, Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) use October CD-ROMs, although
they do not provide a specific reason for the choice of October. My choice of June comes from the fact
that the latest available CD-ROM is of July 2006; however some July CD-ROMS are missing. For consis-
tency, I use June CD-ROMS of each year. This also enables me to extract all available information that
belongs to the calendar year 2005. I performed a manual check to see whether supplementing the data
set with information from December CD-ROMs would improve the analysis, however it has appeared to
have almost zero value added.
10Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find that the boards with directors serving on three or
more boards are heavily skewed toward the largest companies in their sample, and that such directors hold
approximately half of their directorships in Forbes 500 companies. Given this, it is especially important to
supplement Compact Disclosure data with Riskmetrics data as directors missing in Compact Disclosure
database are more likely to belong to S&P 1500 companies.
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1, 1996.11 This results in a sample period of ten years (1996-2005) that includes booms
and bottoms in merger activity.
Creating a data set of directors out of these two different sources is not trivial.
Compact Disclosure is not a directors database in its nature, the information provided
on directors is text information, which implies that the directors do not have IDs. Hence,
I perform first an automated correction and later a manual check for assignment of
a unique ID to each director. Riskmetrics database, on the other hand, is directors
database, hence includes a unique ID for each director. However, to be able to merge
its directors data with Compact Disclosure data, I repeat the ID assignment process for
the combined data set. The basic identifiers in my analysis are name, age and title for
the directors; and CUSIP and ticker for the companies.
The directors data set I create covers 23,010 distinct firms, 302,808 distinct individ-
uals, and spans the period from 1994 to 2005. I merge the M&A sample with this data
set. A total of 2,349 deals, which is 85.3% of the whole sample, have information on
both the target and the acquirer directors in the year prior to the deal announcement.
To be more precise, I use a 450 days window prior to the announcement date to identify
the directors from the company filing information provided by Compact Disclosure.12
The choice of the window comes from Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) who define
adjacent proxies as to have a maximum of 450 days in between. This choice is also
appropriate for Riskmetrics data set as annual meetings almost always take place in the
same month of each year.
I control for several target characteristics that may affect target selection. For this
reason, I exclude the deals where one or more of the target financial controls in the
fiscal year prior to the announcement date are not available from Compustat annual
files. Finally, I consider only the deals where the target lagged six months return and
volatility data prior to the announcement date is available from CRSP daily files as these
11Actually, I need one year of prior data to determine the interlocking directors. However, given that
Riskmetrics database provides 84% of 1996 directors data during the first half of the year, I opt to
include 1996 M&A data in my study. I supplement the directors data set with Compact Disclosure’s
1994-1995 data.
12This is the precise reason for the inclusion of director data that pertains to year 1994. However,
note that only last three months of 1994 data will be relevant.
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are included in my control variables.
Table 2.2: M&A Sample by Announcement Year and Deal Type
This table presents the distribution of the M&A sample by announcement year and presence of an
interlocking director. Interlocking deal is a deal in which there exists at least one director that is
common to both the target and the acquirer. Non-interlocking deal is a deal in which there exists no
such common director.
Number of Number of Number of All Deals
All M&A Deals Interlocking Deals Non-Interlocking Deals % Over Years
1996 223 9 214 10.68
1997 289 11 278 24.52
1998 297 9 288 14.22
1999 299 10 289 14.32
2000 259 13 246 12.40
2001 206 13 193 9.87
2002 109 3 106 5.22
2003 135 3 132 6.47
2004 144 2 142 6.90
2005 127 3 124 6.08
Total 2,088 76 2,012 100.00 %
My final M&A sample consists of 2,088 deals, with an average value per transaction at
$1,911 million. Table 4.2 presents the distribution of my M&A sample by the announce-
ment year, and with respect to the presence of interlocking directors. Consistent with
the literature, the merger activity in my sample drops from its peak in 1999 until 2003,
where it bounds back and then decreases again gradually in 2005. I label a deal as inter-
locking if there exists at least one director common to both the target and the acquirer
firm at the time of the deal announcement, and I label such directors as interlocking
directors. A deal where there is no interlocking director is labeled as non-interlocking.
Out of 2,088 deals, 76 (3.6%) are interlocking and 2,012 are non-interlocking. In terms
of transaction values, interlocking deals represent $184,050 million (4.6%) of the overall
transaction volume from 1996 to 2005.
Table 2.3 presents the industry distribution of the target and the acquirer based on
the United States Department of Labor’s Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code
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divisions.13 Manufacturing (30.5% of targets and 32.3% of acquirers), Services (23.1% of
targets and 28.5% of acquirers) and Finance (27.1% of targets and 19.7% of acquirers)
are the most active industries in the M&A sample in terms of the number of acquisitions.
These are followed by Transportation & Public Utilities, Wholesale & Retail Trade, and
Mining industries.14 As can be seen in the final column and row of the table, interlocking
deals do not concentrate strongly by industry and their industry distribution exhibits a
pattern similar to the M&A sample.
Before moving to the next section to analyze the deal characteristics, I should clarify
the specification of “interlocking deals”. My aim is to identify the deals where there is a
strong channel of information transmission between the parties involved in M&A. As a
result, I focus on the directors who are contemporaneously sitting at the boards of the
target and the acquirer. However, there are few cases where the unique interlock is not
a common board director; but a director at the target firm, and a top-level executive
at the acquirer firm. Although these cases are not identical to board interlocks, they
neither are clearly distinguishable on informational grounds. The reason is that top-
level executives have superior knowledge on the firm and, most likely, influence board
decisions to a great extent. Consequently, I decide to specify such deals as “interlocking
deals”. Nevertheless, out of 76 deals, only 6 are as such; specifying these deals as “non-
interlocking” does not alter the results.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, I analyze the deal, target and bidder characteristics in the whole
sample, and separately in interlocking and non-interlocking sub-samples. I start by
reporting the descriptive statistics for the whole M&A sample in Table 2.4. Even though
my sample is slightly different, the main variables are in line with those reported in the
literature (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov 2009;
Cai and Sevilir 2012). The percentage of interlocking deals in my sample is 3.6%, as
13The SIC code division structure is available at the United States Department of Labor’s website:
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic manual.html.
14The industry distribution of the targets in my sample is in line with those reported in the literature
(Cai and Sevilir 2012; Kang and Kim 2008).
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for the M&A Sample
This table presents the deal, target and acquirer characteristics for the M&A sample. Variables are
defined in Appendix 2. I report the mean, median, standard deviation and interquartile range. Unless
stated differently, the number of observations (N) is 2,088.
Interquartile
Mean Median Std. Dev. Range
Deal
Interlocking Dummy 0.04
Success Dummy 0.88
All Cash Dummy, N=1974 0.29
All Stock Dummy, N=1974 0.47
Hostile Dummy 0.07
Same Industry Dummy 0.57
Same State Dummy 0.29
Tech Deal Dummy 0.04
Toehold Dummy 0.03
Tender Offer Dummy 0.16
Poison Pill Dummy 0.01
Proxy Fight Dummy 0.00
Merger Of Equals Dummy 0.03
Target Termination Fee Dummy 0.67
Pre-Bid Competition Dummy 0.04
Post-Bid Competition Dummy 0.04
Target
Return on Equity -0.13 0.09 2.83 0.19
Book to Market 0.67 0.55 0.71 0.49
Market Capitalization 1268.78 170.77 5099.24 575.45
Growth of Sales 0.17 0.11 0.42 0.26
Price to Earnings 12.11 13.22 94.42 22.63
Debt to Equity 1.17 0.25 18.60 0.86
Institutional Ownership 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.43
Bidder
Return on Equity, N=1966 -0.37 0.14 18.79 0.13
Book to Market, N=1950 0.47 0.39 0.42 0.37
Market Capitalization, N=1950 13355.75 1785.01 38463.66 7820.82
Growth of Sales, N=1949 0.22 0.14 0.44 0.29
Price to Earnings, N=1949 20.72 17.15 243.44 18.25
Debt to Equity, N=1968 0.51 0.37 4.16 0.78
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opposed to 3.9% in Cai and Sevilir (2012) sample.15 The rate of deal success is 88% in
my sample whereas it is 76% for Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009). 16% of bids in
my sample are tender offers compared with 14% in Cai and Sevilir (2012). The fraction
of all cash deals and deals in the same industry are 29.0% and 57.3% in my sample, while
they are 33.2% and 60.8% for Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009), and 35.4% and
42.1% for Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). 7% of deals in my sample are hostile,
compared with 8% in Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) and Andrade, Mitchell,
and Stafford (2001), and 1% in Cai and Sevilir (2012). Toeholds are present in 3% of
the deals in my sample, while being present in 10% of the deals in Bodnaruk, Massa,
and Simonov (2009).16 The average target (bidder) has a market capitalization of $1,269
million ($13,356 million), as opposed to $1,013 million ($10,433 million) in Bodnaruk,
Massa, and Simonov (2009).
Next, I compare the deal characteristics in interlocking and non-interlocking deals.
As can be seen in Table 2.5, the deal characteristics are not substantially different among
the sub-samples. Interlocking deals are slightly larger deals, while being more friendly:
hostile deals, poison pills and proxy fights are not common among interlocking deals.
Total fees and fees paid by the acquirer and target are larger in monetary terms, perhaps
due to larger transaction values; but smaller in percentage terms. Also, interlocking
deals are more likely to lead to post-bid competition. However, these differences are
not statistically significant. The only significant difference among interlocking and non-
interlocking deals is that toeholds mostly pertain to interlocking deals. This issue will
be analyzed in detail in Section 2.7.2, where I show that results are robust to excluding
the deals with toeholds from the sample.
At this point, an analysis of the firm characteristics in interlocking versus non-
interlocking deals is in order. Basically, we would like to see if the targets significantly
differ in some characteristics other than the interlocking relationship. If there are sig-
15Cai and Sevilir (2012) use a sample of completed M&As among public firms with the announcement
date and effective date between 1996 and 2008. In their sample, the acquirer controls less than 50%
of the target before the acquisition announcement and owns 100% of the target after the transaction
whereas in my sample both of these threshold percentages are 50%. Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that
among 1,664 deals, 65 have an “interlocking director” (a “first-degree connection”, as they name it).
16Consistent with Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009), I define toehold as a minimum of 5%
ownership of the bidder in target’s common stock as of the deal announcement.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Interlocking and Non-Interlocking Deals
This table presents the deal characteristics for the subsamples of interlocking and non-interlocking
deals. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. I report the mean and standard deviation. Unless stated
differently, the number of observations (N) is 2,088.
Interlocking Deals Non-Interlocking Deals
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Success Dummy 0.83 0.88
All Cash Dummy, N=1974 0.32 0.29
All Stock Dummy, N=1974 0.47 0.47
Hostile Dummy 0.04 0.07
Same Industry Dummy 0.46 0.58
Same State Dummy 0.50 0.28
Tech Deal Dummy 0.01 0.04
Toehold Dummy 0.30 0.02
Tender Offer Dummy 0.20 0.15
Poison Pill Dummy 0.00 0.01
Proxy Fight Dummy 0.00 0.00
Merger Of Equals Dummy 0.04 0.02
Pre-Bid Competition Dummy 0.03 0.04
Post-Bid Competition Dummy 0.07 0.03
Deal Value (M$) 2421.72 8933.33 1891.70 7386.03
Target Fees (M$), N=1329 5.95 9.46 5.60 8.21
Acquirer Fees (M$), N=719 5.74 9.24 4.36 7.12
Total Fees (M$), N=658 11.48 20.10 10.81 15.92
Target Fees (%), N=1329 0.76 0.68 0.88 0.95
Acquirer Fees (%), N=719 0.44 0.55 0.50 0.71
Total Fees (%), N=658 1.15 1.15 1.29 1.46
nificant differences among these groups, then we would suspect that some aspects other
than the information transmission through the interlocking directors are behind the
results of this paper. Table 2.6 reports the characteristics of interlocking targets and
non-interlocking targets. The tests of differences reveal that these targets are not sig-
nificantly different from each other in terms of financials, except that the interlocking
targets are slightly larger in size and have smaller six months lagged returns.
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In addition to target financials, Table 2.6 demonstrates board and corporate gov-
ernance characteristics for interlocking and non-interlocking targets. Despite having
similar board size, interlocking targets are more central in board networks than non-
interlocking targets; with board centrality being proxied by variables commonly used in
the literature: degree centrality, average directorship count and interlock count. This
leads to a classification of 21% of the interlocking target boards as “busy boards”, as
opposed to 13% of the non-interlocking target boards. Interlocking targets also have
lower governance and entrenchment indices; only 26% of the interlocking targets are
“highly-entrenched”, compared with 46% of the non-interlocking targets. Even though
these differences are significant, in Section 2.7, I will demonstrate that the data does
not support alternative explanations arising from network centrality or entrenchment
literature.
Table 2.7 reports the acquirer characteristics for the sub-samples of interlocking and
non-interlocking deals. Acquirers have significantly higher size and price to earnings
ratios in interlocking deals, at the expense of smaller liquidity ratios. The tests of
difference do not reveal any other significant differences.
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2.4 Interlocking Directors and the Probability of Becom-
ing a Target
In this section, I examine whether having an interlocking director with the acquirer
increases the probability of being selected among potential targets. In order to test this,
first, I have to define a set of potential targets for each deal. Following Bodnaruk, Massa,
and Simonov (2009), I start with the set of the firms that belong to the two-digit SIC
code industry of the actual target and have similar size (within 30% band of the market
capitalization of the actual target). I consider this set as my basic sample. I estimate a
probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if there is a
bid for the firm, and 0 otherwise.
Among the control variables are firm’s return on equity; growth of sales; book to
market, price to earnings, and debt to equity ratios; lagged return and volatility; institu-
tional ownership and industry Herfindahl index.17 Following the literature on geographic
proximity, I also include a dummy variable in the regressions which takes value 1 if the
target is in the same state as the acquirer, and 0 otherwise (Kang and Kim 2008).18
I use either year and industry (two-digit SIC code) dummies, or deal dummies in the
regressions. With the exception of dummies and indices, I winsorize all control variables
at the bottom and top 1% to limit the effect of outliers.
The initial two columns of Table 2.8 reports the results of this probit regression.
As can be seen, the interlocking dummy has a positive coefficient that is statistically
significant at 1% level. This indicates that the main prediction of my model is empirically
strongly supported: Interlocking firms are more likely to be selected as acquisition targets
than non-interlocking firms. Moreover, the effect is economically substantial. Having
an interlocking director with the acquirer raises the likelihood of becoming a target by
12.18% when industry and year effects are controlled for.
17Institutional ownership is the fraction of target’s stock owned by institutional investors required to
report 13F filings. The data is obtained from Thomson 13-F master files. The variables are defined in
Appendix 2.
18Using a sample of partial block acquisitions, Kang and Kim (2008) show that acquirers have a
strong preference for geographically proximate targets. Similarly, Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and
Uysal (2010) find that firms located within industry clusters make more acquisitions.
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As potential target is somewhat of a nebulous concept, I test my hypothesis for var-
ious specifications of the set of potential targets. As in Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov
(2009), the first alternative I consider is changing the definition of industry to three-digit
SIC code, while keeping the characteristic constant (30% band of market capitalization).
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.8 reports the probit regression results for this sample. No-
tice that the results are very similar; there is only a small reduction in the coefficient
value of the interlocking dummy. This is, perhaps, mostly due to a significant loss of
observations since for this constrained set of three-digit SIC code industry, there are
no other (nonselected) potential targets for some selected targets; eventually these are
excluded from the regression.19
In the other alternative specifications, I keep the industry definition as two-digit SIC
code, but I change the target financial used to define similarity. Following Bodnaruk,
Massa, and Simonov (2009), I alternatively use a 10% band of book to market ratio
to define similarity.20 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.8 report the regression results for
this sample. As a final alternative, I use a 10% band of debt to equity ratio, and
report the results in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.8. As can be seen in the table, the
effect of interlocking directors is robust across various industry classifications and firm
characteristics that are used to define the set of potential targets.
Throughout the study, I will analyze the results for all four specifications of the set
of potential targets. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the most relevant
specification is two-digit SIC code industry and 30% size band. First, in 14% of the
deals (287 deals from a total of 2,088), the target and the acquirer belong to the same
two-digit SIC code, but not to the same three-digit SIC code industry. This means that
one in every seven deals, two-digit rather than three-digit SIC code industry is decisive.
Second, target size is one of the most decisive characteristics in target choice as it directly
determines the amount of money the acquirer has to pay for target shares to complete the
19Due to the exclusion of the deals with only one potential (and selected) target, in the sample defined
as three-digit SIC code and 30% band of market capitalization, only 59 deals are interlocking out of a
total of 1806 deals.
20Actually, Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) mention a 15% band of book to market ratio as an
alternative. I choose 10% band as this results in a sample that is closer to the basic sample with respect
to the number of potential targets. Results are very similar if I use a band of 15% instead of 10%.
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acquisition.21 Finally, other studies base their results on potential targets defined using
these characteristics (Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov 2009; Bouwman 2011; Hasbrouck
1985; Shivdasani 1993).
The ultimate lesson from the analysis in this section is that interlocking firms have
higher probability of being selected among potential targets, with the effect being sta-
tistically significant at 1% level. This result is robust to various specifications of the
potential set, which indicates that interlocking directors’ effect is very strong. In the
next Section, I relate this phenomenon to the target-side information asymmetry.
2.4.1 Targets with High Information Asymmetry
The idea that interlocking directors help overcome the information asymmetry prob-
lems by facilitating informational flows is a central feature of my model. Therefore, I
expect to see stronger results after interacting the interlocking dummy with firm specific
variables that proxy for the extent of information asymmetry in the target environment.
I rely on the prior literature to construct proxies for the information asymmetry
level for a given firm.22 The first variable I consider is a performance measure of the
target firm, namely return on equity. Literature suggests that firms with good news
are more likely to be publicly forthcoming with the news whereas firms with bad news
are less likely to be so (Miller 2002; Verrechia 1983). Consequently, firms that are
performing poorly would have higher information asymmetries as these firms would not
be willing to reveal information. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) also note that “firm-
specific information, especially negative information, diffuses only gradually across the
investing public”. Hence, we would expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term
between the interlocking dummy and the performance of the target firm. As can be seen
in Panel A of Table 2.9, conditioning on similar size, the interaction term has a negative
coefficient, significant at the 5% (10%) level for the regression with deal (industry and
21Hasbrouck (1985) notes that “with credit rationing, potential bidders may face limitations on the
absolute size of their outlay, and hence limitations on the size of the firm they may reasonably expect
to acquire”.
22My proxy selection closely follows Kang and Kim (2008).
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year) controls. The results for the set of targets similar in debt ratio are even stronger,
with significance at 1% level. In sum, coefficients for all specifications have the negative
sign as expected, and except one (which has a p-value very close to 10%), are statistically
significant. This is consistent with the idea that selection of the interlocking targets is
driven by information asymmetry regarding target value, with asymmetry being proxied
by poor performance. Notice that in order to be consistent with my control variables,
I use return on equity as the performance measure. Results are even stronger if, as in
Kang and Kim (2008), I use return on assets rather than return on equity as my proxy.
The second proxy I consider for the information asymmetry is the target size. Liter-
ature claims that small firms are subject to information asymmetry problems to a bigger
extent than large firms are, due to the fact that information about small firms gets out
more slowly than that about large firms. This is explained by investors’ willingness to
spend more resources on obtaining information regarding firms in which they can take
large positions (Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000). Following Kang and Kim (2008), I include
a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the target size is in the bottom 25% of the sam-
ple, and 0 otherwise; and its interaction with the interlocking dummy in the regressions.
As reported in Panel B of Table 2.9, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive
and significant at the 5% (10%) level when I control for the deal (industry and year)
effects. Hence, in our basic sample, interlocking targets are more likely to be selected
than non-interlocking targets, particularly when they are small. The effect is not clear
for other specifications of the potential target set, as there is too much dispersion in the
size of the potential targets.
Next variable I consider as a proxy for information asymmetry is the standard de-
viation of past stock returns. Kang and Kim (2008) note that the higher the standard
deviation, the greater the uncertainty about the target’s prospects, and this leads to
greater information asymmetry. They use standard deviation of the target monthly re-
turns over the past five years prior to the deal announcement to control for the riskiness
of the target. However, out of 76 selected interlocking targets, 35 are missing standard
deviation for the prior five years. In order to have meaningful regressions, I adjust the
definition of the proxy as the standard deviation of the monthly returns for two years
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prior to the deal announcement. We would expect to find a positive coefficient for the
interaction term between standard deviation and interlocking dummy. Panel C of Ta-
ble 2.9 shows that the interaction term is significantly positive at the 5% (10%) level
when deal effects are controlled for, conditioning on firms with similar size and two-digit
(three-digit) SIC code industry. Similar to the small size proxy, for other specifications,
I cannot find significant coefficients perhaps due to the fact that most of the interlocking
firms have this variable missing.
So far, I have focused on the information asymmetry in the target environment, which
does not depend on the identity of the acquirer firm. However, what I am trying to cap-
ture is the information asymmetry between the target and the acquirer; hence, some
characteristics of the acquirer may be relevant. The industries where the target and the
acquirer operates are of special importance, as knowledge spill-overs are assumed to be
present within industry groups. This argument suggests that the benefits of information
obtained through the interlocking director will be greater when other information en-
hancement mechanisms, such as belonging to the same industry, are not available. I use
the diversifying dummy, which is an indicator for the deals where the target and acquirer
are from different two-digit SIC code industries, as a proxy for information asymmetry.
Panel D of Table 2.9 illustrates that in all specifications, the interaction between di-
versifying dummy and interlocking dummy has a positive coefficient, as expected. The
coefficient is statistically significant for five out of eight specifications, with the remaining
three having p-values close to 10%. This is consistent with the idea that target-specific
information is particularly important for diversifying deals where the acquirers are more
likely to have informational disadvantages.
Overall, the results presented in this section are consistent with the hypothesis that
interlocking directors help overcome the information asymmetry regarding the target
value. The acquirers are more likely to select interlocking firms, particularly when they
experience poor past performance, when they are small, when they are risky, or when
they belong to a different industry. To the extent that these firms are those where
target-specific information is more valuable, results indicate that interlocking directors
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have an important role in target selection.23 In the next section, I relate the target
selection phenomenon to the acquirer-side information asymmetry.
2.4.2 Acquirers with Financial Constraints
In this Section, I analyze whether financially constrained acquirers are more likely
to select interlocking firms. The intuition behind is as follows. Debt reduces the ability
to raise funds for acquisitions (Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and Uysal 2010). Acquirers
with high debt ratios might be obliged to use their stock in transactions. In an effort
to avoid undervaluation costs, these acquirers would be biased towards selecting inter-
locking firms so to be able to exploit their advantage in transmitting information on
their value to the target. Therefore, I expect to see a stronger effect of the interlocking
directors in target selection when the acquirer is financially constrained due to a high
leverage ratio. On the contrary, since the acquirers abundant in cash holdings or liquid
assets are not likely to face problems in fund raising, I expect a weakened effect of the
interlocking directors in these cases.
Following the finance literature, I start by defining financially constrained firms as
firms with high leverage. Specifically, I use the control variable in my study, debt to eq-
uity ratio, to proxy for firm’s financial leverage. I include the interaction of this variable
with the interlocking dummy in the regressions. Panel A of Table 2.10 demonstrates
that the interaction term is positive in all specifications, and significant up to 1% level,
except for the set of potential firms with same three-digit SIC code industry and similar
size. Results indicate that acquirers are more likely to select interlocking firms, espe-
cially when they have high debt ratio. I obtain similar results when I use net market
leverage defined in Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and Uysal (2010) instead of debt to
equity ratio to proxy for financial constraints of the acquiring firm.
23Kang and Kim (2008) also use research and development (R&D) expenses of the target firm as a
proxy. This variable would correspond to higher uncertainty regarding the target, hence higher informa-
tion asymmetry. However, due to the fact that many actual targets are missing this variable, I cannot
find any significant coefficient in its analysis. Out of 76 selected interlocking targets, 32 targets have
missing values of R&D expenses.
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Next, I analyze the effect of interlocking directors when acquirers have higher finan-
cial slack in terms of unused liquidity. Specifically, I interact the interlocking dummy
with cash over net total assets as defined in Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and Uysal
(2010). Panel B in Table 2.10 illustrates that, as expected, the interaction term has a
negative coefficient which is economically and statistically significant at 1% across all
specifications. Using accounting liquidity variable from the study of Bodnaruk, Massa,
and Simonov (2009) rather than cash holdings provides very similar results. These are
reported in Panel C of Table 2.10. The results reveal that acquirers which are constrained
in liquidity display further bias towards selecting the interlocking firms.
Overall, the results presented in this section are consistent with the hypothesis that
interlocking directors help overcome the information asymmetry regarding the acquirer
value. The acquirers, particularly when they have high financial leverage, or when they
are constrained in cash holdings or in liquidity, are more likely to select the interlocking
firms. To the extent that these acquirers are those for whom it is more valuable to
transmit acquirer-specific information to the targets, results indicate that interlocking
directors play a significant role in target selection.
2.5 Interlocking Directors and Deal Structure
In this section, I analyze further the characteristics of interlocking deals. First, I
show that interlocking deals economically benefit the acquirers, in the sense that they
pay lower premiums for the target shares. Table 2.11 demonstrates this fact. Following
the literature, first I define premium as the acquisition price, obtained from SDC, divided
by the target price on 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Panel A of table 2.11
shows that the mean (median) premium in interlocking deals is 37% (36%) as compared
to 45% (57%) in non-interlocking deals. Nevertheless, the difference is not statistically
significant. Next, I perform a regression analysis where, among the regressors, I include
the variables that the literature has classified as the determinants of the premium paid
by the acquirer. Panel B of Table 2.11 reveals that interlocking dummy has a negative
coefficient, however, it is significant only at the 13% level when both year and industry
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dummies are included.
Table 2.11: Interlocking Directors’ Effect on the Premium Paid for Target
Shares
Panel A of this table presents the descriptive statistics for the premium paid by the acquirer for the
target shares in interlocking and non-interlocking deals. I report the mean, median and difference tests.
The numbers in the test of difference columns denote p-values. The number of observations is 1,777.
Panel B of this table presents the coefficient estimates of the OLS and probit regressions where the
dependent variable is one of the premium proxies. The control variables are target and acquirer size
and book to market ratios; relative size; and all cash, hostile, same industry, same state, toehold, poison
pill, tender offer, merger of equals, high tech, target termination fee, pre-bid and post-bid competition
dummies. In each regression, either year or year and industry dummies are included. Variables are
defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics in parentheses are estimated using standard errors adjusted for
the industry clustering, with industry being defined as the two-digit SIC code. The symbols ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate Analysis
Interlocking Non-Interlocking Test of
Deals (A) Deals (B) Difference (A-B)
Wilcoxon
Mean Median Mean Median t-test z-test
Premium 4 Weeks 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.57 0.32 0.10
Premium High Price 0.38 0.48 0.64 0.49 0.00*** 0.00***
Higher Price Dummy 0.26 0.00 0.36 1.00 0.00*** 0.00***
Panel B: Regression Analysis
Premium Premium Higher Price
4 Weeks High Price Dummy
Interlocking Dummy –0.043 –0.092 –0.144*** –0.114** –0.593*** –0.535***
(–0.92) (–1.36) (–2.79) (–2.30) (–3.76) (–3.59)
Target Log Market Cap. –0.031*** –0.017 –0.019* –0.022* 0.026 0.025
(–2.66) (–1.29) (–1.78) (–1.79) (0.70) (0.54)
Acq. Log Market Cap. –0.023* –0.025** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.057* 0.035
(–1.79) (–2.08) (3.97) (2.98) (1.90) (1.03)
Target Log Book to Market 0.038* 0.065*** 0.047*** 0.025 0.208*** 0.161***
(1.75) (3.23) (3.73) (1.40) (3.85) (2.92)
Acq. Log Book to Market –0.073*** –0.056*** 0.041*** –0.005 0.089* –0.018
(–3.13) (–3.07) (3.05) (–0.34) (1.67) (–0.33)
Table continues to next page.
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Premium Premium Higher Price
4 Weeks High Price Dummy
Relative Size –0.226*** –0.253*** –0.006 0.001 –0.202 –0.194
(–3.75) (–4.06) (–0.19) (0.03) (–1.49) (–1.41)
All Cash Dummy 0.042 –0.002 0.026 0.028 –0.028 0.026
(0.84) (–0.03) (1.04) (0.97) (–0.27) (0.27)
Hostile Dummy 0.134** 0.061 0.025 –0.013 0.154 0.118
(2.60) (0.69) (0.52) (–0.23) (0.78) (0.51)
Same Industry Dummy 0.002 0.042 0.012 0.010 0.069 0.038
(0.05) (1.00) (0.46) (0.39) (0.81) (0.55)
Same State Dummy –0.027 0.016 0.039 0.021 0.177* 0.121
(–0.63) (0.47) (1.32) (0.96) (1.71) (1.48)
Toehold Dummy 0.004 0.050 –0.059 –0.028 0.042 0.127
(0.02) (0.22) (–0.85) (–0.40) (0.22) (0.61)
Poison Pill Dummy –0.047 –0.054 –0.133 –0.044 –0.004 0.199
(–0.34) (–0.32) (–1.28) (–0.34) (–0.01) (0.36)
Tender Offer Dummy 0.005 0.021 –0.025 0.015 0.126 0.207**
(0.10) (0.47) (–1.10) (0.68) (1.51) (2.55)
Merger of Equals Dummy –0.179*** –0.168** –0.139** –0.141** –0.905*** –0.931***
(–3.17) (–2.57) (–2.17) (–2.55) (–2.67) (–2.74)
High Tech Dummy 0.041 –0.032 –0.189*** –0.092*** –0.689*** –0.387***
(0.94) (–0.95) (–4.66) (–2.70) (–5.12) (–3.33)
Target Term. Fee Dummy 0.028 –0.023 –0.010 0.041* –0.067 0.107
(0.62) (–0.41) (–0.43) (1.74) (–0.87) (1.13)
Pre-Competition Dummy –0.017 –0.088 0.098 0.111* 0.316 0.442*
(–0.36) (–1.06) (1.59) (1.82) (1.32) (1.96)
Post-Competition Dummy –0.013 0.029 –0.060 –0.042 –0.351 –0.354
(–0.17) (0.32) (–1.11) (–0.73) (–1.21) (–1.15)
Intercept 0.700*** 0.659*** –0.039 0.040 –0.055 0.950***
(7.12) (7.99) (–0.41) (0.49) (–0.19) (3.60)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj./ Pseudo R-sqr. 0.047 0.095 0.066 0.126 0.053 0.114
Num. of obs. 1569 1569 1569 1569 1569 1545
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An alternative measure of premium is proposed in a recent work by Malcolm, Pan,
and Wurgler (2009). This paper argues that the target’s 52-week high price represents a
reference point to investors and managers, and displays a strong effect on the determi-
nation of the acquisition price. The paper finds that acquisition prices are often biased
towards this reference price. Following Malcolm, Pan, and Wurgler (2009), I define “high
price” as the 52-week high stock price of the target firm over 52 weeks ending 4 weeks
prior to the announcement date. As can be seen in Table 2.11, the premium calculated
as the ratio of the acquisition price to “high price” is significantly lower in interlocking
deals than in non-interlocking deals. I obtain similar results when I use a high price
dummy to indicate the deals where acquisition price is higher than “high price”, and use
this as the dependent variable. Overall, the results suggest that interlocking deals are
profitable for acquirers since they pay significantly lower premiums for target shares in
these deals.
The acquirer’s profitability in interlocking deals is also confirmed by Cai and Sevilir
(2012). They demonstrate that acquirer shareholders obtain higher announcement re-
turns in interlocking deals. They relate this to the acquirer’s ability to pay lower takeover
premiums and lower advisory fees in such deals. But what about the target sharehold-
ers? Given the lower level of premium paid for target shares, one would expect the
target shareholders to be worse off in interlocking deals. Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that
target shareholders obtain a mean five-day announcement return of 18.72% in interlock-
ing deals as compared to 21.24% in non-interlocking deals, however, the difference is not
significant. They state that “although target cumulative abnormal returns are lower in
the presence of a first-degree connection [an interlocking director], target shareholders in
such transactions still obtain sizeable returns at the acquisition announcement”. Perhaps
a more complete argument on this regard would be possible by analyzing also the target
selection stage. Note that having an interlocking director with the acquirer significantly
increases the likelihood of being selected by around 12%. This means that the insignif-
icant reduction in the target abnormal returns might have been compensated with a
significant increase in the probability of being selected, hence, obtaining the abnormal
returns in the first place. Given this, one might argue that the presence of an interlocking
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director benefits the target shareholders, as well as the acquirer shareholders.24
Next, I analyze interlocking directors’ effect on other relevant deal characteristics.
Table 2.12 demonstrates that all stock payment is more likely in interlocking deals,
with the effect being statistically significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that interlocking directors help resolve information asymmetry problem regarding the
acquirer value. Interlocking deals are also more likely to provoke competition, even
though the effect is not significant. Finally, I find that the deal is less likely to be
completed if there is an interlocking director, with the effect being insignificant.
Note that as interlocking deals are profitable deals for the acquirers, when an inter-
locking target is available, the choice of a non-interlocking target is highly suspicious. I
analyze this issue in the next section.
2.6 Performance of Non-Selected Interlocking Firms
My model states that if the bidder privately receives a low signal on the valuation
of the target, she will find it more profitable to make an offer to the unacquainted firm,
as long as the synergy value is above some threshold level. This would correspond to
a case where the actual target is a non-interlocking target, and is selected despite the
fact that there is a very similar target interlocking with the acquirer. Hence, the model
suggests that such non-selected interlocking targets are prone to bad performance. In
this section, I test this hypothesis. Specifically, I analyze the accounting and stock
market performance of the non-selected interlocking firms and provide evidence on their
under-performance.
24Note that the M&A sample in Cai and Sevilir (2012) is slightly different to my sample regarding
the time period, deal success and acquirer’s ownership ratio in the target firm after the transaction. For
this reason, the argument in this paragraph must be taken with precaution.
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Table 2.12: Interlocking Directors’ Effect on All Stock Payment, Post-Bid
Competition, and Deal Success
This table presents the coefficient estimates of the probit regressions where the dependent variables are
all stock payment, post-bid competition, and deal success, respectively for each set of columns. The
control variables are target and acquirer size and book to market ratios; relative size; and all cash,
hostile, same industry, same state, toehold, poison pill, tender offer, merger of equals, high tech, target
termination fee, pre-bid and post-bid competition dummies. In each regression, either year or year and
industry dummies are included. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The t-statistics in parentheses
are estimated using standard errors adjusted for the industry clustering, with industry being defined as
the two-digit SIC code. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All Stock Post-Bid Deal
Payment Competition Success
Interlocking Dummy 0.220 0.389** 0.243 0.268 –0.061 –0.006
(1.21) (2.14) (1.18) (1.16) (–0.24) (–0.02)
Target Log Market Cap. 0.031 0.079 0.167*** 0.181*** –0.256*** –0.257***
(0.70) (1.60) (3.05) (3.01) (–4.28) (–4.10)
Acq. Log Market Cap. –0.104* –0.121** –0.096* –0.097* 0.284*** 0.278***
(–1.93) (–2.28) (–1.87) (–1.69) (5.29) (5.06)
Target Log Book to Market –0.166*** –0.153** 0.157 0.265* 0.042 0.015
(–2.58) (–2.33) (1.25) (1.86) (0.44) (0.17)
Acq. Log Book to Market –0.344*** –0.329*** 0.025 0.004 0.133* 0.070
(–6.43) (–5.89) (0.23) (0.04) (1.68) (1.00)
Relative Size 0.048 0.132* 0.069 0.164 –0.113 –0.088
(0.70) (1.88) (0.81) (1.41) (–1.25) (–0.91)
All Cash Dummy 0.410*** 0.433*** –0.119 –0.060
(3.12) (2.66) (–0.73) (–0.33)
Hostile Dummy –0.579*** –0.530*** 0.903*** 0.935*** –1.172*** –1.176***
(–3.38) (–2.86) (5.18) (5.02) (–6.12) (–6.07)
Same Industry Dummy –0.032 –0.005 0.104 0.178 0.189* 0.279***
(–0.39) (–0.05) (0.61) (0.81) (1.93) (2.78)
Same State Dummy 0.108 0.005 0.025 0.181 0.127 0.035
(1.16) (0.04) (0.17) (1.10) (1.52) (0.37)
Toehold Dummy –0.799*** –0.751*** –0.032 0.014 –0.274 –0.140
(–3.83) (–3.02) (–0.14) (0.05) (–0.98) (–0.46)
Poison Pill Dummy –0.603* –0.791*** –0.611 –0.820* –0.019 –0.099
(–1.95) (–2.63) (–1.53) (–1.87) (–0.06) (–0.28)
Table continues to next page.
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All Stock Post-Bid Deal
Payment Competition Success
Tender Offer Dummy –1.724*** –1.675*** –0.076 –0.069 0.260* 0.240
(–12.42) (–10.98) (–0.46) (–0.38) (1.84) (1.53)
Merger of Equals Dummy 0.757** 0.891** 0.487** 0.260 –0.125 –0.104
(2.39) (2.55) (2.08) (1.14) (–0.66) (–0.52)
High Tech Dummy 0.089 0.059 –0.287 –0.347 0.422*** 0.539***
(0.39) (0.23) (–0.83) (–0.88) (2.61) (3.53)
Target Term. Fee Dummy –0.240 –0.043 0.067 0.059 0.744*** 0.971***
(–1.63) (–0.39) (0.48) (0.37) (5.11) (7.68)
Pre-Bid Competition Dummy –0.232 –0.227 0.603*** 0.396* –0.440** –0.578***
(–0.99) (–0.88) (3.19) (1.77) (–2.13) (–2.71)
Post-Bid Competition Dummy –0.085 –0.078 –1.355*** –1.380***
(–0.51) (–0.42) (–6.23) (–5.84)
Intercept 0.690*** 0.659** –2.124*** –1.023*** 0.736** 1.158***
(3.38) (2.43) (–7.64) (–2.83) (2.56) (3.17)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R-sqr. 0.217 0.273 0.176 0.244 0.321 0.385
Num. of obs. 1823 1787 1726 1344 1823 1734
2.6.1 Accounting Performance
To analyze the post-announcement performance of the non-selected interlocking tar-
gets, I only consider the deals where a non-interlocking firm is selected as target whereas
some interlocking potential target firms exist along with other non-interlocking potential
targets. The interlocking dummy is defined as before, but in this specific sample. I follow
Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) to perform a proper comparison of the performance
of non-selected interlocking firms with that of their peers. I define change in perfor-
mance of the firms as return on assets (ROA) averaged over the three years following
the deal announcement divided by its average over the three years prior to the deal an-
nouncement. Table 2.13 demonstrates that mean and median change in performance of
non-selected interlocking firms are negative across all specifications, with median (mean)
being significantly different from zero in all (most) of them. Next, I define a control firm
for each non-selected potential interlocking firm as another potential target firm in the
same deal that is non-selected but non-interlocking, and that has the closest value of
prior three year ROA to that of the non-selected interlocking firm. I adjust the change
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in performance of the non-selected interlocking firm by subtracting that of the control
firm. As can be seen in Table 2.13, in the basic sample, the non-selected interlocking
firms have an average (median) of -40% (-16%) change in return on assets when change is
adjusted using the peer firms, with significance at 10% (1%) level. The results are similar
across the specifications, however the number of firms and significance of coefficients is
not as high. This provides evidence on the idea that negative information regarding
these interlocking firms must be the reason why they were not selected as targets.
2.6.2 Stock Market Performance
According to my model, the reason why an interlocking firm is not selected as the
target is that the acquirer has received negative information on this potential target
firm. If we expect the bad news on a firm to come out through time, we would be able
to observe this as a deterioration in the stock market performance of the firm. As the
bad news come out, the market would process the information and the stock price of
the company would adjust. Therefore, we would expect a reduction in the stock price
of such firms. In this section, I analyze whether the non-selected interlocking firms
under-perform their peers in the stock market.
Following Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009), I create portfolios of the potential
targets and analyze their performance. As in the previous section, I only consider the
deals where a non-interlocking firm is selected as target whereas some interlocking and
non-interlocking potential target firms exist. I refer to such deals as “relevant deals”,
and analyze three different portfolios of potential target firms in these deals. As there
will be an in-depth analysis, I consider only the basic sample where potential target
firms are defined as firms that belong to the two-digit SIC code industry of the actual
target and have similar size. I focus on the equal weighted returns in an attempt to
reduce the noise inherent in defining potential targets.
The first portfolio I consider is the portfolio of interlocking firms that are not selected
in relevant deals, which I name as the “interlocking portfolio”. The second portfolio
consists of all potential target firms in these deals that do not have an interlocking
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director with the acquirer, which I name as the “non-interlocking portfolio”. The third
portfolio is a sub-set of non-interlocking portfolio where, for each firm in the interlocking
portfolio, a control firm that belongs to the same deal and has the closest lagged return
value is selected from the non-interlocking portfolio. I name this portfolio as the “control
portfolio”. By construction, the number of firms added to the interlocking and control
portfolios are same at each point in time, but the size of the portfolios may vary slightly
as firms get delisted. Finally, for a comparison, I also consider CRSP equal weighted
portfolio.
The details of the portfolio formation is as follows. Whenever a relevant deal is
announced, the interlocking and non-interlocking potential target firms are added to the
corresponding portfolios. Specifically, the firms are added to the portfolios on the day
after the deal announcement and are held in the portfolio for 1 year (252 trading days).
This is a dynamic portfolio where firms enter and exit at non-regular dates. Therefore,
the number of firms in the portfolio varies with time depending on the announcement
of relevant deals and the number of potential targets. As relevant deals occur often, the
portfolios are non-empty from the creation date until the closing date. However, as the
first relevant deal is announced on January 23, 1996 and the last on December 5, 2005,
for few days in January and December, there are no firms in the portfolios. For these
days, I assign the market portfolio returns to the portfolios. This results in a portfolio
for the full period of January 1996-December 2006. I also consider 2 years and 3 years
holding period portfolios which are for the periods of January 1996-December 2007 and
January 1996-December 2008, respectively. Finally, I analyze the monthly return series
that are obtained by compounding the daily returns of portfolios.
Figure 2.1 presents the cumulative returns of the equal weighted interlocking and
non-interlocking portfolios for holding periods of one, two and three years. Note that all
three portfolios outperform the CRSP equal weighted portfolio. In order to capture the
risk, I regress each portfolio’s returns (excess of risk free rate) on four factors: market,
size, and book to market factors proposed by Fama and French (1993), and Carhart
(1997) momentum factor.25 In un-tabulated results, I find that these portfolios have
25I thank Kenneth French for providing the Fama and French (1993) factors on his website:
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significant positive alphas. This is not surprising since the literature has already shed
light on significant positive returns to the potential target firms.
Figure 2.1: Cumulative Returns of the Equal Weighted Interlocking and Non-Interlocking
Portfolios. This figure presents the cumulative returns of the interlocking and non-interlocking portfo-
lios. The sample period starts in January 1996 and ends in December 2006, 2007, and 2008 for one, two
and three years holding periods, respectively. Portfolio formation is described in the text.
Song and Walkling (2000) demonstrate the increase in firms’ stock prices following
the acquisition of their rivals and attribute this to the increased expectation that they
will be taken over themselves, which is named as “acquisition probability hypothesis”.
Similarly, Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) show that anticipated takeovers affect the
correlation of a stock’s return with the market return. They construct a quintile-spread
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. I calculate the momentum returns using
the procedures of Carhart (1997).
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portfolio that buys firms with a high takeover vulnerability and sells firms with a low
takeover vulnerability, and this portfolio has an annualized abnormal returns of 11.77%
when four factors are controlled for. Finally, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)
create a novel instrument to addresses the fact that prices are endogenous and increase
in anticipation of a takeover, which they name the “anticipation effect”.
Eckbo (1992) demonstrates that a significant portion of the rival firms across in-
dividual U.S. mergers earn non-zero abnormal performance as a result of the merger
announcements. Despite their non-significant negative returns in non-horizontal deals,
rivals in horizontal deals earn cumulative abnormal returns of a significant 1.26% within
[-20,10] window of the announcement date. The abnormal returns are higher for the
sample of U.S. horizontal challenged deals and when using the rival firms identified
by the enforcement agencies. This effect is consistent with two scenarios: the market
power hypothesis where the dominant coalition reduces industry output and increases
the product price post-merger; and information signalling hypothesis where the merger
signals opportunities for efficiency gains available to the non-merging industry rivals as
well. However, consistent with the prior literature (Eckbo 1983, 1985; Schumann 1990),
Eckbo (1992) finds evidence in favor of the information signalling hypothesis.
One could argue that interlocking and non-interlocking portfolio returns may be
driven by the abnormal returns to the potential target (rival) firms. To assess the mag-
nitude of the effect of acquisition announcements, I analyze the abnormal returns to
non-selected potential target firms in relevant deals using standard event study method-
ology. Following Kang and Kim (2008), I first obtain the estimates of the market model
for each firm by using 200 trading days of return data, beginning 220 days before and
ending 21 days before the deal announcement. I use as the market return the CRSP
equal weighted return, and sum the daily abnormal returns to get the cumulative ab-
normal return (CAR) from day t1 before the announcement date to day t2 after the
announcement date. Table 2.14 reports the CARs for non-selected potential targets for
different event windows [t1,t2]. For short event window of [-20,1], the cumulative returns
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are on average positive, however, for other windows they are negative.26 What can be
clearly seen from the table is that non-selected interlocking firms have lower cumulative
abnormal returns than the non-selected non-interlocking firms. However, the differences
are not significant.
Figure 2.2: Cumulative Returns of the Equal Weighted Interlocking and Non-Interlocking
Portfolios - Starting from the Two Days after the Deal Announcement. This figure presents
the cumulative returns of the interlocking and non-interlocking portfolios. The sample period starts in
January 1996 and ends in December 2006, 2007, and 2008 for one, two and three years holding periods,
respectively. Portfolio formation is described in the text.
Next, I create portfolios starting from the second day after the deal announcement
to clean out the large first day abnormal returns that may accrue to potential target
firms. The reason is that I want to assess the long term stock market performance of
26Note that unlike Eckbo (1992), I do not distinguish between horizontal or non-horizontal deals.
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firms following the deal announcements. The resulting portfolios are presented in Figure
2.2. As can be seen in the figure, now the cumulative returns of interlocking portfolios
worsen compared to the non-interlocking portfolios. The difference is mostly reflected
in one year holding period portfolios; two and three years holding period portfolios
perform similar to those in Figure 2.1. For one year holding period, all three portfolios
have similar performance that is superior to the CRSP market portfolio. However, as we
increase the holding period, the interlocking portfolio starts to distinguish itself. Indeed,
the three year holding period interlocking portfolio does not outperform CRSP portfolio,
neither does two year holding period interlocking portfolio.
Finally, I regress each portfolio’s excess returns on three Fama and French (1993)
factors and Carhart (1997) momentum factor. The results of the regressions are pre-
sented in Table 3.8. As can be seen from the table, the portfolios have significant alphas,
both economically and statistically. Note that the alphas I obtain from the portfolios
of potential target firms is consistent with what Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) obtain
from the quintile-spread portfolio (an annualized 14-19% vs. 12%). However, whereas
Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) determine firms from probit regressions run each year
using all available firms, I focus on the firms that are similar to the actual targets during
portfolio formation.
Let us analyze the alphas of portfolios with different holding periods. One year
holding period portfolios of potential target firms have significantly positive alphas,
even when the first day abnormal returns are not considered. However, alpha of the
interlocking portfolio is lower than that of the non-interlocking or control portfolio.
What is more interesting is that, non-interlocking portfolio and control portfolio continue
delivering significant alphas for two and three year holding periods whereas interlocking
portfolio does not deliver alphas for long horizons. Figure 2.3 demonstrates in detail how
the interlocking portfolio under-performs the non-interlocking portfolios and the CRSP
equal weighted portfolio when the holding period is three years.
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative Returns of the Equal Weighted Portfolios with 3 Years Holding
Period - Starting from the Two Days after the Deal Announcement. This figure presents the
cumulative returns of the interlocking and non-interlocking portfolios with three years holding period.
The sample period is January 1996-December 2008. Portfolio formation is described in the text.
The findings in this section point to that non-selected interlocking firms under-
perform non-selected non-interlocking firms in the stock market, specifically when we
consider portfolios of two or three years holding periods. This is consistent with the
idea that bad news on the non-selected interlocking firms might have been the reason
for the acquirer to select a non-interlocking firm in these deals. This is also consistent
with alternative stories. For instance, it could be the case that non-selected interlocking
firms do not have fundamental problems which would be considered as bad news, but
simply that there are obstacles in acquiring them.27 This would also result in under-
27It would be interesting to further analyze the characteristics of the firms in the interlocking portfolio,
59
performance of the interlocking portfolio given the acquisition probability hypothesis.
However, even if this is the explanation behind the interlocking firms’ returns, observing
that the acquirers have not selected them in the first place provides evidence on that
information flows from interlocking directors might have benefitted the acquirer in target
selection.
2.7 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I analyze whether the results are driven by the endogeneity issues,
sample selection or some alternative mechanisms. Basically, I analyze the possibility of
reverse causality or omitted variables, the acquirer’s ownership in the target prior to the
deal, board centrality of the interlocking targets, and the entrenchment literature, as
alternative explanations.
2.7.1 Testing the Endogeneity Concerns
The results in this paper support the model’s first prediction: Having an interlocking
director with the acquirer raises the likelihood of becoming a target, specifically when
the potential problems that would arise from information asymmetry between the target
and the acquirer are more relevant. This finding rejects the null hypothesis that target
selection is independent of interlocking directors and, to the extent that appointment
of interlocking directors are exogenous, supports the hypothesis that information flows
through an interlocking director may induce a firm to become an acquisition target.
A potential concern is that creation of director interlocks may be endogenously de-
termined. One concern is the reverse causality. It may be the case that an acquirer that
is interested in a specific target first initiates a board relationship with that target. To
analyze this possibility, I manually collect information on the tenure of the interlocking
directors from proxy statements available at SEC EDGAR database. I find that the
especially regarding the entrenchment issues.
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mean (median) number of years that an interlocking directors spends on target firm be-
fore deal announcement is 6.4 (5) years and that on acquirer firm is 11.3 (9) years. If we
consider the initial year of the interlocking relationship, i.e. the minimum of tenure at
the target and that at the acquirer, the mean (median) is 4.9 (3) years.28 To the extent
that M&A transactions are not planned 3-4 years before the deal announcement, this
finding suggests that reverse causality is not a plausible explanation for how interlocking
directors relate to target selection.
A second concern is the role of the unobservables in target selection. An alternative
explanation of the interlocking director effect is that interlocking firms have fundamen-
tally different unobservable characteristics, and that these characteristics are related to
the tendency of firms to pair in M&As. In other words, interlocking directors may be
endogeneously determined. Literature provides theoretical background (Adams and Fer-
reira 2007; Harris and Raviv 2008; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998) and empirical evidence
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008) on that the board of
directors are endogeneously determined according to the firm’s corporate governance
needs. Interlocking directors may be a result of this endogeneity.
A possible explanation for interlocking directors’ effect on target selection is as fol-
lows. It could be the case that firms with greater similarity are more likely to select the
same directors for their boards, resulting in the interlocking relationship. If the acquirers
also tend to select targets with characteristics similar to theirs, observing an interlock-
ing director between the M&A parties may be an artifact of acquirer-target similarity.
Put in other words, omitted characteristics that relate to firm similarity may determine
target selection and this may reveal itself in interlocking directors; suggesting that their
information transmitter role is irrelevant for target choice. However, the approach taken
in this study alleviates these concerns to a great extent. Note that in the regression
analysis, for each deal, first I create a set of firms similar to the actual target (set of
potential target firms), and then test target selection in this sample. If some specific
characteristics of the actual target determine firm similarity that leads to an acquisition,
28These numbers are consistent with Cai and Sevilir (2012) who state that a typical interlocking
director spends on average 6.4 years on both the acquirer’s and the target’s board before the deal
announcement.
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we would expect these characteristics to be present also in the potential targets. As long
as such characteristics are controlled for in the definition of the set of potential targets,
endogeneity should not be a concern.
Recall from Table 2.8 that the effect of the interlocking directors is economically
and statistically very strong in all specifications where I control for industry, size, book
to market and leverage of the firms by defining the potential target sets accordingly.
Note that these characteristics overlap with the ones proposed in the literature as the
determinants of becoming a takeover target (Cremers, Nair, and John 2009). To the
extent that acquirer-target similarity is revealed in these variables, endogeneity should
have been accounted for. In this section, I analyze further firm characteristics that may
determine firm similarity. One potential omitted variable is the corporate governance
of firms. The literature has found a set of variables that help explain firm corporate
governance and I consider these as alternative characteristics to control for firm similarity
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008). These are board
characteristics, therefore any omitted variable resulting in the interlocking directors are
expected to be present in these characteristics as well. To be more specific, in determining
the potential targets, along with the two-digit SIC code industry, I use a 10% band of
board size, or board independence (percentage of “outside directors” whose primary
affiliations are with another firm), or degree centrality. Alternatively, I use a 10% band
of ROA to control for the accounting performance of firms.
Results of this analysis is demonstrated in Table 2.16. The magnitude and signifi-
cance of the positive effect of interlocking directors on target selection in these alternative
specifications are very similar to those in Table 2.8. The controls introduced in this sec-
tion do not diminish the effect of interlocking directors; the change is insignificant. These
results suggest that interlocking directors are exogeneous to relevant firm characteristics
up to a level such that controlling for them does not alter the results.
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In a recent work, Bouwman (2011) finds that while firms attempt to select directors
whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices, this matching
of governance practices is imperfect because many other factors also affect the director
choice. Moreover, directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence
the firm’s governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. The result is
the convergence of governance practices which is supportive of an effect running from
interlocking directors to corporate governance changes.
A final piece of evidence on the extent of the exogeneity of the interlocking relation-
ships comes from the previous literature. Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist (1979) examine
the reconstitution pattern (and its stability) of the interlocking relationships between
the largest American firms which ended through the death of an outside director. They
conclude that “interlocking directorates do not generally represent evidence of close
interconnections between specific corporations but do connect some stable, city-based
groups”. The low reconstitution rate that they found for interlock ties (6%) is later con-
firmed in a similar study of Palmer (1993) where he considers reconstruction of interlock
ties that were accidentally broken due to events such as death or retirement (8.9%).
Another variable that might relate to target selection is acquirer’s ownership of target
shares prior to the deal announcement, i.e. toehold. Toeholds may be a concern for both
reverse causality and omitted variables, and I investigate this in the next section.
2.7.2 Testing the Alternative Sample
In Section 2.3.2, we have seen that toeholds are frequently observed in interlock-
ing deals (30%), as opposed to their rare occurrence in non-interlocking deals (2%).
Interestingly enough, the causal relationship between the toehold and the interlocking
director is not clear. It may be the case that the interlocking directors induce minority
acquisitions in the linked firms, or that owning a toehold leads to the assignment of the
interlocking directors to the target board. To be able to distinguish one from another,
a deeper historical analysis for these cases is required.
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Toeholds may indicate an interest of the bidder (minority shareholder) in acquiring
the target firm. One would expect that if a bidder is interested in acquiring a firm, buying
its shares prior to the bid would give an advantage to the bidder. Hence, including deals
with toeholds in the sample may bias the results in favor of target selection. However,
empirically, we do not observe this behavior. Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009) note
that toehold bidding has declined dramatically since the 1980s and is now rare. They
report that “only 3% acquire toeholds during the six-month period leading up to the
initial offer announcement, the period when the actual bid strategy is being formulated”
(Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 2009). Moreover, the annual toehold frequency has been
steadily declining since 1980s. They name this phenomenon as the “toehold puzzle”.
Given these facts, it is not likely that a strong bias would be present in the results of
this paper.
Let us consider back the causality issue. For the moment, assume that the acquirer
of the minority share in target firm assigns its directors to the target board, hence
causality is from toehold to the interlocking director. Given the “toehold puzzle”, two
alternative explanations are left for why the acquirer in the first place would initiate an
ownership to later assign an interlocking director: benefit from some degree of control
over target firm actions or benefit from the inside information on the target firm.29 The
latter alternative is precisely what is analyzed in this paper. Therefore, I have opted to
keep the deals with toeholds in my final sample.
Even though I have provided evidence on that including toeholds is an appropriate
choice, to clear any suspicion on the results being driven by toehold considerations, I
perform a very conservative robustness check. Specifically, I re-run each regression for
a sample restricted to only deals without toeholds. This sample consists of 2,022 deals,
of which, only 53 are interlocking. Given this low rate of interlocking deals (2.6%), it
would not be surprising to observe a reduced significance of the coefficients. However,
if we observe that overall significance of results diminishes substantially, even up to the
point where the coefficient signs are altered, we might conclude that the results were
driven by the deals with toeholds.
29It is most likely that both benefits are considered by the acquirer.
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Table 2.17 reports the results of this robustness exercise. I find that basic sample
results for the restricted sample (of deals without toeholds) are very similar to those
for the unrestricted sample. As can be seen in column 1, the coefficient of interlocking
dummy has only decreased to 0.838 from 1.102 even though 30% of the interlocking
deals (toeholds) are excluded. The main hypothesis that interlocking firms are more
likely to be selected as targets strongly holds in the restricted sample. The conclusions
regarding target information asymmetry and acquirer financial constraints are neither
contradicted. All coefficients of the interaction terms between the interlocking dummy
and the proxies preserve their expected signs. The coefficients of interaction term with
return on equity, standard deviation, and acquirer cash to assets ratio are still sta-
tistically significant. The coefficients of interaction term with small size, diversifying
dummy, and acquirer debt to equity are not significant anymore, perhaps due to the loss
in number of observations, but the p-values are slightly above 10% threshold. Only the
interaction term with the acquirer liquidity has a coefficient with no significance, but
one should note that many acquirer firms are missing this variable. Overall, this exercise
demonstrates that results of the paper are not driven by toehold considerations.
2.7.3 Testing the Alternative Explanations
In this Section, I test whether the empirical phenomenon of bidders selecting in-
terlocking targets, which my information asymmetry model predicts, is driven by some
other considerations. The first alternative I consider is drawn from network centrality
literature. A number of studies have shown that board networks affect strategic deci-
sions such as the decision to acquire, the choice of target, and the method of payment.
Stuart and Yim (2010) find that firms with central boards have a higher propensity to be
targeted in private equity transactions. Similarly, ? show that central boards are more
likely to make an acquisition and to be acquired. Bouwman and Xuan (2010) also find
that a firm is more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions, among other financial
activities, if it has interlocks with firms that engage in the same activity.
In addition to its effect on strategic decisions, board centrality also relates to firm
69
performance. Firms centrally positioned in the boardroom network may have better
access to information, and this may lead to better performance, both around mergers
and in normal times. ? find that firms with central boards of directors are associated
with better performing acquisitions. Larcker, So, and Wang (2011) show that such firms
earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns and future growth in return on assets. These
studies indicate that board networks, created by multiple directorships, provide economic
benefits. On the contrary, boards with multiple directorships may become ineffective
monitors, which leads to weak corporate governance within the firm. Consistent with
this consideration, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with busy boards, those
in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated
with weaker profitability and lower market to book ratios.
We have seen in Table 2.6 that interlocking targets are, in fact, significantly more
central in the board network than non-interlocking targets, and more likely to have busy
boards. Given the empirical findings in the literature and in this paper, it is possible
that the interlocking targets are selected simply because their boards are more central,
not because they have a direct link with the acquirer. The explanation could be as
follows. Central firms are more likely to have busy directors, which perform their jobs
ineffectively, and this results in under-performance of the firm (Fich and Shivdasani
2006). Firms with poor performance are more likely to be become hostile takeover
targets, supporting the disciplinary role of corporate takeovers (Barber, Palmer, and
Wallace 1995; Cremers, Nair, and John 2009; Hasbrouck 1985; Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1988).30 Due to their centrality, we are also more likely to observe an interlocking
director in these firms; this leads to the target selection phenomenon demonstrated in
this paper. In order to rule out this explanation, I control for busy boards in the
regressions.
30These studies have focused on the low market to book (q) ratios as a proxy for poor firm performance.
The disciplinary role of corporate takeovers suggests that takeover targets represent cases where the
corporation’s internal controls and board level control mechanisms have been ineffective (Jensen 1986).
Similarly, Shivdasani (1993) find that the outside directors of hostile targets have fewer incentives (as
proxied by their lower equity ownership) to actively monitor managerial behavior, which is consistent
with the view that board of directors and hostile takeovers are substitute mechanisms for corporate
control.
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Panel A of Table 2.18 report the regression results when, among the control variables,
I include the busy board dummy, which takes value 1 if the majority of outside directors
hold three or more directorships, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of busy board dummy
is not statistically significant in any of the specifications. In the basic sample with
year and industry dummies, its coefficient is positive but not significant; and there is
only a negligible reduction in the coefficient of the interlocking dummy, from 0.948 to
0.947. Overall, the results suggest that the economic and statistical significance of the
interlocking relationship is robust to controlling for busy boards.
Next, I control for network centrality of the targets using the available proxies in
the literature. The first measure I use is degree centrality, which measures a board’s
connectedness, and is defined as the number of interlocking outside boards. This measure
is used in the studies of Stuart and Yim (2010) and Larcker, So, and Wang (2011).
Following ?, I normalize this variable by dividing it over the maximum degree centrality
value of the corresponding year. The second measure I use is the average directorship of
the target firm. The definition of this variable is obtained from Stuart and Yim (2010); it
is the mean number of board seats held by the directors on each firm’s board.31 Finally,
I include in my analysis the interlock count, which is the total number of interlocking
directors with other firms as defined in Stuart and Yim (2010). Panels B, C and D
of table 2.18 report the regression results when three proxies for network centrality are
included, one at a time, as control variables. As can be seen, none of these variables
significantly reduce the effect of the interlocking dummy. Clearly, the results in the
paper are not driven by network centrality of the interlocking firms.
The second alternative I consider relates to the entrenchment literature. This liter-
ature has shown that cross-firm differences in corporate governance, specifically in anti-
takeover defenses, have substantial effect on firm value and firm performance. Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that a governance index (the G-index) based on twenty-
four provisions is negatively correlated with firm value. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2009) demonstrates that six of these provisions fully drive their results and propose the
31To be more precise, as in Stuart and Yim (2010), first I define directorship count as a count of the
number of positions in distinct boards held by a director. Aggregating this to the firm level, average
directorship is the mean number of directorship count held by the company directors.
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entrenchment-index (the E-index) based on these. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that
an important component of both the G-index and the E-index is classified boards.
Corporate governance may also influence target selection. The interlocking directors
might facilitate merger process not because of informational reasons, but because they
act as negotiators so as to prevent anti-takeover defenses. D’Aveni and Kesner (1993)
find that the deals in which the top managers of both the bidder and the target share
elite connections (including directorships) are less likely to involve target resistance than
the deals without such connections. If this is why interlocking directors are relevant
for target selection, above all, we would expect that there are anti-takeover defenses
present in these potential targets. However, Table 2.6 already provides evidence on that
this is not the case. Indeed, if at all, the interlocking firms are less entrenched than
the non-interlocking firms. Next, under this alternative explanation, we would expect
to see a stronger effect of the interlocking directors for highly entrenched firms, with
entrenchment defined as the degree of anti-takeover defenses in place. As in Masulis,
Wang, and Xie (2007), I define a high entrenchment dummy, which takes value 1 if the
firm has an E-index greater than 2, and 0 otherwise. I include an interaction variable
between high entrenchment dummy and interlocking dummy in the regressions. If the
purpose of interlocking directors is to overcome entrenchment issues, we would expect
to see a significantly positive coefficient for this interaction term. On the contrary to
the entrenchment explanation, in Panel A of Table 2.19, we see that the coefficient is
insignificantly negative for all specifications.
Entrenchment theory also suggests that controlling for corporate governance vari-
ables would significantly affect the results. Panels B, C and D of Table 2.19 reports the
results of the regressions when G-index, E-index, classified board indicator are used as
controls, one at a time. Even though the economic impact of the interlocking dummy
decreases to some extent, coefficients on the interlocking dummy is still positive and
highly significant in all specifications. It is important to note that a great majority of
the observations do not have corporate governance variables defined, so that the results
of this section should be taken with caution. Nevertheless, analysis with this small
sample reveals that entrenchment hypothesis is not a plausible candidate in explaining
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the target selection phenomenon.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the role of interlocking directors in mergers and acquisitions
within an information asymmetry context. According to the model I develop, acquirers
are more likely to select the acquainted targets which, empirically, would correspond
to firms that have an interlocking director with the acquirer. I find strong empirical
support for model’s implications. Conditioning on firms with similar industry and size
characteristics, having an interlocking director with the acquirer raises the likelihood
of becoming a target by 12 percent. I explain this by informational flows through
interlocking directors, which help to overcome the information asymmetry between the
target and the acquirer.
As a further evidence of the information asymmetry explanation, I find that acquirers
are more likely to select the interlocking firms, particularly when these firms experience
poor past performance, when they are small, when they are risky, or when they belong to
a different industry. Moreover, acquirers that have high financial leverage, or insufficient
cash holdings, or limited liquidity are further biased towards interlocking targets, and
this is consistent with such acquirers’ willingness to use stock as the payment method. To
the extent that the above cases are those where target or acquirer-specific information
is more valuable, results indicate that interlocking directors have a significant role in
target selection. I also show that results are not driven by alternative explanations, such
as network centrality or entrenchment.
My model not only explains the target selection phenomenon, but also predicts that
an interlocking potential target that is not selected is prone to bad performance. I test
the performance of non-selected interlocking firms and find supporting evidence. These
firms have worse accounting and stock market performance as compared to their peers.
In future research, the portfolio implications of the model’s prediction on non-selected
interlocking firms may be analyzed in further detail as some interesting results have
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already emerged. Also, the model can be extended to analyze the bidding behavior,
negotiation process and method of payment; and the predictions can be tested using
the data. Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that interlocking direc-
tors mitigate inefficiencies that arise from informational advantages of the target or the
acquirer in M&As, and this issue deserves further attention.
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2.9 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let us first remember bidder’s posteriors on type of the acquainted target after observing
the private signal:
Prob(v1 = vH |η = h) = qφqφ+(1−q)(1−φ) = ΦH
Prob(v1 = vL|η = h) = 1− ΦH
Prob(v1 = vL|η = l) = (1−q)φ(1−q)φ+(q)(1−φ) = ΦL.
Prob(v1 = vH |η = l) = 1− ΦL
From this, it is easy to write the bidder’s valuations of targets after receiving the signal:
E[v1|η = h] = ΦHvH + (1− ΦH)vL
E[v1|η = l] = ΦLvL + (1− ΦL)vH
E[v2] = qvH + (1− q)vL = v.
Note that, since φ > 1/2 (i.e., the signal is informative), we have that E[v1|η = h] > v >
E[v1|η = l].
If the target is of type H, it will accept the offer if p ≥ vH . If the target is of type L, it will
accept the offer if p ≥ vL. If bidder bids p < vL, non potential target will accept the offer, hence
there will be no transaction. Hence, we always restrict our attention to the cases where p ≥ vL.
This generalizes to the bids for any target. Now let us focus our attention on the unacquainted
target.
If bidder bids vL ≤ p < vH and the unacquainted target is of type L, the profits of the bidder
will be: Π = vL+w− b. Since this is decreasing in p, the bidder will offer the smallest possible p
that the target will accept, which is p = vL. Bidder’s profits will be: Π = w. But if the target is
of type H, it will reject the offer, so bidder’s profits will be zero. Bidder’s expected profits when
p = vL is E[Π] = (1− q)(vL + w − vL) = (1− q)w.
If bidder bids p ≥ vH , again, as profits of the bidder is decreasing in p, the bidder will offer
the smallest possible p that both targets will accept, which is p = vH . Bidder’s expected profits
when b = vH is E[Π] = E[v2] + w − vH = [qvH + (1− q)vL] + w − vH = w − [(1− q)(vH − vL)].
79
Bidder will offer p = vH to the unacquainted target if (1− q)w ≤ w − [(1− q)(vH − vL)]
⇒ w ≥ [ (1−q)q (vH − vL)]⇒ wvH−vL ≥
(1−q)
q .
Otherwise, bidder will offer p = vL to the unacquainted target. Since (1 − q)w > 0, the
bidder will make an offer with certainty.
Proof of Lemma 2:
If the acquainted target is of type H, it will accept the offer if p ≥ vH . If the acquainted
target is of type L, it will accept the offer if p ≥ vL.
a. High signal
Let’s assume the bidder has received the signal η = h.
If bidder bids vL ≤ p < vH and the acquainted target is of type L, the profits of the bidder
will be Π = vL +w− b. Since this is decreasing in p, the bidder will offer the smallest possible p
that the target will accept, which is p = vL. Bidder’s profits will be Π = w. But if the target is
of type H, it will reject the offer, so bidder’s profits will be zero. Bidder’s expected profits when
p = vL will be E[Π|η = h] = Prob(vL|η = h)(vL + w − vL) = (1− ΦH)w.
If bidder bids p ≥ vH , as profits of the bidder is decreasing in p, the bidder will offer the
smallest possible p that both targets will accept, which is p = vH . Bidder’s expected profits
when p = vH will be E[Π|η = h] = E[v1|η = h] + w − vH = [ΦHvH + (1 − ΦH)vL] + w − vH =
w − [(1− ΦH)(vH − vL)].
Bidder will offer p = vH to the acquainted target if (1− ΦH)w ≤ w − [(1− ΦH)(vH − vL)]
⇒ w ≥ [ (1−ΦH)ΦH (vH − vL)]⇒ wvH−vL ≥
(1−ΦH)
ΦH
.
Otherwise, bidder will offer p = vL to the acquainted target. Since (1 − ΦH)w > 0, the
bidder will make an offer with certainty.
b. Low signal
Let’s assume the bidder has received the signal η = h.
If the bidder bids vL ≤ p < vH and the acquainted target is of type L, the profits of the
bidder will be Π = vL + w − b. Since this is decreasing in p, the bidder will offer the smallest
possible p that the target will accept, which is p = vL. Bidder’s profits will be Π = w. But if
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the target is of type H, it will reject the offer, so bidder’s profits will be zero. Bidder’s expected
profits when b = vL will be E[Π|η = l] = Prob(vL|η = l)(vL + w − vL) = ΦLw.
If the bidder bids p ≥ vH , as profits of the bidder is decreasing in p, the bidder will offer
the smallest possible p that both targets will accept, which is p = vH . Bidder’s expected profits
when p = vH will be E[Π|η = l] = E[v1|η = l] + w − vH = [ΦLvL + (1 − ΦL)vH ] + w − vH =
w − [ΦL(vH − vL)].
Bidder will offer p = vH to the acquainted target if ΦLw ≤ w − [ΦL(vH − vL)]
⇒ w ≥ ΦL(vH−vL)1−ΦL ⇒ wvH−vL ≥ ΦL1−ΦL .
Otherwise, bidder will offer p = vL to the acquainted target. Since (ΦL)w > 0, the bidder
will make an offer with certainty.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that:
Prob(vH |η = h) = ΦH > q ⇒ 1−ΦHΦH < 1−ΦHq <
1−q
q .
Prob(vL|η = l) = ΦL > (1− q)⇒ 1−qq < 1−q1−ΦL < ΦL1−ΦL .
Note also that (1− ΦH)w < (1− q)w < (ΦL)w. This implies:
Offering vL to T1|η = h ≺ Offering vL to T2 ≺ Offering vL to T1|η = l.
Finally, w− (ΦL)(vH − vL) < w− (1− q)(vH − vL) < w− (1−ΦH)(vH − vL). This implies:
Offering vH to T1|η = l ≺ Offering vH to T2 ≺ Offering vH to T1|η = h.
However, the cutoffs 1−ΦHq and
1−q
1−ΦL will be decisive. The below graph will help us making
our conclusions.
w
vH−vL : →
1−ΦH
ΦH
1−ΦH
ΦH
→ 1−ΦH
q
1−ΦH
q
→ 1−q
q
1−q
q
→ 1−q
1−ΦL
1−q
1−ΦL →
ΦL
1−ΦL
ΦL
1−ΦL →
Offer to the unacq. target: vL vL vL vH vH vH
Profits: (1− q)w (1− q)w (1− q)w w − (1− q)× w − (1− q)× w − (1− q)×
(vH − vL) (vH − vL) (vH − vL)
Offer to the acq. tar.|η = l: vL vL vL vL vL vH
Profits: (ΦL)w (ΦL)w (ΦL)w (ΦL)w (ΦL)w w − (ΦL)×
(vH − vL)
Offer to the acq. tar.|η = h: vL vH vH vH vH vH
Profits: (1− ΦH )w w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )×
(vH − vL) (vH − vL) (vH − vL) (vH − vL) (vH − vL)
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Comparison of expected profits above gives us the bidder’s optimum strategy con-
ditional on each signal. Upon receiving a high signal, the bidder will offer p = vH to
the acquainted target if wvH−vL ≥
1−ΦH
q . Otherwise, bidder will offer p = vL to the
unacquainted target. Upon receiving a low signal, the bidder will offer p = vH to the
unacquainted target if wvH−vL ≥
1−q
1−ΦL . Otherwise, bidder will offer p = vL to the ac-
quainted target. This completes the proposition, and I provide a summary table below.
w
vH−vL : →
1−ΦH
ΦH
1−ΦH
ΦH
→ 1−ΦH
q
1−ΦH
q
→ 1−q
q
1−q
q
→ 1−q
1−ΦL
1−q
1−ΦL →
ΦL
1−ΦL
ΦL
1−ΦL →
Offer|η = l: vL to acq. tar. vL to acq. tar. vL to acq. tar. vL to acq. tar. vH to unacq. tar. vH to unacq. tar.
Profits: (ΦL)w (ΦL)w (ΦL)w (ΦL)w w − (1− q)× w − (1− q)×
(vH − vL) (vH − vL)
Offer|η = h: vL to unacq. tar. vL to unacq. tar. vH to acq. tar. vH to acq. tar. vH to acq. tar. vH to acq. tar.
Profits: (1− q)w (1− q)w w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )× w − (1− ΦH )×
(vH − vL) (vH − vL) (vH − vL) (vH − vL)
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2.10 Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Accounting Liquidity The ratio of net liquid assets to total assets (Compustat items (4−5)/6)).
All Cash Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is purely cash financed, and 0 otherwise.
All Stock Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is purely stock financed, and 0 otherwise.
Average Directorship The mean number of board seats held by the directors on the firm’s board.
Board Size The number of directors on the firm’s board.
Board Independence The percentage of outside directors on the firm’s board.
Book Equity Stockholders equity minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes.
Book to Market The ratio of book equity to market capitalization.
Busy Board Dummy variable equal to 1 if the majority of outside directors hold three or more
directorships, and 0 otherwise.
Cash over Net Assets The ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets minus cash
(Compustat items 1/(6−1)).
Classified Board Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a classified board, and 0 otherwise.
Debt to Equity The ratio of debt (Compustat item 9) to market capitalization.
Deferred Taxes Deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat item 35), or, 0 if that is missing.
Degree Centrality The number of interlocking outside boards, normalized by dividing over the
maximum value for the corresponding year.
Diversifying Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and the bidder are from different industries,
with industry being defined as the two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.
E-index Entrenchment index based on 6 provisions taken from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009).
G-index Governance index based on 24 provisions taken from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).
Growth of Sales The proportional change in sales over the fiscal year (ln(Compustat items 12/12(t−1))).
High Entrenchment Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s E-index is greater than or equal to 2,
and 0 otherwise.
High Premium The ratio of the price paid for target shares recorded by SDC to the high price.
High Price The 52-weeks high stock price of the target over 52 weeks ending 4 weeks prior to
the announcement date.
Higher Price Dummy variable equal to 1 if high price is higher than the price paid for target shares
recorded by SDC, and 0 otherwise.
High Tech Dummy variable equal to 1 if both the target and the bidder belong to a high tech
industry as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004), and 0 otherwise.
Hostile Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is recorded by SDC as “hostile” or “unsolicited”,
and 0 otherwise.
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Variable Definition
Industry Herfindahl Index variable that equals to sum of the squares of market shares (in sales) over all
firms within the industry.
Interlock Count The total number of interlocking directors with other firms.
Interlocking Dummy variable equal to 1 if there exists at least one director that is common to both
the target and the acquirer at the time of the deal announcement, and 0 otherwise.
Institutional Ownership The fraction of firm stock owned by institutional investors required to report 13F filings.
Market Capitalization The stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal
year (Compustat items 24×25).
Market Value Total assets plus market capitalization minus book equity.
Merger of Equals Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is structured as a merger of equals, and 0
otherwise.
Net Market Leverage The ratio of debt minus cash and marketable securities (Compustat items 9−1)
to market value.
Outside Directors The directors whose primary affiliations are with another firm.
Poison Pill Dummy variable equal to 1 if a poison pill exists, and 0 otherwise.
Proxy Fight Dummy variable equal to 1 if a proxy fight has taken place, and 0 otherwise.
Pre-Bid Competition Dummy variable equal to 1 if another bid by a different bidder is recorded by SDC
in the six months before the current bid, and 0 otherwise.
Post-Bid Competition Dummy variable equal to 1 if another bid by a different bidder is recorded by SDC
in the six months after the current bid, and 0 otherwise.
Preferred Stock Liquidating value of preferred stock (Compustat item 10), or, if that is missing,
the first available of the redemption value of preferred stock (Compustat item 56) or
total preferred stock (Compustat item 130).
Premium The ratio of the price paid for target shares recorded by SDC to the stock price of
the target on 4 weeks prior to the announcement date.
Price to Earnings The ratio of the year-end stock price to earnings per share (Compustat items 24/58).
Relative Size The ratio of the market value of the target to the market value of the acquirer on
4 weeks prior to the announcement date.
Return on Assets The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets of the prior fiscal
year (Compustat items 13/6(t−1)).
Return on Equity The ratio of income before extraordinary items (adjusted for common stock equivalents)
to average equity for the prior fiscal year (Compustat items 20/(60+60(t−1))/2).
Same Industry Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target belongs to the same industry as the bidder,
with industry being defined as the two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.
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Variable Definition
Same State Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is located in the same state (Compustat state
variable, or if it is missing, SDC state variable) as the bidder, and 0 otherwise.
Stockholders Equity Total stockholders equity (Compustat item 144), or, if that is missing,
the first available of total common equity plus total preferred stock
(Compustat items 60+130) or total assets minus total liabilities (Compustat items 6−181).
Success Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is completed, and 0 otherwise.
Target Termination Fee Dummy variable equal to 1 if target termination fee exists, and 0 otherwise.
Tender Offer Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is tender offer, and 0 otherwise.
Toehold Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fraction of the target’s common stock owned by
the bidder as of the deal announcement date is greater than 5%, and 0 otherwise.
Total Assets The book value of assets (Compustat item 6).
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Chapter 3
On the Economics of Hedge Fund
Drawdown Status: Performance,
Insurance Selling and Darwinian
Selection
3.1 Introduction
The drawdown of an investment is a measure of the decline of the value of that invest-
ment from its historical peak. Drawdown analysis plays an important role in investment
management, as the extent to which large drawdowns occur is an essential aspect of
the evaluation of managers and their strategies. This is reflected in the widespread in-
dustry use of drawdown based performance evaluation measures, such as the Calmar
and the Sterling ratios.1 These measures are, ceteris paribus, negatively related to the
maximum drawdowns that funds experience, which makes large drawdowns a negative
1The Calmar ratio is defined as the ratio of compound annualized rate of return to maximum draw-
down, typically computed over a period of 3 years. The Sterling ratio is defined similarly but its
denominator uses the average annual maximum drawdown plus 10%. In some variations, the risk-free
rate is subtracted from the numerator, which results in a return-to-risk metric akin to the Sharpe ratio.
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signal about the quality of the manager. In essence, large drawdowns proxy for risk
and, consequently, play a negative role on performance evaluation. In this paper we look
deeper into the economics behind drawdowns in the context of the hedge fund industry.
We theoretically argue and empirically corroborate that drawdowns are related to future
performance and that, in sharp contrast to the previous view, large drawdowns (plus
fund survival) are predictive of outstanding performance. But these are just two of the
many new insights into hedge funds that drawdown analysis delivers.
Our first departure from the traditional view consists of looking at a fund’s draw-
downs relative to the drawdowns of other funds in the market instead of in isolation.
The second main departure is to analyze the dynamics of hedge funds drawdowns in-
stead of its maximum past level. We argue that relative drawdowns and their dynamics
are both predictive of the hedge fund’s future performance. To develop these ideas, we
define the drawdown status of a fund at a given moment in time as the decile to which
the fund belongs in the drawdown distribution of the industry. Economic reasoning
suggests that both the current level and the past evolution of this drawdown status are
related to key aspects of hedge funds –such as the manager’s talent and interests– and
hedge fund investors’ decisions –to exit or remain in the fund, to research more or less
thoroughly, etc.– and are therefore predictive of future performance. This means that,
ex ante, drawdown status is indeed a hedge fund characteristic related to performance.
Our empirical analysis corroborates this hypothesis and also indicates that drawdown
status is, from a quantitative standpoint, one of the most important performance-related
hedge fund characteristics –despite being (incomprehensibly) neglected in the literature.
To illustrate the power of drawdown status as a key hedge fund characteristic re-
lated to performance, in Figure 3.1 we plot the cumulative returns of several comparable
portfolios based on fund characteristics and performance measures. Panel A plots the
cumulative returns of portfolios sorted by characteristics identified in the literature as be-
ing predictive of hedge fund performance: return, size, volatility and total delta;2 Panel
B plots the cumulative returns of portfolios sorted by performance evaluation measures
2See, for instance, Agarwal and Naik (2000, 2005), Brorsen and Harri (2004), Agarwal, Daniel and
Naik (2009).
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Figure 3.1: Performance of Characteristics Based Portfolios. This figure presents the cumu-
lative net returns of the characteristics based portfolios. The sample period is January 1996-December
2009. The characteristics under analysis are drawdown, return, size, volatility, total delta, alpha, Sharpe,
Calmar, and Sterling ratios. See Table 3.1 for the definition of characteristics. For each year, alpha is
calculated as the sum of the 12 monthly alphas that is estimated from the fund-level time-series re-
gression of excess returns on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, allowing for structural breaks, and
includes both the regression intercept and the regression residuals. Sharpe ratio is average monthly
excess returns divided by the standard deviation of the excess returns (excess of risk free rate) over
the past three years. Calmar ratio is average annual return over past three years divided by maximum
drawdown suffered over three years. Sterling ratio is average annual return over past three years divided
by average annual maximum drawdown over three years and 10% is added to the denominator. At the
end of each year t, we sort the characteristics of funds into ten deciles. We create two value weighted
portfolios for each characteristic: the set of all hedge funds that are in the 1st decile of years t− 1, t− 2,
t − 3 and the the set of all hedge funds that are in the 10th decile of years t − 1, t − 2, t − 3. We plot
the one that performs best out of these two for each characteristic and label it. In brackets and next to
the label of each strategy we indicate if the strategy holds the funds in the “1st” or “10th” decile.
widely accepted by academics or practitioners: alpha, Sharpe ratio, Calmar ratio and
Sterling ratio. Each return series corresponds to a value weighted portfolio that each
year holds the funds in the relevant extreme decile of the corresponding characteris-
tic or performance measure in the previous three years. More specifically, we consider
portfolios that each year hold all funds that belong to the intersection of the previous
three years top versus bottom deciles. Figure 3.1 plots the one that performs best out
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of these two for each characteristic and performance measure analyzed. In brackets and
next to the label of each strategy we indicate if the strategy holds the funds in the “1st”
or “10th” decile. For instance, the line labeled ‘Size (1st)’, plots the cumulative return
of a portfolio that each year (from 1996 to 2009) holds all hedge funds that belong to
the intersection of the first size decile (smallest funds measured by assets under man-
agement, AUM) of the previous three consecutive years in the Hedge Fund Research
(HFR) universe of hedge funds.3 Notice that by reporting the 1st decile portfolio we are
implicitly revealing that the portfolio of funds in the 10th decile performs worse than
this one.
As we can observe in Panel A, the strategy labeled ‘Drawdown’ exhibits the best
performance among all the characteristics based portfolios. The reader must acknowl-
edge some surprise upon realizing that this portfolio holds every year all hedge funds in
the intersection of the largest drawdown decile of the previous three years.4 This result
is indeed remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it indicates that drawdown status
is a hedge fund characteristic that predicts outstanding performance. Second, in quan-
titative terms, drawdown status is a better predictor of hedge fund returns than other
well-known characteristics. Third, outstanding performance is associated precisely with
the funds that experienced large drawdowns in the past and are very far from their all
time record when incorporated in the portfolio –in other words, funds that would tend to
qualify as bad performers (and be viewed as managed by untalented traders) according
to the standard drawdown based measures of performance. Another remarkable result
inferred from Panel A is that total delta predicts future returns in the opposite direction
as expected. In particular, we plot the portfolio of funds with the smallest total delta
precisely because it outperforms the portfolio of funds with the largest total delta. This
is in sharp contrast with the traditional view (Agarwal et al. (2009)) that performance
3For comparison we also include the cumulative return of the portfolio labeled ‘HFR’, which includes
all funds in the HFR database.
4Panel A reports raw returns –that is, returns that are not risk-adjusted. We have computed risk-
adjusted returns in the context of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. We find that the largest
alpha corresponds to the Drawdown portfolio. Thus, the superior performance of the drawdown based
portfolio holds in terms of both raw and risk-adjusted returns. Finally, results are even more striking
when we compare the performance of the ‘Drawdown’ strategy with the one associated to portfolios
sorted on the basis of previous year status (as opposed to the previous three years status).
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is positively related to incentives (total delta). This result is further analyzed later on.
Panel B reveals a very similar phenomena. Again, the best performance is associated
to the Drawdown portfolio. Interesting enough, while alpha and Sharpe ratio operate
in the expected way (best performance associated to the portfolio of funds in the 10th
decile, that is, funds with the largest alpha and Sharpe ratio), the opposite occurs in
the case of the Calmar and Sterling ratios: outstanding performance is associated to
funds with the smallest ratios. Although this is conflictive with the use of these ratios
as performance evaluation measures, it is consistent with the outstanding performance
of the drawdown portfolio: low Sterling and Calmar ratios very likely are associated
to funds that experienced large drawdowns in the recent past, that is, funds that most
likely also belong to the Drawdown portfolio.
To summarize, the analysis of Figure 3.1 points at drawdown status as a legitimate
candidate in the literature of hedge funds characteristics. It also shows the naivete´
in the treatment of hedge funds’ large negative returns (or volatility), in general, and
drawdowns, in particular, both in the academia and according to industry standards
(Calmar and Sterling ratios).
Why is drawdown status related to performance? The past drawdown status of a
hedge fund is related to its future performance because it is informative of the manager’s
talent. A key distinctive feature of the hedge fund industry is a remuneration system for
managers whereby success is extremely well compensated but in a very specific manner.
The typical arrangement includes a fixed fee plus an incentive fee that is subject to a
“high-water mark” clause. The fixed fee is applied to the AUM of the fund and ranges
(across funds) from 0 to 6% with an average of 1.5%. The incentive fee ranges from 0
to 50% with an average of 19.1%.5 Given these figures, it is obvious that the main goal
for any manager is to collect incentive fees. However, the high-water mark clause allows
the manager to collect incentives fees only from a particular investor when the net asset
value (NAV) of the fund at the end of the measurement period is above its record during
the measurement periods since the investor entered the fund. This is where the fund’s
5These figures refer to the universe of hedge funds in the HFR data set, which is the one used in this
paper. They are in line with those reported in other studies where alternative data sets are used.
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drawdown history enters the picture: incentive fees are collected from both old and new
investors in the fund when the fund is above the high-water mark –in other words, when
its current drawdown is zero. Furthermore, funds currently at the high-water mark level
are also expected to generate larger incentive fees in the near future because doing so
will require only a strictly positive future return.6 The opposite dynamics applies to
funds currently facing a large drawdown: they do not collect incentive fees from old
investors (those who entered the fund before the large drawdown occurred); and most
likely they forgo fees from potential new investors who declined to enter the fund after
observing the large drawdown. Moreover, managers should not expect incentive fees in
the near future because that would require large returns that lift the fund’s net asset
value to the high-water mark. This means that, on the supply side, all managers seek to
keep drawdown to a minimum. One way to achieve this, but perhaps not the only one,
is talent in asset management. On the demand side, funds that currently experience
large drawdowns are relatively cheap, in terms of incentive fees, for old investors: these
do not pay them if they stay in the fund, but most likely will pay them if they leave
and enter a new fund. Hence, it may be worthwhile to research them thoroughly and
retain only those that are managed by talented traders. This process could result in the
death of funds facing large drawdowns and managed by untalented traders. The last
two points directly link drawdown status to talent in asset management. We contend
that analyzing the evolution of drawdown status, which is just a measure of the relative
position over time of each fund’s drawdown with respect to the other hedge funds, allows
one to discern talented managers. In essence, drawdown status analysis uses economic
reasoning to predict the future performance of hedge funds by sorting out talented and
untalented traders on the basis of past evolution of their drawdown status. The strategy
‘Drawdown’ plotted in Figure 3.1 is just one example of this new methodology’s success.
In principle, talented managers –and especially those implementing a sound risk
management technology– will tend to exhibit small drawdowns. Outstanding perfor-
mance should therefore be associated with hedge funds that persistently exhibit a low
drawdown status (in the 1st drawdown decile). However, in this paper we argue (and
provide corroborating evidence) for this not being the case owing to the “contaminating”
6Or a return higher than hurdle rate, if it exists.
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presence of funds that merely mimic low drawdown funds.7 These are funds managed
by untalented traders (i.e., those unable to deliver pure alpha returns) who specialize
in strategies akin to selling insurance.8 These strategies resemble a dynamic strategy of
rolling over short positions in deep out-of-the-money put options on some broad stock
or commodity index. All of them share the property of delivering positive returns in
normal times but have the (hidden) cost of large losses in times of turmoil. By their very
nature, these strategies usually place the fund in the lowest drawdown decile. They differ
from the strategies of talented investors in that they are not associated with outstanding
performance once proper account is taken of the true risks involved.
On the other hand, at any given time, the high drawdown decile is populated by both
unlucky talented managers and untalented managers. In principle, we could expect this
decile being associated to poor performance, as untalented managers will hit the decile
more frequently. This reasoning is too simplistic as it ignores the death of funds. In this
paper we argue and offer evidence consistent with a Darwinian selection process within
the hedge fund industry: funds that “survive” in the largest drawdown decile for several
periods are managed by talented managers and exhibit outstanding performance. Notice
that these are funds that the traditional approach would consider very risky (after all,
they suffered the largest drawdowns in the industry). They are, however, managed by
talented managers, which means that high risk conditional on survival is tantamount to
outstanding performance. This is one of our key insights and merits closer examination.
As mentioned previously, a distinctive feature of the hedge fund industry is an in-
centive structure that depends on the high-water mark clause. This means that old
investors in a fund that suffers a large drawdown face a choice between staying in the
fund (and saving a lot of fees, since incentive fees will not be paid until the fund returns
to the high-water mark) and leaving to enter a new fund (where the investor starts at
the high-water mark and must therefore expect to pay large fees). Clearly, the high-
water mark clause plays in favor of staying in, but only when the fund’s expected return
remains positive –that is, when the manager is talented. Hence, it is at the time of
7We also document other factors contributing to this finding, such as the existence of systematic risk
in hedge funds strategies and the backfilling bias.
8For instance, see Lo (2001), and Jorion (2007), for further details on these strategies.
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such decisions that it is most worthwhile to gather extra relevant information about
the manager’s investment philosophy, strategy and reasons behind the large drawdown.
But these are also times for managers to be less secretive and willingly disclose facets of
their investment philosophy to rationalize the large drawdown. In fact, we should expect
talented managers to be the ones more willing to reveal information. Hence, unlike nor-
mal times, rough times generate incentives for both extra researching (by investors) and
disclosing (by managers). If this interaction operates efficiently, investors will leave the
funds managed by untalented traders and stick to the talented ones. This process may
result in a Darwinian selection mechanism whereby funds managed by untalented man-
agers die fast. Under this hypothesis, these funds populate the high drawdown decile
temporarily but are excluded from the set of funds that experience large drawdowns
for a large enough number of periods. It is important to notice that while this latter
set excludes all funds that die due to the Darwinian selection mechanism, it does not
include all the “surviving” funds, but just those that survive in the highest drawdown
decile –that is, it does not include the funds that move to lower drawdown deciles. In
any case, it does include funds that survive for several periods beside remaining in the
largest drawdown decile. According to our previous reasoning, this is only possible if
investors are fully convinced that these funds are managed by talented traders.
At this point we should acknowledge that managerial self-confidence could also play
a role in the survival of talented managers after a prolonged period of large drawdowns.
First, some degree of self-confidence is required as incentive fees would only be collected
if (large) positive returns materialize in the future and management fees are probably not
enough to cover the fund’s running costs. Second, we do not believe, however, that man-
agerial rational self-confidence constitutes an alternative hypothesis to the Darwinian
selection for the same phenomena, the survival of talented managers. The main reason
is that if investors leave the fund, a rational self confident (talented) trader would find
marginally optimal closing the fund and start a new one, as long as there is at least one
potential investor to fool in the future.
In this paper we find portfolios of funds experiencing the largest drawdowns to have
outstanding performance. Furthermore, this performance improves (monotonically in
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the number of years) when we restrict the portfolios to funds that survive in the high-
est drawdown decile for several years –which is consistent with the Darwinian selection
hypothesis. We also provide additional evidence on the average number of consecutive
periods that liquidated funds remain in the largest drawdown decile, on the evolution of
flows into the funds and on the evolution of managerial ownership that further corrobo-
rate the existence of a Darwinian mechanism. The evidence indicates that these are not
funds run by self-confident managers abandoned by external investors.
In our study we deviate from the standard methodology used in the hedge funds
characteristics literature, which consists of regression analysis employing a predictive
variable while controlling for previously identified characteristics related to performance.
Instead, we use the portfolio sort methodology to assess the predictability of hedge
funds returns. This approach is not new; in fact, it is the most widely used approach
in the literature on asset pricing anomalies and has also been recently used in a hedge
fund context in Jagannathan, Malakhov and Navikov (2010). Our basic construction
consists of sorting portfolios on the basis of different lags in the drawdown status of
hedge funds and then testing the performance of these portfolios in the context of the
most widely accepted model in the hedge funds literature –namely the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven-factor model.9 The portfolio sorts methodology presents both advantages
and disadvantages. On the positive side, it is versatile and allows for a rich set of
variables to be tested. Also, and crucially, it enables direct assessment of outstanding
performance in a risk-adjusted manner. Furthermore, as pointed in Jagannathan et al.
(2010), the portfolio approach allows us to reduce measurement errors and to take into
account the performance of funds at the sorting and portfolio formation stage as they
remain in the analysis up to the time of their disappearance from the database. Finally,
the methodology has the clear practical advantage of investors in general, and managers
of funds of hedge funds in particular, exhibiting a genuine interest in its output. On
the negative side, we highlight that unlike the case of stocks where the market portfolio
exhibits no alpha, it turns out that the portfolio that includes all hedge funds in the
9In the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, hedge fund excess returns are regressed on seven factors that
have proven to have high explanatory power. These factors are the excess return on the S&P 500 index;
the spread factors on size, term structure, and credit risk; and the excess returns on portfolios of lookback
straddle options on currencies, commodities, and bonds.
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HFR data set (henceforth, “the HFR portfolio”) exhibits a strictly positive alpha.10
Both methodologies, however, suffer from an identification problem when analyzing
the relationship between hedge fund characteristics and hedge fund performance. It is
well known that the regression approach may yield faulty results when some relevant
control variables are not properly accounted for. More specifically, outstanding perfor-
mance may be attributed to a given characteristic just because what is actually a more
dominating characteristic has not been identified and controlled for. Yet, the portfolio
sort methodology may suffer form a similar problem. Simply put, a given sorting hedge
fund characteristic may seem to explain outstanding performance, when in fact that
performance is partially (or even completely) explained by some other characteristic.
This problem can be addressed by imposing “conditional” sorts that control for the al-
ternative characteristics, but data availability may impose a serious limitation on this
approach. For all these reasons –and in order to dispel any suspicion that our results
are driven solely by the use of portfolio sorting– in Section 3.8 we test our hypothesis in
the context of the more traditional regression methodology and confirm that our results
hold in this setting.
At this point we must argue in favor of drawdown status analysis even when iden-
tifying some hedge fund characteristic that partially explains the performance of some
of our drawdown based portfolios (which, indeed, is not the case as we will see later
on). This is better illustrated by means of an example. It is well known that hedge
fund performance tends to deteriorate as funds receive large inflows and grow in size
(Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2006), Fung et al. (2008), Jagannathan et al. (2010)). This
suggests that there is a “threshold” size for each hedge fund above which the manager
is unable to keep up with outstanding performance. Now assume that we find that most
of the outstanding performance of the large drawdown portfolios is related to size (small
funds). In this case, the economic channel could be operating as follows. Some hedge
funds managed by talented managers grow too much, above the threshold size. Then,
10While this is consistent with the existence of talent in the overall industry, it has been recently
challenged in papers such as Fung, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) on account of the backfilling bias (the
fact that funds only enter the HFR database after several years of good performance) and structural
breaks in the return series. This last point is verified in Section 3.7 of this paper where we provide an
analysis accounting for structural breaks.
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some factors that affect performance, such as operational risk, starts negatively affecting
the fund. At some point the fund suffers a large drawdown that places it in the largest
drawdown decile, what generates large capital outflows. Now that the fund size is below
the threshold size, it is expected to deliver outstanding performance in the future again
(as it still is managed by a talented trader). Aware of this, many old investors in the
fund do not let the fund go (Darwinian selection) and stick to it through several peri-
ods of large drawdown status. This story is perfectly consistent with our analysis and
indeed highlights the importance of drawdown status analysis to predict performance.
The story just points at a specific channel (fund size) for which drawdown status analysis
works.
Our results are of interest on their own right but also when balanced against existing
theories and empirical results in the literature and with industry standards. First, results
reported here severely question the role played by managers’ incentives in hedge funds
performance. In a recent paper, Agarwal et al. (2009) test the hypothesis of a positive
relationship between managers’ incentives and hedge funds performance. Incentives
are measured by total delta and, consequently, are high when the fund is at its high-
water mark (maximum option delta). This contrasts sharply with our results, which
indicate that outstanding performance is associated with funds that are far from the high-
water mark (i.e., funds with very low option delta). Second, our results also challenge
the validity of the drawdown-based performance measures (the Calmar and Sterling
ratios) frequently used by practitioners. Our analysis makes it clear that hedge funds
drawdowns contain more information about manager talent than the one summarized
in the maximum historical drawdown. Furthermore, Figure 3.1 shows that it is the
inverse of the Calmar and Sterling ratios that predict performance. This shows that,
consistent with our analysis, large drawdown plays a better role as a proxy of talent
than risk. In general, the main message of our analysis on this issue is that in the case of
hedge funds, large negative returns (and survival) is very informative about talent and
constitutes a very noisy proxy for risk. Third, on a more philosophical front, our analysis
points to a paradox concerning the behavior of hedge fund investors: the Darwinian
selection process cannot operate without a fairly high level of investor sophistication,
but the huge inflows attracted by funds in the low drawdown decile suggest a fairly
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low level of sophistication because these funds, as a group, do not deliver outstanding
performance. This dynamic may be explained, in part, by market segmentation whereby
professional investors dominate participation in large drawdown funds and individual
investors dominate in low drawdown funds. Alternatively, because we have looked at
only aggregate figures, it may be that the large inflows to the low drawdown funds are
mainly allocated to the good managers in the pool.
As a premier on the drawdown status of hedge funds, this paper leaves many is-
sues unaddressed. First, our analysis focuses only on the analysis of the two extreme
deciles; naturally, a more comprehensive analysis is a fruitful topic for future research.
In particular, the analysis of the portfolio of funds that survive after hitting the highest
drawdown decile, irrespectively of whether they stay in the highest drawdown decile
(analyzed here) or move to lower deciles (not analyzed here) deserves special attention
as it fits closer the Darwinian dichotomy between death and survival. Second, we believe
that much could be learned by comparing the role played by drawdown status in hedge
funds versus mutual funds. Some of our results here depend critically on the high-water
mark clause, which is ubiquitous in the hedge fund industry but nearly absent in the
world of mutual funds; hence, mutual funds are a good control group for testing our
hypothesis. Finally, we believe the Darwinian selection process could be at place in
many other corners of finance. One of the lessons that can be drawn from our analysis is
that risk conditional on survival has dimensions beyond the standard notion of risk. To
the extent that the Darwinian process may be operating in stocks, our theory may have
some bearing on the debate on the value premium and the risk associated to financial
distress.11
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we analyze the
economics behind drawdown status and state our hypotheses on the relationship be-
tween drawdown status and hedge fund performance. In Section 3.3 we describe the
methodology employed and relate our analysis to the existing literature on hedge fund
characteristics. Section 4.2 is dedicated to describing the data and defining the vari-
11On this front, it is important to notice the different opportunities open for investors to punish unfitted
managers: while in hedge funds investors can do it by withdrawing funds at NAV, the mechanisms
available in the case of stocks are very different.
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ables used in our empirical analysis. In Section 3.5 we present our leading empirical
results that corroborate the hypothesized relationship between drawdown status and
hedge fund performance. In Section 3.6 we further explore the economics underlying the
results obtained in Section 3.5 by testing the presence of insurance sellers in the low-
est drawdown status portfolios, and the existence of a Darwinian selection mechanism
among the funds in the largest drawdown decile. Section 3.7 is dedicated to robustness
checks of our results. In Section 3.8 we set the analysis in the context of the standard
regression methodology, and in Section 3.9 we include some concluding remarks.
3.2 The Economics of Hedge Fund Drawdown Status
The relationship between drawdown status and future performance would be rela-
tively straightforward in a simple world of investment with just two types of long-lived
traders: talented and untalented. We are aware that the word “talent” has many dimen-
sions in investment management (and elsewhere). For instance, from a finalist perspec-
tive, a trader who delivers outstanding performance is no more talented than one who
cannot deliver such performance but does succeed at raising a lot of capital. Indeed,
both succeed at their core business (i.e., maximizing profits) and so must be endowed
with a comparable amount of talent. That being said, in this paper, and more specif-
ically in the context of the simple economy we describe next, we will view as talented
those managers who can deliver outstanding performance in the form of pure (and per-
sistent) alpha investing, and view as untalented those managers who deliver identically
and independently distributed returns with zero mean each period. In this benchmark
world, talented managers lie more often and more persistently in the lowest drawdown
decile than untalented managers. This means that, in general, we should expect that
portfolios of hedge funds drawn from the lowest drawdown decile outperform portfolios
of hedge funds drawn from the highest drawdown decile.12 Be means of a purely heuris-
tic argument we can actually make even stronger and more precise predictions on the
12For limitations of scope and other reasons that will become apparent later on, in this paper we focus
on analyzing the two extreme deciles. Note also that, abusing in the use of language, we will often refer
to funds in the lowest (highest) drawdown decile as small (large) drawdown funds or funds with low
(high) drawdown status.
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expected performance of portfolios sorted on the basis of the past history of drawdown
status:
• In the case of portfolio sorts on one-lag drawdown status (that is, each year’s
portfolio is sorted from the distribution of drawdowns of the previous year), we
should expect the following prediction to hold:
– Prediction 1: The lowest drawdown status portfolio will outperform the
highest drawdown status portfolio. This follows because, at any given point
in time, talented managers are more likely than untalented managers to hit
the lowest drawdown decile. Hence, the relative pool of talented managers
must be larger in the lowest than in the highest drawdown decile.
• In the case of portfolio sorts on T -lag drawdown status,13 we should expect the
following predictions to hold:
– Prediction 2: The performance of the lowest drawdown status portfolios
will increase in the length T of the lag. This prediction is based solely on the
stronger return persistence of talented managers. Lucky untalented managers
will only lie in the lowest drawdown decile transitorily. Hence, a requirement
of lying in the low drawdown decile for several consecutive years will sort
out most of the lucky untalented managers picked in the one-lag draw, and
increasing the the lag will increase the odds that a manager remaining in the
pool is talented.
– Prediction 3: The performance of the highest drawdown status portfolios
will decrease in the length T of the lag. This result follows using a symmetric
argument to the previous one. Unlucky talented managers will only lie in the
highest drawdown decile transitorily. Hence, a requirement that managers
lie in the highest drawdown decile for several consecutive years will sort out
most of the unlucky talented managers picked in the one-lag draw, which will
increase the odds that a manager remaining in the pool is untalented.
13We define T -lag drawdown status as the intersection of deciles. For instance, a fund enters the
2-lag lowest drawdown decile portfolio in year t if it belongs both to the lowest decile of the drawdown
distribution of year t− 1 and to the lowest decile of the drawdown distribution of year t− 2.
99
Of course, the world of hedge funds is considerably more complex than assumed in our
benchmark economy, and in general we should not expect the data to support all of these
predictions. Using our knowledge and experience in the world of investments, we can
identify four main challenges to the assumptions behind our benchmark economy. Three
are of an economic nature and either follow from well-known stylized facts about hedge
funds or are a direct by-product of the incentives fees and high-water mark mechanism
that characterizes the hedge fund industry; the fourth is related to the way in which
hedge funds report to databases. We analyze each of these challenges in turn.
The first critical simplification in our benchmark economy is that it ignores the death
of hedge funds. The death (or survival) of hedge funds is endogenous. In particular,
many funds that experience large drawdowns die mainly because investors withdraw
their money. If investors are able to sort talented from untalented managers during the
period in which a fund experiences a large drawdown, then hedge funds managed by
untalented traders will die faster. This means that the pool of talented managers in the
largest drawdown sort may improve, rather than deteriorate, as we increase the sorting
lag. Simply put: if, for instance, untalented traders are abandoned by investors one year
after they hit the highest drawdown decile, then they will be selected in the one-lag sort,
but not in any of the other lagged shorts. Hence these longer lagged sorts in the highest
drawdown decile will tend to be more dominated by unlucky talented managers. All this
means that Prediction 3 could be reversed when hedge funds survival is endogenous.
This is one of the key insights to be derived from this paper. The market may operate a
Darwinian selection mechanism whereby talented managers (the fittest) are more likely
to survive several periods after large drawdowns. Remarkably, this selection mechanism
is incentive compatible for old investors, because of the industry’s incentive structure,
and for talented managers. As we explained in the introduction, old investors in a fund
experiencing large drawdowns have two choices: stay in or leave and move to a new
fund. If they stay in, they will save a lot of money in incentive fees as these will not be
charged until the fund goes back to the high-water mark; if they leave, they will start
at the high-water mark in the new fund and will pay incentive fees as the fund realizes
positive returns. Obviously the incentive fees game plays in favor of staying in, but only
when the expected return of the fund is positive; that is, when the manager is talented.
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Hence, these are times when it is worthwhile gathering extra relevant information on
the manager’s investment philosophy and strategy. But it is also optimal for talented
managers to be less opaque on their investment philosophy. Not doing so would probably
result in the exit of investors and the death of the fund. As stated before, this interaction
between investors and managers can result in a Darwinian selection process, whereby
only the most talented managers survive. In this case, performance would be increasing,
rather than decreasing, in the length of the lag used to sort funds in the 10th decile
(largest drawdowns).
The second key assumption that could be violated in the real world is that of lack of
persistency in the returns of untalented managers. Under this assumption, untalented
managers only hit the low drawdown decile transitorily. However, as we previously men-
tioned, due to the high-water mark clause, all managers are interested in hitting the
low drawdown status as often as possible. Being endowed with talent is one way of
achieving this. There are, at least, two well-known alternatives. First, fund managers
can specialize on “insurance selling” like strategies.14 These strategies resemble a dy-
namic strategy of rolling over short positions in deep out-of-the-money put options on
some broad stock or commodity index. All of them share the property of delivering
positive returns in normal times with the (hidden) cost of large loses in turmoil times.
By its own nature, these strategies set the fund in the lowest drawdown decile most
of the time. But they are very different to the strategies of talented investors, as they
are not associated to outstanding performance when properly accounting for the true
risk of the strategy. Hence, insurance sellers are missing in our benchmark economy
as they would correspond to the case of untalented traders with persistent returns in
the lowest drawdown decile. Their presence in the real world will tend to deteriorate
the performance of the low drawdown status portfolios when measured in samples that
include crisis periods. On the other hand, another way of reaching the lowest drawdown
status frequently without talent consists on implementing a sound risk control technol-
ogy.15 Although these traders seldom deliver large returns, they tend to lie in the low
14For instance, see Lo (2001), and Jorion (2007), for further details on these strategies.
15The risk control technology can be specified in terms of value at risk or, even, maximum drawdown
constraints. The optimization problem in the presence of such constraints has been widely analyzed in
the literature: see, for example Grossman and Zhou (1993), Cvitanic and Karatzas (1995), Lopez de
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drawdown decile as large drawdowns are explicitly avoided. In sum: at any time the
lowest drawdown decile may be contaminated (relative to our benchmark economy) by
the presence of funds, that mimic low drawdown funds, managed by untalented traders
who use various techniques to maximize fees.16 Since these funds are not associated with
outstanding performance, a strong presence of these funds in the lowest drawdown decile
will damage the performance of the lowest drawdown portfolio sorts up to the point of
possibly reversing predictions 1 and 2. It is worthwhile mentioning that the presence of
these mimicking funds can be partially tested. For instance, insurance sellers tend to
experience very large losses during periods of crisis; therefore, if such losses are larger
for the lowest drawdown decile portfolio than for the HFR portfolio then we could infer
that the former was more heavily populated by insurance sellers.
The third key assumption in our benchmark economy is the absence of systematic
risk in the strategies of both talented and untalented traders. The title “Talent Re-
quired”17 of an article on hedge funds by Sanford Grossman in the Wall Street Journal
probably reflects the essence of this industry: talent is assumed but is probably not
always there. Indeed, it is well known that the industry offers some alpha, but mainly
a lot of beta investing, what has given rise to a growing literature on hedge fund repli-
cation.18 Introducing systematic risk alters our benchmark economy in several ways.
First, it makes the lowest decile extremely crowded during “normal” periods –that is,
most of the time.19 Second, we expect that systematic risk will intensify the Darwinian
selection process described previously. Recall that the drawdown status ranks funds with
respect to other funds in the market. In the presence of systematic risk, large drawdown
funds are specially singled out in normal times, which facilitates both the researching
and identification of the talented ones among these funds.
Prado and Peijan (2004), and Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005).
16This last statement must be understood in the context of our definition of talented versus untalented
managers. We are not associating the use of risk control techniques with a the lack of talent in asset
management. Some talented managers may also use a sound risk control technology, and doing so would
place them in the lowest drawdown decile even more often than otherwise. The presence of these does
not alter the predictions of our benchmark economy.
17The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2005, Page A18.
18For instance, see Leibowitz (2005) and Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007).
19Observe that the lowest decile will tend to be very crowded at every point in time because it picks
all the funds with a good track record and a non-negative current return, without regard to how large
the current return is.
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The fourth possible deviation from our benchmark economy is related to the way
in which hedge funds report to databases. First, it is well known that funds tend to
enter data sets after several periods of good performance, and that this performance is
backfilled. In terms of our economy, this backfilling bias will result again in the over-
crowdness of the low drawdown decile with funds that are not necessarily managed by
talented traders. Second, some very successful funds cease reporting to databases when
they are no longer interested in attracting investors. This may occur because the fund
has reached the maximum allowed number of investors or because the manager believes
that additional capital would deteriorate performance given his investment niche. In
terms of empirical studies that rely on information from databases, such funds “die”
(as they stop reporting) of success rather than failure. Since these successful funds
most likely lie in the lowest drawdown decile they could be missed in the sequentially
increasing lagged sorts. For example, if a very successful fund stops reporting one year
after it hits the lowest drawdown decile, it will be picked in the one-lag sort, but not
in any of the other lagged sorts. Thus, the stop reporting process operates in exactly
the opposite direction to the Darwinian selection process, although it affects the lowest
rather than the highest drawdown sorts. In terms of our predictions, if the stop reporting
process is very intense, then Prediction 2 could be reversed.
We are now in a position to advance and interpret the most important results of our
analysis. Using the universe of hedge funds in the HFR data set, we find that:
• On average, 72% of the funds have a drawdown equal to zero and so belong to
the lowest drawdown decile. This confirms the lowest drawdown decile as an
“absorbing” decile. It is explained by its own definition and is consistent with the
existence of substantial systematic risk in hedge funds strategies, the backfilling
bias and, more importantly, with the existence of many mimicking funds that
implement either insurance-selling strategies or pure tight risk control techniques.
• The lowest drawdown status portfolio underperforms the highest drawdown status
portfolio. This is just the opposite of what is expected in our benchmark econ-
omy. We interpret this as confirming that the lowest drawdown decile is highly
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contaminated by mimicking funds. Furthermore, the lowest drawdown portfolio
underperforms the HFR portfolio, especially during periods of crisis. We interpret
this result as corroborating a significant presence of insurance sellers in the lowest
drawdown decile.
• Performance is monotonically increasing in the length of the sorting lag for the high
drawdown status portfolios. This too is the opposite of what is expected in our
benchmark economy. The evidence supports the existence of a strong and efficient
Darwinian selection process, which is corroborated by a closer examination of the
hedge funds included in the sorted portfolios.
• No clear pattern is found in the relationship between the length of the sort lag
and the performance of portfolios in the lowest drawdown decile. This finding
is consistent with the over-crowdedness of that decile and with the interaction
between the self de-reporting process and the presence of mimicking funds.
In the next section we introduce some formal definitions and discuss the methodology
employed in this paper. We also relate our work to the existing literature on hedge funds
characteristics and performance.
3.3 Methodology and Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on hedge fund characteristics and performance
on two fronts. First, it introduces the drawdown status of hedge funds as a new and
important characteristic related to performance. Second, from a methodological point
of view, it deviates from the standard regression analysis and uses the portfolio sort
methodology to identify outstanding performance.20 We now turn to analyze these two
issues in more detail.
We first define NAV i,t as the net asset value of hedge fund i at the end of measure-
ment period t. We assume that all hedge funds use annual measurement periods and,
20In any case, as previously stated, we also verify our results using the more conventional regression
setting.
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consequently, NAV i,t corresponds to the net asset value of fund i at the end of December
of year t. Then, the drawdown of hedge fund i at the end of year t is defined as
Di,t ≡ 1− NAV i,t
Maxτ≤tNAV i,τ
, (3.1)
where τ applies to all years from fund i’s inception date. Under this definition, Di,t lies
in the interval [0, 1]. When Di,t = 0, the fund has set a new high-water mark at the end
of year t. When Di,t 6= 0, the fund is below the high-water mark. The high-water mark
clause directly links Di,t to the fees managers raise (and investors in the fund pay).
21
When Di,t = 0, the manager collects incentives fees in year t both from old investors
as well as new investors (year t investors) in the fund.22 When Di,t is close to one, the
fund ends the year very far from the high-water mark. Old investors in the fund are
not paying incentive fees currently and very likely will not pay them in the near future.
Hence, roughly speaking, from the investors point of view, Di,t = 0 is associated to funds
which are relatively expensive in the present and also very likely in the near future, while
Di,t close to one is associated to funds which are cheap in the present and very likely
in the near future too for old investors. Finally, notice that there is not a one to one
relationship between Di,t and the fund return in year t. We only know that Di,t = 0 is
associated to funds whose return for the year is non-negative. But it may apply to funds
whose returns are arbitrarily large or low. On the other hand Di,t 6= 0 is consistent with
positive and negative returns during year t, even when Di,t is very close to one.
The drawdown status of fund i at date t is just the decile Di,t belongs to in the
distribution of the drawdowns of all hedge funds in the economy at date t. In this
paper we analyze the relationship between the current and past drawdown status of
hedge funds and their future performance. The general treatment of this problem is
complex and, definitively, beyond the scope of this paper that mainly aims to introduce
21In our sample, 91,6% of the funds have a high water mark clause. In the discussion that follows
we implicitly assume that the fund does not have a hurdle rate. The relationship between Di,t and
fees in the presence of a hurdle rate is very similar, with the only noticeable difference of the stronger
requirement of the fund return being larger than the hurdle rate, instead of being larger than zero, in
order for the manager to be able to collect the incentive fee.
22Strictly speaking, there is the critical case of NAV i,t−1 = NAV i,t = Maxτ≤t NAV i,τ , for which
Di,t = 0 but the manager does not collect incentives fees, as the fund return for year t is zero.
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the subject and present very appealing results to the academic debate. For this reason
we restrict our attention to the analysis of hedge funds for which our analysis in the
previous section provides sharp predictions. In particular, we focus on the analysis of
hedge funds in: 1) the two extreme deciles, d = 1 and d = 10; and, 2) in the intersection
of consecutive deciles. Formally, with DSd,t(T ) we denote the set of all funds that belong
to the drawdown decile d in the T consecutive years preceding and including year t. For
example, DS10,t(1) is the set of all hedge funds in the 10
th drawdown decile of year t;
DS1,t(3) is the set of all hedge funds that belong to the intersection of the 1
st drawdown
decile of years t, t − 1 and t − 2; and so on. Due to data limitations, we will further
restrict our analysis to the case of three lags, T ≤ 3.
In order to test the relationship between drawdown status and performance, we
adopt a portfolio sort approach. The portfolio sort approach is not new, but rather the
contrary. It is the most standard and widely used approach in the literature on asset
pricing anomalies.23 In this context, the analysis starts with an assumed asset pricing
model, which currently mainly consists of a four-factor specification which includes the
three Fama and French (1993) factors plus a fourth momentum factor. Then portfolios
of securities sorted on a variety of economic variables are tested in the context of the
asset pricing model.24 In this paper we adopt this approach to assess the outstanding
performance of portfolios sorted according to hedge funds past drawdown status. To do
this we assume the most widely accepted model of performance evaluation in the hedge
fund literature, the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. This model builds on the
original Sharpe’s style regression model (Sharpe (1992)) and assesses performance in a
risk-adjusted manner while accounting for hedge funds’ investment styles and heavy use
of non-linear strategies. The model exhibits a very high explanatory power.25
23It has also been used recently for hedge fund performance analysis in Jagannathan et al. (2010).
24The set of sorting variables used in the literature is very large, including many accounting vari-
ables, such as accruals (Sloan (1996), profitability (Haugen and Baker (1996) and Cohen, Gompers, and
Vuolteenaho (2002)), asset growth (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)), pension plan funding status (Franzoni
and Marin (2006), and net stock issues (Daniel and Titman (2006)), and many other variables, such as
the stock’s past returns (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), etc. For a summary of the current debate on
pricing anomalies and the use of the portfolio sort methodology see Fama and French (2008).
25See Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004), Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007), Fung et al. (2008), Bollen and
Pool (2009) and Jagannathan et al. (2010).
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In the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model, hedge fund excess returns are
regressed on the following factors: the excess return on the S&P 500 index (SNP); a
small minus large factor (SizeSpr) constructed as the difference between the returns of
the Wilshire Small Cap 1750 Index and the Wilshire Large Cap 750 Index; the excess
returns on portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies (FXOpt), commodities
(ComOpt), and bonds (BdOpt), which are constructed to replicate the maximum possi-
ble return to trend-following strategies on their respective underlying assets; the excess
return on Fama treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than 10 years (Bd10Yr)
and the excess return on the CitiGroup Corporate BBB 10+yr index less Bd10Yr (Cred-
Spr).26 Hence, the performance of a portfolio of hedge funds i is assessed by inspecting
the “alpha” in the following model:
Ri,t = αi + βi,1SNPt + βi,2SizeSprt + βi,3FXOptt + βi,4ComOptt
+βi,5BdOptt + βi,6Bd10Y rt + βi,7CredSprt + i,t (3.2)
where Ri,t is the excess return of portfolio i during period t.
In our empirical exercise we create both equally and value weighted portfolios that at
each year t hold all the hedge funds in the corresponding DSd,t−1(T ). More specifically,
using the information available in December of year t we sort funds into deciles and then
form portfolios in January of year t+ 1. These portfolios can be viewed as anticipating
because the information arrives to the data providers several months after January.27 In
any case, in order to avoid suspicions on the results being driven by the use of anticipating
information, in not tabulated results available from the authors upon request, we verify
that none of our results change significantly when portfolios are formed at the beginning
of May of each year. The reason for this is obvious. Unlike stocks, where the portfolio
formation date is critical because information is impounded into prices very fast, in hedge
26Some of the factors in the original Fung and Hsieh (2004) model were not tradable. Following Sadka
(2010) critique to the use of these factors, in this paper we substitute the not tradable factors with the
tradable ones used in Jagannathan (2010). We have verified, however, that our results hold when using
the original Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors (results are available from the authors upon request).
27This is the case for several reasons. First, although HFR database provides a flash update at the
beginning of each month, most of the data is missing as the funds report the data later during the month.
Second, managers often send corrections to data previously reported. Indeed, HFR states that data is
subject to revision during the trailing four months.
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funds shares are marked at the fund’s NAV. Hence, information related to the talent of
the manager will only be revealed slowly over time as the NAV reflects the manager’s
trading skills. For this reason, the differences in performance between the January and
May portfolios should be small and mainly obey to considerations such as the different
lifespan of the portfolios or the asymmetric death of funds in the portfolios.28 Once
portfolios are formed, we compute the monthly returns and estimate model (3.2). Fung
et al. (2008) extend model (3.2) allowing for time variation in risk exposures arising
from structural breaks. We have also analyzed this modified version in Section and have
verified that all our results hold.
Setting up performance evaluation in the context of the portfolio analysis method-
ology presents several advantages. First, the methodology is very versatile and allows
for a rich set of variables to be tested. Furthermore, it allows to assess if hedge funds
performance is outstanding in a risk-adjusted manner. It also presents some inconve-
niences. In particular, unlike the case of securities where the market portfolio exhibits
no alpha, it turns out that the portfolio that includes all hedge funds in the HFR data
set (the HFR portfolio) exhibits a strictly positive alpha. For this reason we refer to
outstanding performance as an alpha above the one of the HFR portfolio. As noted in
the introduction, both methodologies suffer from an identification problem when applied
to the hedge fund characteristics-performance debate. To alleviate this problem, we rely
on the use of conditional sorts, in the portfolio sorts methodology, and include all con-
trols that the literature has suggested so far, in the regression analysis. For all these
reasons we strongly believe that these two approaches complement each other and must
be taken into account in the analysis of hedge fund characteristics. As we will see, all
our results survive both methodologies, what place drawdown status as a genuine hedge
fund characteristic related to performance.
The literature on hedge funds characteristics is too large to cover in detail here.
The consensus so far is that the following hedge fund characteristics are related to
performance: size (Brorsen and Harri (2004), Getmansky (2005), Ammann and Moerth
28This would not be the case if portfolios were formed using shares of funds that trade in secondary
markets. In this case, like in the case of stocks, the use of non-anticipating information at the portfolio
formation date is key.
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(2005)), age (Liang (1999), Howell (2001), Amenc and Martellini (2003)), managerial
incentives measured using fee structure (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999),
Liang (1999), Edwards and Caglayan (2001)) or using delta (Agarwal et al. (2009)),
fund provisions (Liang (1999), Agarwal et al. (2009)), past performance (Agarwal and
Naik (2000), Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003), Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2005),
Jagannathan et al. (2010)), flows (Getmansky (2005), Agarwal et al. (2006), Fung et
al. (2008)), strategy (Amenc and Martellini (2003), Brown and Goetzmann (2003)) and
volatility (Schneeweis (1998), Le Moigne and Savaria (2006)).29 In Section 3.8 we use
all these variables as controls when assessing the relevance of drawdown status as a
performance related characteristic.
3.4 Data and Variable Construction
3.4.1 Data
Data on hedge fund performance and characteristics is provided by Hedge Fund Re-
search Inc. (HFR). HFR builds its dataset based on surveys of hedge fund managers.
Funds report to HFR mainly for marketing purposes, because they are prohibited from
public advertisement. HFR tracks data on hedge funds from 1992, and from 1994 on-
wards keeps records of hedge funds that either stop reporting or are liquidated. As of
May 2010, HFR covers 10,931 hedge funds in its database.30 All funds are classified into
the “active” and “dead” funds categories. In our study, active funds are those that are
reporting as of May 17, 2010. Once a fund is no longer reporting or liquidated, it is
transferred to the dead funds category. Out of these 10,931 funds, 4,427 are classified as
active funds, and 6,504 as dead funds.
HFR reports the monthly time series of returns, assets under management (AUM)
29See Agarwal and Naik (2005) and Gehin (2006) for a review of main findings on hedge fund char-
acteristics. Le Moigne and Savaria (2006) compare the relative importance of thirteen hedge fund
characteristics in explaining the cross-sectional variations and find that style, performance, volatility
and fee structure are the most important characteristics.
30This figure does not include a total of 4102 funds of funds which are also covered by HFR but not
included in our analysis.
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and net asset value (NAV) of the hedge funds in its database. Monthly returns are
defined as the change in net asset value during the month divided by the net asset
value at the beginning of the month. Most of our analysis is performed at a monthly
frequency. For this reason we drop 146 funds that report returns quarterly, 24 funds
that have missing return values during reporting period and 47 funds that do not report
returns at all.31 This leaves us with 10,714 funds. We do a similar revision for assets
under management. Unfortunately, 2,046 funds do not report AUM at all and 943 funds
report AUM with missing or zero year-end values.32 Dropping these funds reduces the
sample to 7,725 funds. Most of the funds do not report NAVs. However, following the
method employed by TASS database, we can backfill NAV values from reported return
values.33
Along with the time series variables, HFR database reports funds characteristics.
These include management fees, incentive fees, lockup period, redemption period, ad-
vance days notice, hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions. Fund characteristics are
reported one-time and, consistent with prior research, in our analysis we assume that
hedge funds have kept these structures unchanged through time.34 A total of 135 hedge
funds have missing information related to these fund characteristics. Dropping them
reduces the sample to 7,590 funds.
Returns can be reported net of all fees, net of only management fees or gross of all
fees. In our sample, 98% of the returns are reported net of all fees. Following standard
31None of these funds reported NAV when return was not reported, so we were unable to recuperate
missing returns from NAV.
32A total of 50 funds that have year-end AUM value set at zero (during their reporting period) are
eliminated as these would create problems in the formation of portfolios, as well as in the computation
of the Flow variable.
33Liang (2000) provides an in-depth explanation on this issue. For the funds that do not report NAV,
TASS assigns some hypothetical initial NAV and then backfills the missing NAVs from the initial NAV
and return numbers. HFR does not backfill the missing NAVs.
34Liang (2001) argues that hedge funds seldom modify their fee structure. He shows that less than 1%
of the funds in his sample changed their fee levels from 1997 to 1998, and that the change was related to
poor performance during 1998 financial crisis. We perform a similar study using characteristics reported
to HFR as of March 2007 and May 2010. We find that less than 1.4% (2.8%) of the funds in the sample
have changed their incentive fee (management fee) structure during this period. These numbers are
very low considering that the period under study embeds the recent financial crisis which had significant
negative effects in hedge fund performance. Hence, we believe that assuming fund characteristics to be
fixed will not have any significant effect on our analysis. Similar results hold for other fund characteristics.
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practice in academic studies, we consider only funds that report returns net of all fees,
which leaves us with a sample of 7,408 funds. The vast majority of the funds report
returns and assets under management in US Dollars. Dropping the remaining funds that
report variables in different currencies leaves us with a sample of 6,540 funds.
The fee structure of hedge funds requires further data filtering. Incentive fees are
based on performance over a predefined period, which in most cases is one year. Within
a few months after the period is over, the monthly return data is corrected by fund man-
agement to be reported as net of all fees. This updated data is then sent to data vendors;
hence it is important to leave a lag between data download and data analysis periods.35
Consistent with this fact, HFR states that “the trailing four months of performance are
subject to revision as HFR receives updates from lagged funds”.36 On account of these
two facts, we decide not to include 2010 data in our analysis.
We further restrict the sample period in order to mitigate the well known survivorship
bias. The survivorship bias is the tendency to exclude failed funds in performance
studies, eventually leading to incorrect results. As HFR tracks failing funds since 1994,
our final sample period covers the period January 1994 to December 2009. Given this
period, we require funds to have 3 lags of annual variables defined in order to be included
in the study. This implicitly restricts the sample to funds with at least three consecutive
years of history. Our main goal in this restriction is to keep the universe of funds across
portfolios fixed. Furthermore, the requirement of a two or three year length of return
history is applied in all the previous studies in the hedge funds literature.37 This is mainly
done to ensure that each fund has a long enough corrected time series for meaningful
regression results. Agarwal and Naik (2005) note that multi-period sampling bias occurs
because academic research requires a minimum of 24 month or 36 month returns for a
fund to be included in the sample. However, Fung and Hsieh (2000) find that this bias is
small with its magnitude being close to 0.6% when a 36 month minimum return history
is imposed.
35See Ackermann et al. (1999) for a detailed explanation.
36See HFR Indices Basic Methodology and FAQ available at
http://www.hedgefundresearch.com/index.php?fuse=indices-faq&1285989513.
37Note that requirement of two years return history is also implicitly applied in all studies where
annual variables are regressed on lagged annual variables.
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The final sample includes 3,540 hedge funds during the period 1994-2009 with basic
fund characteristics and 3 lags of annual variables defined. Of these funds, 1,644 are
active, 877 are not reporting and 1,019 are liquidated.
3.4.2 Variable Construction
In addition to the drawdown related variables defined and discussed before, in this
paper we also use other variables either for portfolio sorting or as controls in the re-
gression analysis. In particular, the following variables are used in the present paper:
flow, total delta, fees, gross return, age, volatility, alpha, Sharpe ratio, Calmar ratio,
and Sterling ratio.
In the construction of variables, we closely follow Agarwal et al. (2009), introducing
natural modifications for the new variables used in this paper. We define the monthly
dollar flow of fund i in month t as:
Monthly dollar flow i,t = AUMi,t −AUMi,t−1(1 +Returni,t).
Annual dollar flow of fund i in year t is the sum of the monthly dollar flows during year
t. The flow for a portfolio (P ) in year t is the sum of the annual dollar flows of the funds
in the portfolio scaled by the total AUM of the funds in the portfolio at the end of the
previous year:38
Flowp,t =
∑
iP Annual dollar flow i,t∑
iP AUMi,t−1
.
Total delta is the total expected dollar change in the manager’s compensation for a
1% change in NAV of the fund at the end of year. It is the summation of the delta from
investors’ assets (option delta) and the delta from the manager’s coinvestment assuming
38An exception to this definition is used in the regression analysis. Since we are following the regressions
performed in Agarwal et al. (2009) where the analysis is done on an annual basis, we use their definition
of Flow in the regression analysis. Here, the Flow of fund i is defined as the net dollar flow into the fund
in year t, scaled by AUM of the fund at the end of the year t− 1:
Flowi,t =
AUMi,t −AUMi,t−1(1 +Returni,t)
AUMi,t−1
.
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that manager reinvests in the fund all incentive fees collected over time. The computation
of deltas requires the computation of fees and gross returns simultaneously and then use
of Black-Scholes option pricing formula. See Appendix A in Agarwal et al. (2009) for the
details of the computation. Note that option delta of the fund is the sum of the deltas
from different sets of investors, each of whom have their own exercise price depending on
when they entered the fund (which determines the high-water marks that apply to each
investor). Hence, the computations are derived by tracking the entry/exit of investors
in the funds according to the funds’ net flows. Once annual fees are computed, we add
back one-twelfth of this each month for the past year to deduce monthly gross returns, as
in Agarwal and Naik (2000). Volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly returns
of the fund for a given year. Age is the age of the fund at the end of the year. In our
portfolio analysis, as in other studies, we focus on the intercept directly obtained from
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor regressions. We denote this intercept as alpha
and perform comparative analysis on its value and t-statistics.39
We follow Kestner (1996) for the computation of the Sharpe, Calmar and Sterling
ratios. Sharpe ratio is defined as the average monthly excess returns divided by the stan-
dard deviation of the excess returns (excess of risk free rate). To facilitate comparison
with Calmar and Sterling ratios, in the construction behind Figure 3.1 we calculate it
for a three-year period. Calmar ratio is defined as the average annual return over the
past three years divided by the maximum drawdown (MaxD) suffered over these three
years:
Calmari,t =
(Returni,t +Returni,t−1 +Returni,t−2)/3
MaxDi,t−2→t
.
Finally, Sterling ratio is defined as the average annual return over past three years
divided by average annual maximum drawdown over three years and 10% is added to
39An exception is done in the analysis of characteristics based portfolios reported in Figure 3.1. Here,
to obtain results comparable with those in Agarwal et al. (2009), Monthly alpha is estimated from the
fund-level time-series regression of excess returns on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, allowing for
structural breaks, and includes both the regression intercept and the regression residuals. Annual alpha
is the sum of the monthly alphas in a given year.
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the denominator:
Sterlingi,t =
(Returni,t +Returni,t−1 +Returni,t−2)/3
(MaxDi,t +MaxDi,t−1 +MaxDi,t−2)/3 + 10%
.
3.4.3 Summary statistics
In Table 3.1 we report the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis.
The results show that our sample shares the main properties of other samples used
elsewhere, including papers that use a larger set of funds. For instance, the comparison
of our summary statics and those in Agarwal et al. (2009)40 reveals that our funds are
very similar in terms of average returns, lockup period, restriction period, age, fees and
volatility. We notice that the presence of the high-water mark clause is more frequent
in our sample (91.6% of the funds) than in theirs (80.1% of the funds) and that hurdle
rates are much less frequent in our sample (12% versus 60.8%). The three most relevant
differences relate to size, flows and the incentive related variables. In particular, our
funds are relatively larger ($167 millions vs. $120.6 millions of AUM on average), receive
more inflows as a percentage of AUM (173% vs. 120% on average) and have a larger
average managerial ownership (11.6% versus 7.1% of AUM), option delta ($174.9 millions
versus $100.1 millions) and total delta ($331.4 millions versus $188.8 millions). We
believe these differences do not arise from a significant different composition of funds
in the samples but rather from the fact that in our sample we include the period 2003-
2009. During this, mostly bullish, period many funds grow in terms of AUM, receive
large inflows and experience returns that get them closer to their high-water marks,
what explains the larger option and total deltas.
40This paper uses a very comprehensive data set obtained as the union of funds in the CISDM, HFR,
MSCI and TASS databases.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of HFR Filtered Data Set
This table reports the summary statistics of HFR filtered data set. The sample period is 1994-2009.
Returns are the annual returns of the fund net of all fees. Gross returns are the annual gross returns of
the fund derived from net returns after taking into consideration fees, inflows and fund provisions.
Drawdown is one minus the ratio of the fund’s net asset value (NAV) to its maximum reached over the
fund’s entire history. Total delta is the total expected dollar change in the manager’s compensation for
a 1% change in the fund’s NAV. Option delta is the manager’s delta from investors’ assets in the fund.
Managerial ownership is the ratio of the manager’s investment in the fund to the AUM of the fund.
Hurdle rate is a provision that allows the manager to collect incentive fees only above a pre-specified
rate of return. High-water mark is a provision that allows the manager to collect incentive fees only
after recovering all past losses if they exist. In the table, we report the percentage of funds that have
hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions. Lockup period is the pre-specified period of time that an
investor cannot redeem her shares after investing in the fund. We report its statistics for the subsample
of funds that impose lockup period. Restriction period is given by the sum of the advanced days notice
and redemption period, where advanced days notice is the pre-specified period of time that the investor
must notify the fund’s managers of her intent to withdraw money and redemption period is the time
she has to wait to get her money after advanced days notice is over. Flow is the net dollar flows into
(or out of, if negative) the fund during the year, scaled by AUM of the fund at the end of the year.
Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of the monthly returns of the fund during the year. Age
is the age of the fund in years. Management fee is the percentage of fund’s net AUM that is paid
annually to the fund management for administering the fund. Incentive fee is the percentage of annual
profits captured by the fund management in reward for positive performance and is defined over some
benchmark or high-water mark.
25th 75th
Fund Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Percentile Median Percentile
Returns (% per year) 12.9 34.5 1.4 9.7 20.4
Gross returns (% per year) 15.9 41.7 1.7 11.5 24.4
Drawdown (% per year) 5.3 13.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
Total delta ($’000) 331.4 1064.7 15.3 65.9 245.1
Option delta ($’000) 174.9 563.2 5.8 31.9 125.6
Managerial ownership (% of AUM) 11.6 19.6 1.6 4.8 11.8
Hurdle rate (% of funds) 12.0
High watermark (% of funds) 91.6
Lockup period (years) 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
Restriction period (years) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4
Flow (%) 173.2 8935.8 -17.0 4.6 53.5
AUM ($M) 167.0 481.6 11.1 39.3 130.0
Volatility (%) 3.8 3.5 1.6 2.9 4.9
Age (years) 5.5 3.9 2.7 4.5 7.3
Management fee (%) 1.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.0
Incentive fee (%) 19.1 5.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
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Table 3.2: Main Characteristics of the 6 Drawdown Status Based Portfolios
This table reports the main characteristics of the six drawdown status based portfolios. The sample
period is January 1996-December 2009. At the end of each year t, we sort the drawdown of funds into
ten deciles. Lowest drawdown status (DS) Lag 1 portfolio is the the set of all hedge funds in the 1st
drawdown decile of year t− 1. Highest drawdown status Lag 1 portfolio is the the set of all hedge funds
in the 10th drawdown decile of year t− 1. Lag 2 portfolios are the set of all hedge funds that belong to
the intersection of the corresponding drawdown decile of years t− 1 and t− 2. Lag 3 portfolios are the
set of all hedge funds that belong to the intersection of the corresponding drawdown decile of years
t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3. Number of funds is the total number of funds in the portfolio at the beginning of
formation period. Annual dollar flow is the annualized net dollar flows into (or out of, if negative) the
funds in the portfolio during the year. See Table 3.1 for the definition of variables. Regarding number
of funds and AUM, we report their percentages over corresponding HFR portfolio values in parenthesis.
The percentages reported in parenthesis for dollar flow, total delta, option delta, manager delta and
incentive fees are defined over their portfolio values. To facilitate comparison, we report the averages of
the all variables over 14 years. All numbers are rounded to the nearest integer (for precision, numbers
that are less than one percent are are rounded to the first decimal in percentage).
Lowest DS Portfolios Highest DS Portfolios HFR
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
Number of funds 752 648 567 109 51 29 1089
(72%) (61%) (53%) (10%) (5%) (3%) (100%)
AUM ($M) 164,081 151,871 140,907 8,269 2,008 775 211,212
(80%) (71%) (64%) (5%) (2%) (0.4%) (100%)
Annual dollar flow ($M) 17,011 18,849 17,362 -1,182 -754 -194 11,164
(12%) (17%) (18%) (-10%) (-24%) (-16%) (7%)
Total delta ($M) 359 331 305 14 4 2 431
(0.3%) (0.3%) (0.3%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.2%) (0.2%)
Option delta ($M) 196 184 173 4 1 0.4 222
(0.1%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.1%)
Manager delta ($M) 163 147 133 10 3 1 209
(0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (0.1%)
Incentive fees ($M) 3,521 3,210 2,953 12 11 6 3,546
(3%) (3%) (3%) (0.2%) (0.6%) (1%) (2%)
Mean age (years) 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.6 6.9 7.3 6.4
Mean lockup period (years) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
Mean restriction period (years) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
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3.5 Drawdown Status and Performance: Portfolio Sorts
Analysis
In this section we analyze the relationship between hedge fund drawdown status
and performance using the portfolio sort methodology. We study a total of 6 portfolios
corresponding to the two extreme deciles, d = 1 and d = 10, for lags 1, 2 and 3. These
are the portfolios that at each period t + 1 hold all hedge funds that belong to the
corresponding sets DSd,t(T ), for d = 1, 10 and T = 1, 2, 3. In Table 3.2 we collect the
basic properties of the funds included in these 6 portfolios.41
Table 3.2 already reveals some very interesting properties of drawdown based port-
folios. First notice that, as conjectured in Section 3.2, the lowest drawdown status
portfolios are over crowded. On average, during the period January 1996 to December
2009, 72% of the funds have a one-lag drawdown equal to 0. This means that on a typical
year, 72% of the funds in the sample end the year setting a new historical high-water
mark. In principle, this stylized fact is consistent with both the existence of a lot of
talent in the hedge fund industry and the existence of a lot of mimicking funds which,
as we argued in Section 3.2, basically consist of untalented insurance sellers and (pure)
risk managers. The large figure is also explained by a lot of systematic risk in hedge
funds strategies. Also as expected, funds in the lowest drawdown decile are much larger
than funds in the highest drawdown decile. Furthermore, while the former attract large
inflows, the latter suffer capital outflows. Even more interestingly, low drawdown status
funds have a much larger total delta and charge much more money in incentive fees than
funds in the highest drawdown decile, which from an incentive perspective should result
in superior performance, according to the managers incentives hypothesis (Agarwal et
al. (2009)). Finally, regarding investment styles, the largest drawdown status portfolios
are relatively more populated with equity-hedge funds and relatively less populated with
event driven, macro and relative value funds.
41Notice that the sample period for the portfolios is January 1996-December 2009. This is due to the
requirement of having at least 200 funds in any given year in order to have meaningful portfolio sorts.
By January 1996 the sample included a total of 222 funds.
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative Net Returns of the Lowest Drawdown Status Portfolios (d = 1).
This figure presents the cumulative net returns of the lowest drawdown status portfolios. The sample
period is January 1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation.
In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 we plot the cumulative net returns of value weighted and
equally weighted portfolios for lags 1, 2 and 3 for the lowest drawdown decile (Figure
3.2) and the highest drawdown decile (Figure 3.3). For comparison purposes, we also
include the cumulative net return of the HFR portfolio in both figures. As we can ob-
serve in Figure 3.2, the cumulative returns of the lag 1, 2 and 3 portfolios are almost
indistinguishable across lags, for both the equally and value weighted portfolios. Fur-
thermore, the HFR portfolio tends to perform slightly better than the low drawdown
portfolios, specially during the last year of the sample. In conclusion, in the case of
the low drawdown status portfolios and performance measured in terms of cumulative
returns: 1) there is no clear pattern of improvement or deterioration in performance as
we increase the sorting lag, 2) all drawdown based portfolios perform worse than the
HFR portfolio. The picture that arises from Figure 3.3 is completely different. In the
case of the highest drawdown status portfolios and when performance is measured in
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Net Returns of the Highest Drawdown Status Portfolios (d = 10).
This figure presents the cumulative net returns of the highest drawdown status portfolios. The sample
period is January 1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation.
terms of cumulative returns: 1) performance improves as we increase the sorting lag,
and 2) all drawdown based portfolios do much better than the HFR portfolio. Two more
points are in order. First, the outperformance of the highest drawdown status relative
to the lowest drawdown status portfolios is huge. For instance, $1 invested in January
1996 in a low drawdown status portfolio results in a maximum portfolio value of 3.01$
in December 2009 (investing in the one-lag equally weighted portfolio). On the other
hand, $1 invested during the same period in the high drawdown status portfolio results
in maximal portfolio value of 13.71$ (investing in the 3-lag value weighted portfolio).
The final observation is that while equally weighted portfolios perform better than value
weighted portfolios in the case of the lowest drawdown status portfolios, the opposite
occurs in the case of the highest drawdown status portfolios. This means that while in
the former case the relatively small funds in the portfolios are the best performers, in
the later case the relatively larger funds are the best performers.
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We now assess the performance of the portfolios in terms of risk adjusted net returns.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the estimation results of Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model for our 6 portfolios.42 Table 3.3 reports the results for the lowest three and Table
3.4 for the highest three drawdown status portfolios. The tables corroborate that all
the previous conclusions reached in terms of cumulative returns hold true in the case
of risk adjusted returns. In particular, Table 3.3 shows that in the case of the lowest
drawdown status portfolios: 1) alphas are almost constant across lags and only the one
associated to the 3-lag portfolio is statistically significant at the standard significance
levels, and 2) all drawdown based portfolios underperform the HFR portfolio. In the case
of the highest drawdown status portfolios, Table 3.4 shows that: 1) all the alphas of the
drawdown based portfolios are significant at the 1% level; 2) alphas are increasing in the
lag; and, 3) all drawdown based portfolios outperform the HFR portfolio. It is important
to notice that the outstanding performance of the largest drawdown portfolios is not only
statistical but also economically significant. The alphas of the drawdown based portfolios
are always more than double the alphas of the HFR portfolio. In the case of the value
weighted 3-lag portfolio, it is more than 6 times larger! Finally, the improvement in
performance as we increase the lag is also quantitatively important. For instance, in the
case of value weighted portfolios alpha more than doubles, increasing from 0.64% in the
one-lag portfolio to 1.23% in the 3-lag portfolio.
The previous results are remarkable for several reasons. First, the poor performance
of the lowest drawdown portfolios relative to both the highest drawdown and the HFR
portfolio is against the predictions of our benchmark economy and quite paradoxical
when accounting for the main characteristics of the funds included in the sorts: their
expensiveness and their success at raising capital (large inflows). More important, our
results question the relationship between managers incentives (measured in terms of
total delta) and performance proposed elsewhere. The funds in the lowest drawdown
decile have the largest total delta, but they deliver the worst, rather than the best
as the incentives theory suggests, relative performance! Of course, we must take this
evidence with caution as the inferior performance could be explained by another hedge
42We thank David Hsieh for providing the risk factors on his web site:
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls.
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Table 3.3: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Lowest Drawdown Status Port-
folios (d = 1)
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the lowest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in
the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard
errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.18* 0.23** 0.22** 0.22** 0.34***
(1.18) (1.19) (1.22) (1.82) (2.16) (2.14) (2.31) (3.77)
SNP 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.29***
(5.22) (5.12) (5.09) (7.05) (7.12) (7.22) (7.34) (11.75)
SizeSpr 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.22***
(2.86) (2.77) (3.11) (4.03) (4.06) (4.23) (4.22) (6.54)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01*
(1.30) (1.37) (1.03) (1.35) (1.25) (1.20) (0.78) (1.69)
ComOpt 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02* 0.01* 0.01*
(1.83) (1.67) (1.41) (1.59) (2.19) (1.93) (1.84) (1.75)
BdOpt -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.78) (-1.72) (-1.67) (-1.68) (-1.19) (-1.12) (-0.93) (-0.08)
Bd10Yr 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.10** 0.10** 0.09* 0.06
(1.93) (1.83) (1.71) (1.88) (2.09) (2.00) (1.82) (1.64)
CredSpr 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.17** 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.16**
(1.41) (1.62) (1.64) (2.47) (1.14) (1.39) (1.32) (2.38)
Adjusted R2 41.8% 42.4% 44.3% 56.2% 49.9% 51.6% 51.6% 69.3%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
fund characteristic that affects negatively the performance of the funds in the lowest
drawdown decile. This issue is further explored in Section 3.8. In any case, following
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Table 3.4: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Highest Drawdown Status Port-
folios (d = 10)
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the highest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in
the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard
errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.64** 1.01*** 1.23*** 0.18* 0.80*** 1.05*** 1.10*** 0.34***
(2.48) (3.89) (3.35) (1.82) (3.40) (4.13) (3.32) (3.77)
SNP 0.54*** 0.59*** 0.47*** 0.21*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.49*** 0.29***
(7.87) (9.03) (4.88) (7.05) (10.37) (9.02) (6.47) (11.75)
SizeSpr 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.14*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.81*** 0.22***
(3.01) (4.21) (4.29) (4.03) (4.64) (4.87) (6.54) (6.54)
FXOpt 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01*
(0.50) (1.11) (1.65) (1.35) (1.28) (1.29) (1.26) (1.69)
ComOpt -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01*
(-1.04) (0.42) (0.55) (1.59) (-0.65) (0.54) (0.06) (1.75)
BdOpt 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02* 0.04** 0.03 0.03 -0.00
(0.68) (1.01) (0.60) (-1.68) (2.33) (1.62) (1.16) (-0.08)
Bd10Yr -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 0.08* -0.15 -0.16 -0.06 0.06
(-0.78) (-0.91) (-0.69) (1.88) (-1.57) (-1.46) (-0.47) (1.64)
CredSpr 0.20 -0.11 0.01 0.17** 0.21 0.05 0.10 0.16**
(1.20) (-0.70) (0.06) (2.47) (1.21) (0.32) (0.46) (2.38)
Adjusted R2 47.5% 44.6% 25.2% 56.2% 57.6% 53.1% 44.2% 69.3%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
the insights stated in Section 3.2, in the next section we explore some of the factors
behind the poor performance of the lowest drawdown portfolios and conclude that the
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evidence points at the decile being heavily populated by insurance sellers who do not
have skills to deliver outstanding performance. Hence, one view is that the presence of
insurance sellers is (one of) the reason(s) behind the failure of the incentives hypothesis
in our exercise. Strictly speaking, the incentives hypothesis does not apply to insurance
sellers. However, these are funds that tend to have a large total delta. So, their heavy
presence in the lowest drawdown decile distorts the relationship between incentives and
performance, as for these funds we cannot expect superior performance (in spite of having
high incentives when measured in terms of total delta). The second striking result is
that, again contrary to what is expected in our benchmark economy, the increase in the
lag when drawing from the largest drawdown decile results in an increase in performance.
The evidence is, hence, in favor of the Darwinian selection process being in place. In
the next section we also explore this result in more detail.
3.6 Dissecting the Performance of Drawdown Status Based
Portfolios
In this section we explore in further detail the performance of our six portfolios to
get a better understanding of the striking results obtained in Section 3.5. Our analysis
provides evidence in favor of a heavy presence of insurance sellers in the lowest drawdown
portfolios and corroborates the existence of a Darwinian selection mechanism operating
among the large drawdown funds.
3.6.1 Assessing the Presence of Insurance Sellers: Performance in
Times of Crises
In Section 3.2 we argued that one of the reason that can revert the predictions of the
benchmark economy is the presence of low drawdown mimicking hedge funds. Among
these we included the case of hedge funds pursuing insurance selling strategies. These
funds are characterized by the implementation of strategies that perform well in normal
market conditions, but suffer large loses in times of crisis. Hence, one way to spot their
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presence in the lowest drawdown portfolios consists on comparing the performance of
the low drawdown portfolios in normal versus crisis times. To facilitate comparisons, we
explore next the performance in normal versus times of crisis for both the lowest and
highest drawdown status portfolios.
We assess performance in periods of crisis in two alternative ways. The first approach
consists on directly computing the average returns of the portfolios in times of crisis.
This approach provides a direct assessment of performance in terms of raw returns
(returns not adjusted to risk). The second approach consists on computing the alphas
in the context of the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model including only the
normal times in the analysis. The comparison of these alphas in normal times to the
alphas associated to all times, which include the crisis periods, is also revealing of the
performance of the portfolios during crisis, but this time in terms of risk-adjusted returns.
Given that insurance sellers implement strategies that resemble the rolling over of short
position on deep out of the money put options, we define crisis periods as those months
in which we should expect the largest losses for these type of strategies. In the case
of equity funds, these loses must be associated to very negative returns of the S&P
index. They do not need to coincide with the month in which the the S&P falls, but
perhaps the next few months. This is so because of two main reasons that reinforce
each other. First, the fund manager may choose to hold on to the short position to
avoid realizing loses in the crash month. Second, it may be the case that liquidity dries
up in the options market during the crash month and managers may find it difficult to
close the position. Given these considerations, we define “crisis” periods as the quarter
that includes the month in which the S&P falls by more than 10% and the two months
afterward. This criteria results in the following crisis quarters: August-October 1998,
September-November 2002, October-December 2008 and February-April 2009. These
periods coincide with well-known events: the first is related to the LTCM crisis; the
second, to the “market confidence” crisis related to the Argentine default, accounting
restatements after ENRON, terrorist threat to the US, etc.; the third, to the collapse
of Lehman Brothers; and, the last to the further deterioration of the current financial
crisis. Finally, we define as “normal” times the rest of months in our sample, January
1996-December 2009.
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Table 3.5: Performance in Normal Times and in Times of Crisis
Panel A of this table reports the mean monthly raw returns of the portfolios during periods of crisis for
the drawdown based portfolios. The periods of crisis are: August-October 1998, September-November
2002, October-December 2008, February-April 2009. Panel B reports OLS intercepts in percentage
form when excess returns of drawdown based portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven
factors, excluding the periods of crisis. In explanation, the sample period is January 1996-December
2009; but excluding periods of crisis from the regression. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio
formation. Factors are described in the text. Standard errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Performance in Times of Crisis (Mean Returns in %)
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Lowest DS Portfolios
in times of crisis -1.58 -1.58 -1.54 -1.37 -1.21 -1.29 -1.17 -0.72
in the whole period 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.79
Highest DS Portfolios
in times of crisis -0.54 1.59 2.87 -1.37 0.70 1.17 1.88 -0.72
in the whole period 1.11 1.49 1.71 0.63 1.24 1.53 1.65 0.79
Panel B: Performance in Normal Times (Regression Coefficients)
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Lowest DS Portfolios
in normal times 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.40***
in the whole period 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.18* 0.23** 0.22** 0.22** 0.34***
Highest DS Portfolios
in normal times 0.68*** 0.88*** 1.03*** 0.30*** 0.72*** 0.95*** 0.92*** 0.40***
in the whole period 0.64** 1.01*** 1.23*** 0.18* 0.80*** 1.05*** 1.10*** 0.34***
In Table 3.5 we report the results of this exercise. Panel A of Table 3.5 reports the
average raw net returns of the portfolios during periods of crisis for the equally and
value weighted portfolios associated to the highest and lowest 3-lag drawdown status
portfolios. As we can observe, during periods of crisis all the lowest drawdown status
portfolios do worse than the HFR portfolio. While this is also true when looking at
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the whole sample (including both normal and crisis periods), the underperformance is
much more pronounced in crisis periods. This result is specially strong in the case of
equally weighted portfolios: while these portfolios only do marginally worse than the
HFR portfolio in the whole sample, they have negative alphas in crisis periods that
almost double in size the one of the HFR portfolio. For instance, the average monthly
loss of 0.72% of the HFR portfolio is almost half the size of the average monthly loss
of 1.29% associated to the 2-lag equally weighted lowest drawdown status portfolio.
These results clearly point at a heavier presence of insurers in the lowest drawdown
portfolios than in the whole HFR universe. They also suggest that insurers tend to
be relatively small funds. On the other hand, the opposite picture arises when looking
at the performance of the highest drawdown status portfolios. These portfolios not
only do better than the HFR portfolio during crisis periods, but remarkably exhibit
positive returns during these periods (in all but the one-lag value weighted portfolio).
For instance, while the value weighted HFR portfolio suffers an average monthly loss
of 1.37% during crisis periods, the 3-lag highest drawdown status portfolio yields and
average gain of 2.87%. Furthermore, the overperformance relative to the HFR portfolio
is much stronger in periods of crisis than during the whole period. These results suggest
a very small presence, if not the complete absence, of insurers among the funds in the
largest drawdown status portfolios.
Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the alphas and their levels of significance of the dif-
ferent portfolios in normal times, that is excluding the crisis periods. To facilitate the
comparisons, we also include the alphas for the whole period (including crisis periods)
reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The results are truly remarkable and clearly reinforce all
the conclusions inferred from the examination of Panel A. As we can observe, while the
lowest drawdown status portfolios always do better, in terms of risk adjusted returns, in
normal times than during the whole period, the opposite happens to the highest draw-
down status portfolios, whose performance is much better in the whole period than in
normal times (with the only exception of the one-lag value weighted portfolio). The first
observation is, again, consistent with the heavy presence of insurers among the funds
in the lowest drawdown status portfolios; the second is consistent with the absence of
insurers in the highest drawdown status portfolios. Notice also that the comparison of
126
alphas in normal times versus the whole period allows us to conjecture about risk ad-
justed returns in times of crisis. In particular, the results reported in Panel B suggest
that while risk adjusted returns are negative for the lowest drawdown status portfolios
in times of crisis, they are positive for the highest drawdown status portfolios in such
periods. Hence, our conclusion on raw returns in times of crisis (Panel A) also apply to
risk adjusted returns during these periods (Panel B).
In summary, the evidence reported in Table 3.5 is supportive of the following three
important conclusions: 1) there is a heavy presence of insurance sellers among the funds
in the lowest drawdown status portfolios, 2) insurance sellers are probably absent among
the funds in the highest drawdown status portfolios; and 3) very remarkable, while the
highest drawdown status portfolios perform extraordinarily well in times of crisis, both in
terms of raw as well as risk adjusted returns, the opposite occurs to the lowest drawdown
status portfolios.
3.6.2 Assessing the Stop Reporting and Darwinian Survival Processes
In Section 3.2 we argued that the predictions of the benchmark economy in terms of
the sequential T -lags analysis could be reversed if the “stop reporting” and the “Dar-
winian selection” processes were very intense. In the previous section we did not find
any patterns on the performance of the lowest drawdown portfolios as we increase the
sorting lag. But we did find strong evidence consistent with the Darwinian selection
process in the performance of the largest drawdown portfolios. In this subsection we
explore these processes in more detail. A first approximation to this issue consist of
computing the average number of consecutive years that a fund that stops reporting
during the portfolio formation period stays in the d = 1 decile, and the average number
of consecutive years that a fund that is liquidated during the portfolio formation period
stays in the d = 10 decile. In Figure 3.4 we report the time series of these average times.
Panel A of Figure 3.4 reveals that on average funds in the lowest drawdown decile that
stop reporting during the portfolio formation period stay in the low drawdown decile for
3.09 consecutive years (that is, more than 3 years). This means that the stop reporting
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process cannot impose a clear bias in the relative performance of the lagged portfolios.
In plain words, it cannot be the case that the lag 2 and 3 portfolios do better or worse
than the lag 1 portfolio because the good funds that stop reporting are mechanically
excluded from those portfolios. On the other hand, Panel B of Figure 3.4 reports that on
average funds in the highest drawdown decile that liquidate in the portfolio formation
period stay in the highest drawdown decile for 1.78 consecutive years (that is, less than
2 years). This number constitutes corroborating evidence for the Darwinian selection
hypothesis. If we associate liquidating funds to funds managed by untalented traders,
the fact that on average these funds survive in the highest drawdown decile for just 1.78
consecutive years imply that these funds will tend to be excluded from the portfolios as
we increase the sorting lag from 1 to 3 years.
Figure 3.4: Stop Reporting and Liquidation of Funds in the Portfolios. Panel A of this
figure presents the average number of consecutive years that a fund that stops reporting during the
portfolio formation period stays in the d = 1 decile. Panel B of this figure presents the average number
of consecutive years that a fund that is liquidated during the portfolio formation period stays in the
d = 10 decile. The sample period is 1996-2009.
In summary, the statistics reported in Figure 3.4 corroborate that: 1) the stop re-
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porting problem does not generate any explicit bias in the relative performance of the
lowest drawdown portfolios as we increase the lag, and 2) the Darwinian selection pro-
cess is, at least, one of the mechanisms that generates an improvement in the relative
performance of the lowest drawdown portfolios as we increase the sorting lag.
Figure 3.5: Flows of Surviving vs. Liquidating Funds. This figure plots the time series of the
average 12-month lagged flows –excluding the flows of the liquidation month– of the portfolio of funds
in the 3-lag highest drawdown decile (surviving funds) vs. the portfolio of funds in the 3-lag highest
drawdown status portfolio that are liquidated (liquidating funds). There are no funds in the latter
portfolio during 1996-1997. Hence, the sample period of comparison is 1998-2009.
From now until the rest of the section we concentrate on the Darwinian selection
process. If the Darwinian selection mechanism is in place, then we should expect that
funds that survive for several periods in the largest drawdown decile experience less out-
flows than funds that belong to the same decile but stop reporting. After all, according
to the hypothesis, lag-3 high drawdown funds survive because (some) investors decide
that it is best for them to stay than to exit and move to a new fund. We now test
this prediction of the Darwinian selection hypothesis. In order not to contaminate the
measurement of the flows of the liquidated funds with the flows of the liquidation month,
129
we use 12-month lagged flows excluding the liquidation month. In Figure 3.5 we plot
the time series of the 12-month lagged total flows to AUM of the portfolio of funds that
survive in the lag-3 highest drawdown decile (surviving funds) versus the portfolio of
funds in lag-3 highest decile that liquidate (liquidating funds). The figure clearly shows
that surviving funds suffer much less outflows than liquidating funds. In particular, in
all but three years the outflows associated to the portfolio of liquidating funds are much
larger than the ones associated to surviving funds. In years such as 1998, 2000, 2002,
2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009 the differences in outflows are truly remarkable. This is clear
evidence in favor of the Darwinian selection mechanism that adds to the one already
reported in terms of outstanding performance of the high drawdown status portfolios.
Finally, we analyze managerial ownership as a final test of the Darwinian selection
mechanism. In the Introduction we argued that funds in the highest drawdown status
portfolio may survive because of management self-confidence rather than investors ex-
tended trust. If managerial self-confidence were the main driving force, then we should
expect surviving funds to be (almost) fully owned by managers. In there we also argued
that if this were the case we should expect talented managers to opt for closing the fund
and start a new one. To clarify matters, we compute the time series of the the aver-
age managerial ownership of the funds in the 3-lag highest drawdown status portfolios.
Managerial ownership is computed following Agarwal et al. (2009). The construction
assumes that the manager starts the fund with zero ownership but from that point on
reinvests in the fund all incentive fees collected over time. On the one hand, assuming
a zero initial ownership may end up underestimating the true managerial stake in the
fund; but, on the other hand, the assumption of full reinvestment of fees may result
in an upward bias. In any case, the exercise is worthwhile undertaking. In Figure 3.6
we plot the time series of managerial ownership of the portfolio of funds in the 3-lag
large drawdown status portfolio. As we can observe, the average managerial ownership
is always below 25%; furthermore, at every point in time more than 80% of funds have
a managerial ownership below 50%. These figures are clearly in favor of the Darwinian
selection hypothesis as they corroborate that external investors in the fund opt to stay
through hard times of large drawdowns.
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Figure 3.6: Managerial Ownership in Surviving Funds. Panel A of this figure plots the time
series of managerial ownership of the portfolio of funds in the 3-lag high drawdown status portfolio.
Panel B plots the fraction of funds in the 3-lag large drawdown status portfolio that have a managerial
ownership below 50%. The sample period is 1996-2009.
3.7 Robustness Checks
In this subsection we explore in further detail the performance of our six drawdown
based portfolios. First, we verify that our previous results also hold when analyzing
the performance of the portfolios in terms of the funds’ gross rather than net returns.
Second, we establish robustness when controlling for economically relevant hedge fund
characteristics. In particular we show that our results hold when controlling for the
number of funds, size, style, and age of the funds in the portfolios. Third, we show the
robustness of the results when making extreme assumptions on the returns of liquidated
funds. Fourth, we investigate if the abnormal performance of the large drawdown funds
is explained by liquidity risk bearing. Finally, we verify that the results are not driven by
the well documented backfilling bias and that they survive when accounting for structural
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breaks.
3.7.1 Performance in Terms of Gross Returns
In the previous section we found that the lowest drawdown status portfolios under-
perform the highest drawdown status portfolios. This result was derived using the funds’
net return as reported by hedge fund managers. Since net returns are returns net of fees,
the result can be driven by the largest fees charged by the lowest drawdown status funds.
In other words, it may be the case that the under performance of the lowest drawdown
portfolios may vanish when we measure performance in terms of gross, rather than net,
returns. In this subsection we redo the whole analysis of the previous section but using
the funds’ gross returns.
Gross returns are derived from net returns using the methodology in Agarwal et al.
(2009). As explained in Section 4.2, each fund’s gross returns are derived by tracking the
entry/exit of investors in the funds according to the funds inflows/outflows and taking
into account the individual high-water marks that apply to each investor in the fund to
derive the fees charged by the fund manager. We believe the fees estimated with this
methodology constitute the best possible proxy to the actual fees charged by the fund.
Consequently, in our view, gross returns are computed using a sound methodology.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are the equivalent to Tables 3.3 and 3.4 when using hedge funds’
gross returns, instead of the funds’ net returns. According to Table 3.6, the performance
of the low drawdown portfolios improves when measured in terms of gross returns, but
still all alphas are smaller than the alpha of the HFR portfolio. Consequently, our previ-
ous result regarding the small drawdown portfolios remains valid. The outperformance
of the large drawdown portfolios, both in isolation and when compared with the HFR
portfolio, is confirmed in Table 3.7. All this means that: 1) the under-performance of
the lowest drawdown status portfolios is not explained by the larger fees they charge
to investors, and that 2) the over-performance, and the increasing performance in the
lag, of the highest drawdown status portfolios are not driven by small fees. Hence, we
conclude asserting that all the conclusions on performance obtained in Section 3.5 are
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robust to the type of returns used for performance evaluation.
Table 3.6: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Lowest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Gross Returns
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess gross returns of the lowest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in
the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard
errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.53***
(2.75) (2.80) (2.88) (3.43) (3.99) (3.99) (4.20) (5.71)
SNP 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.29***
(5.28) (5.17) (5.14) (7.08) (7.21) (7.31) (7.44) (11.79)
SizeSpr 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.22***
(2.82) (2.74) (3.08) (3.98) (4.00) (4.17) (4.15) (6.42)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(1.25) (1.34) (0.99) (1.31) (1.19) (1.14) (0.72) (1.63)
ComOpt 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01*
(1.88) (1.72) (1.45) (1.64) (2.28) (2.01) (1.91) (1.82)
BdOpt -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.76) (-1.72) (-1.67) (-1.67) (-1.09) (-1.04) (-0.85) (-0.01)
Bd10Yr 0.09* 0.08* 0.07 0.07* 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.06
(1.80) (1.73) (1.60) (1.75) (1.90) (1.82) (1.65) (1.45)
CredSpr 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.17** 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.16**
(1.40) (1.62) (1.64) (2.45) (1.09) (1.35) (1.27) (2.32)
Adjusted R2 41.6% 42.3% 44.2% 55.9% 49.3% 51.0% 51.0% 68.7%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 3.7: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Highest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Gross Returns
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess gross returns of the highest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in
the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard
errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.76*** 1.15*** 1.43*** 0.35*** 0.94*** 1.24*** 1.32*** 0.53***
(2.93) (4.42) (3.73) (3.43) (3.96) (4.80) (3.92) (5.71)
SNP 0.54*** 0.59*** 0.47*** 0.21*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.49*** 0.29***
(7.80) (9.06) (4.77) (7.08) (10.20) (8.93) (6.36) (11.79)
SizeSpr 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.14*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.81*** 0.22***
(3.00) (4.23) (4.28) (3.98) (4.60) (4.86) (6.51) (6.42)
FXOpt 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.49) (1.11) (1.61) (1.31) (1.26) (1.24) (1.21) (1.63)
ComOpt -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01*
(-1.00) (0.44) (0.55) (1.64) (-0.61) (0.60) (0.13) (1.82)
BdOpt 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02* 0.04** 0.03* 0.03 -0.00
(0.69) (1.05) (0.67) (-1.67) (2.34) (1.71) (1.26) (-0.01)
Bd10Yr -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 0.07* -0.15 -0.17 -0.08 0.06
(-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.72) (1.75) (-1.60) (-1.52) (-0.58) (1.45)
CredSpr 0.21 -0.11 0.03 0.17** 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.16**
(1.23) (-0.68) (0.13) (2.45) (1.24) (0.34) (0.47) (2.32)
Adjusted R2 47.4% 44.6% 24.9% 55.9% 57.2% 52.6% 43.6% 68.7%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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3.7.2 Controlling for the number of funds in the portfolios and other
hedge fund characteristics (size, age and strategy)
Table 3.2 reveals that the lowest and largest drawdown portfolios are very different
in terms of the number of funds in the portfolios and in terms of some well-known char-
acteristics that the literature has identified as related to performance. In this subsection
we investigate whether our results in the previous section are explained by these factors.
A few remarks are in order before analyzing the role played by these factors in our
analysis. First, notice that the different number of hedge funds included in the portfolios
can not be the explanation of our results per se. This is obvious when observing that the
lowest drawdown portfolios not only underperform the largest drawdown ones, but also
the HFR portfolio, which is the largest portfolio in terms of number of funds. In any
case, in the exercises that follow we do control for the number of funds in the portfolios.
Second, regarding the role played by alternative characteristics on our results, as noticed
in the introduction, the finding of a hedge fund characteristic that is very important in
explaining our results would definitively tone down the value of drawdown status as a
hedge fund characteristic, but would not challenge the value of drawdown status analysis.
Using the portfolio sorts methodology, in the previous subsection we obtained two
main results. First, we found that largest drawdown status portfolios exhibit outstand-
ing performance and that the performance is increasing in the sorting lag. Second, we
showed that the highest drawdown status portfolios outperform the lowest drawdown
status portfolios. One way to test if these results are explained by an alternative char-
acteristic consists of checking for the robustness of the results to conditional sorting.
For instance, in order to check if the results are driven by size, we would verify if the
results still hold true for the sub-portfolios sorted by size within each of the drawdown
status categories. One of the necessary conditions for this approach is the existence of
enough funds and heterogeneity in terms of the new alternative characteristic in each of
the drawdown status categories. Unfortunately this is not our case. First notice that
the number of funds in the largest drawdown status portfolios ranges between 29 and
109. Any sub-portfolio of these according to some characteristic would necessarily result
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on a meaningless portfolio due to lack of diversification. On the other hand, regarding
heterogeneity, consider for instance a characteristic such as total delta. Even if we had
more funds in the largest drawdown status portfolios, so that a double sort on total delta
could result in meaningful portfolios, we still would have a pool of hedge funds whose
total delta is not comparable to the one of the lowest drawdown status portfolios. Hence
a conditional sorts exercise is just not feasible in our case. Instead we rely on a weaker
test that only addresses our second finding in the previous subsection, namely, that the
largest drawdown status portfolios outperform the lowest drawdown status portfolios.
For this reason, the results in this section should be taken together with those in Section
3.8 where we can better control for alternative hedge fund characteristics.
To analyze the role played by the number of funds in the portfolios and alterna-
tive characteristics on the superior performance of the largest drawdown portfolios we
compare the performance of the largest drawdown portfolios to matching portfolios in
number of funds, size, strategy and age drawn from the lowest drawdown decile.43 More
specifically, we proceed as follows. First, at the end of each period t, for each lag T we
sort all funds in the lowest drawdown set, DS1,t(T ), in size quintiles and age terciles.
Second, for each fund in the largest drawdown portfolio, DS10,t(T ), we randomly draw
a matching hedge fund from the corresponding DS1,t(T ) with the same strategy and in
the intersection of the quantiles to which the hedge fund characteristics belong to. For
instance, suppose a fund has the following characteristics: it has $500 million of AUM,
it is an event driven fund and it is 6 years old. Then the matching fund is an event
driven fund randomly chosen from those funds in the intersection of the size quintile
that includes $500 million and the age tercile that includes 6 years. We then compute
the returns of this matching control portfolio, and compare its performance to the corre-
sponding largest drawdown portfolio. Table 3.8 reports the performance of the matching
portfolios. Comparing Table 3.8 and Table 3.3 we verify an overall improvement in the
performance of the small drawdown portfolios when funds are sorted according to the
characteristics of the large drawdown portfolios (matching portfolios). In the case of
43Table 3.2 also shows that the lowest and largest drawdown portfolios are very different in terms of
total delta. Unfortunately, we have not been able to control for this characteristic in our exercise as
reasonable matching funds in terms of this characteristic do not exist in the lowest drawdown portfolios.
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value weighted portfolios, the 3-lag portfolio now exhibits a significant alpha, which is
larger than the alpha of the HFR portfolio; in the case of the equally weighted port-
folios, all alphas remain significant but now are in line with the alpha of HFR, while
before they were much lower. But, although performance improves, it still is short to
explain the out-performance of the large drawdown portfolios. In particular, comparing
Table 3.8 and Table 3.4, we see that the alphas of the large drawdown portfolios are
close to three times bigger than the alpha of the matching portfolios. This means that
the characteristics included in the present exercise only explain a small fraction of the
outstanding performance of the high drawdown status portfolios. Hence, we conclude
that drawdown status is a hedge fund characteristic that predicts future performance
both unconditionally and when controlling for the relevant characteristics.
3.7.3 De-reporting Returns
Hedge funds stop reporting to databases for two very different reasons: success and
death. Ex ante we should expect that the first reason is more relevant for the lowest
and the second for the highest drawdown status portfolios. If this is the case, then
it could be possible that the difference in performance of these two portfolios arises
because we are not properly accounting for the actual returns of hedge funds when
they stop reporting. Fortunately, HFR classify dead funds into the “not reporting” and
“liquidated” categories.44 Hence we can make suitable assumptions on the de-reporting
returns that apply to each of these cases in order to verify if our results are driven by
this phenomena. This is the approach we adopt in this subsection.
Regarding liquidated funds, following Posthuma and van der Sluis (2003) we add an
extra -50% return in their last month of reporting. This is extremely conservative as
inferred from the analysis of Ackermann et al (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2006) and Hodder
et al. (2008). Regarding the de-reporting return for funds that stop reporting (but are
44In the previous versions of HFR database, the information on whether a fund is “not reporting” or
“liquidated” was missing for some funds and the fund was classified as “liquidated/no longer reporting”.
Hence some papers had developed diagnosis to classify funds into “not reporting” and “liquidated”
categories. See for instance, Fung et al. (2008). But in our recent version of HFR database, this
information is available for all funds, hence we do not need further diagnosis.
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Table 3.8: Performance Controlling for Size, Age, Strategy and the Number
of Funds
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the matching portfolios are
regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The sample period is January 1996-December 2009.
Matching portfolios are created as follows. First, at the end of each period t, we sort all funds in the
lowest drawdown set, into quintiles according to size and into terciles according to age. Second, for
each fund in the largest decile portfolio, we randomly draw a matching hedge fund from the lowest
decile portfolio with the same strategy and in the intersection of the corresponding quantiles in which
hedge fund characteristics belong to. Factors are described in the text. All return series are multiplied
by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard errors are white
heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.26 0.24 0.48** 0.18* 0.34*** 0.31** 0.34* 0.34***
(1.45) (1.36) (2.10) (1.82) (2.67) (2.34) (1.75) (3.77)
SNP 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.29***
(4.95) (5.85) (5.73) (7.05) (8.29) (7.69) (7.48) (11.75)
SizeSpr 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.14** 0.14*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.22***
(5.24) (3.52) (2.02) (4.03) (5.11) (5.39) (3.20) (6.54)
FXOpt 0.02** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.01*
(2.47) (0.84) (1.32) (1.35) (1.75) (1.87) (0.37) (1.69)
ComOpt -0.00 0.03** 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01*
(-0.36) (2.53) (1.33) (1.59) (0.24) (1.17) (1.29) (1.75)
BdOpt -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(-1.29) (-0.94) (-0.81) (-1.68) (-0.74) (-0.82) (-0.89) (-0.08)
Bd10Yr 0.08 0.17** 0.08 0.08* 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.06
(1.49) (2.45) (1.01) (1.88) (1.31) (1.38) (0.31) (1.64)
CredSpr 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.17** 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.16**
(0.51) (1.02) (0.22) (2.47) (0.90) (-0.31) (-0.27) (2.38)
Adjusted R2 41.3% 39.4% 31.8% 56.2% 55.4% 54.9% 46.3% 69.3%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
138
not liquidated), there is not much we can do. It is true that investors in these funds
probably will continue enjoying large returns, but any assumption regarding this in our
analysis would be arbitrary. So, for these funds we just keep the last return provided
by the manager as we did before. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 report the equivalent results to
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, but when using the previous criteria for the returns of liquidated
funds.
The comparison of Table 3.9 (correcting liquidated fund returns) and Table 3.3 (with-
out correction) reveals that the correction severely reduces the performance of the port-
folios, which implies either a heavy presence of liquidated funds in the low drawdown
status portfolios or that the correction is too strong to take it seriously. Under the cor-
rection, none of the portfolios exhibit statistically significant alphas. If we ignore the lack
of statistical significance, we can observe that the main qualitative properties of Table
3.3 remain true in Table 3.9, namely: all the drawdown based portfolios underperform
the HFR portfolio and there is no improvement nor deterioration in performance as we
increase the sorting lag. The comparison of Tables 3.10 and 3.4 also reveals a heavy
presence of liquidated funds in the high drawdown status portfolios or that the correc-
tion imposed in returns is too strong. Unlike in the previous case, all alphas remain
larger than the alpha of the HFR portfolio (which is not statistically significant) and all,
but the one-lag portfolio, exhibit statistically significant alphas. In particular, the 3-lag
value weighted portfolio has an alpha of 0.99% which is statistically significant at the
99% confidence level and almost 10 times bigger than the alpha of the HFR portfolio
(not significant). Hence, we observe that Table 3.10 delivers the same qualitative results
as Table 3.4, namely: all the drawdown based portfolios outperform the HFR portfolio
(with the single exception of the one-lag portfolios) and performance increases as we
increase the sorting lag. In summary, our results in Section 3.5 are not challenged at
all when correcting returns to account for funds liquidation using, perhaps, a too strong
criteria. Hence, the different returns of the low versus high drawdown status portfolios
cannot be explained by the returns of liquidated funds.
Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the choice of the liquidation return.
As Table 3.11 demonstrates, both of the 3-lag highest drawdown portfolios preserve
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Table 3.9: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Lowest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Liquidated Funds Returns
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the lowest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors after correcting for liquidated funds
returns. Returns are corrected in the sense that for the funds that are liquidated, we respectively add
an extra negative return of 50% in their last month of reporting. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in
the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard
errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.11
(0.65) (0.62) (0.63) (1.03) (0.44) (0.35) (0.43) (1.17)
SNP 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.29***
(5.51) (5.46) (5.51) (7.23) (7.06) (7.19) (7.34) (11.83)
SizeSpr 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.21***
(2.82) (2.74) (3.08) (3.80) (3.73) (3.96) (3.95) (5.96)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(1.18) (1.26) (0.91) (1.25) (0.92) (0.87) (0.48) (1.27)
ComOpt 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.01*
(1.83) (1.67) (1.42) (1.57) (2.17) (1.92) (1.86) (1.74)
BdOpt -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.94) (-1.91) (-1.89) (-1.80) (-1.41) (-1.46) (-1.32) (-0.23)
Bd10Yr 0.09* 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10* 0.10* 0.09 0.06
(1.73) (1.63) (1.51) (1.63) (1.76) (1.73) (1.54) (1.24)
CredSpr 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16** 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.15**
(1.29) (1.49) (1.49) (2.28) (0.96) (1.19) (1.08) (2.00)
Adjusted R2 41.5% 42.2% 44.0% 55.2% 47.3% 49.4% 49.1% 67.3%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 3.10: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Highest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Liquidated Funds Returns
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the highest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors after correcting for liquidated funds
returns. Returns are corrected in the sense that for the funds that are liquidated, we respectively add
an extra negative return of 50% in their last month of reporting. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in
the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in percentage form. Standard
errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.27 0.56* 0.99*** 0.10 0.33 0.66** 0.73** 0.11
(1.02) (1.87) (2.69) (1.03) (1.42) (2.55) (2.16) (1.17)
SNP 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.48*** 0.21*** 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.52*** 0.29***
(8.24) (6.99) (4.94) (7.23) (11.06) (8.59) (6.79) (11.83)
SizeSpr 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.14*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.81*** 0.21***
(2.81) (4.30) (4.39) (3.80) (4.62) (4.69) (6.28) (5.96)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.50) (0.96) (1.07) (1.25) (1.01) (1.28) (0.86) (1.27)
ComOpt -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01*
(-0.89) (0.48) (0.66) (1.57) (-0.53) (0.41) (-0.02) (1.74)
BdOpt 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.02* 0.04** 0.03* 0.03 -0.00
(0.51) (1.42) (0.80) (-1.80) (2.08) (1.83) (1.22) (-0.23)
Bd10Yr -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.16 -0.15 -0.06 0.06
(-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.29) (1.63) (-1.59) (-1.29) (-0.40) (1.24)
CredSpr 0.23 -0.05 0.13 0.16** 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.15**
(1.34) (-0.32) (0.62) (2.28) (1.25) (0.85) (0.62) (2.00)
Adjusted R2 48.0% 41.3% 28.4% 55.2% 59.3% 53.8% 44.8% 67.3%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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their high and significantly positive alphas even if we assume that liquidation return
is -70%. Moreover, value weighted portfolios have a significant alpha at all levels of
liquidation return. On the contrary, lowest drawdown status portfolios, along with the
HFR portfolio, do not have significant alphas at any level. Moreover, equally weighted
portfolios have negative alphas, although insignificant.
3.7.4 Controlling for Liquidity
Funds that specialize in illiquid investments often impose long lockup and restriction
periods. These funds are less liquid and investors in the fund require an extra return for
the lack of liquidity. This observation suggests that one of the possible reasons behind the
outstanding performance of our large drawdown portfolios is that they just compensate
investors for bearing a large liquidity risk. If this were the case, we would also have
a problem with our Darwinian selection hypothesis as this requires enough liquidity so
that investors can exit from the unfitted funds, funds managed by untalented traders.
Hence, analyzing liquidity plays a dual role because it entails a liquidity premium and
affects investors discretionality. Verifying that our results survive the liquidity test is a
must.
There are two approaches to liquidity in hedge fund management: the analysis of
lockup and restriction periods, and the addition of a liquidity factor in the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) model.45 Regarding lockup and restriction periods, Table 3.2 of Section 3.5
already revealed that these cannot be the explanation of the outstanding performance
of the large drawdown portfolios relative to the low drawdown portfolios, as the average
lockup and restriction periods are almost identical across the board. Although this is
perhaps sufficient to disregard liquidity considerations, we further analyze the issue in
the context of our portfolio sorts methodology. Following Ramadorai (2012), for each
fund we define the variable withdrawal restriction as the sum of the fund’s lockup and
restriction periods. Then we analyze the performance of our drawdown based portfolios
when restricted to include only funds that satisfy some criteria in terms of the withdrawal
45See, for instance, Gibson and Wang (2010) and Aragon (2007).
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Table 3.11: Liquidated Funds Returns: Sensitivity Analysis
This table reports OLS intercepts in percentage form when excess returns of the drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors after correcting for liquidated funds
returns. Returns are corrected as such: For the funds that are liquidated, we respectively add an extra
negative return in their last month of reporting. For brevity, results are reported for negative returns
of 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% and 100%. The sample period is January 1996-December 2009. See Table
3.2 for the description of portfolio formation. Factors are described in the text. Standard errors are
white heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Lowest DS Portfolios
Liquidation Return
-50% 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.11
-60% 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06
-70% 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
-80% 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03
-90% 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07
-100% 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12
Highest DS Portfolios
Liquidation Return
-50% 0.27 0.56* 0.99*** 0.10 0.33 0.66** 0.73** 0.11
-60% 0.20 0.47 0.95** 0.09 0.24 0.58** 0.65* 0.06
-70% 0.12 0.38 0.90** 0.07 0.14 0.50* 0.58* 0.02
-80% 0.05 0.29 0.86** 0.06 0.05 0.42 0.51 -0.03
-90% -0.02 0.20 0.81** 0.04 -0.03 0.35 0.44 -0.07
-100% -0.08 0.10 0.74* 0.03 -0.12 0.25 0.32 -0.12
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restriction variable. In particular, we analyze the performance of portfolios of funds for
the following three cases: restriction period smaller than 3, smaller than 2 and smaller
than 1 year. Table 3.12 reports the results of this exercise. To simplify the exposition,
we only report results for the value weighted portfolios. As we can see in the table, the
restricted portfolios exhibit the same features as the unrestricted ones, namely, significant
risk adjusted returns in the case of the high drawdown portfolios and no outstanding
performance in the case of the low drawdown status portfolios.
We now proceed to asses the role played by liquidity on our results in terms of the
liquidity factor. Given that we already use a transformed version of the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) factors to account for tradability, we obtain the traded liquidity factor described
in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).46 We multiply this series by negative one, so that a
positive shock in the factor can be interpreted as an improvement in liquidity. In Tables
3.13 and we report the performance of our drawdown based portfolios when this liquidity
factor is added to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Table 3.13 reveals that, like
the HFR portfolio, all low drawdown portfolios load positive and significantly to the
liquidity factor. Also, the addition of the liquidity factor reduces the (non-significant)
alphas by more than 50%. The impact of the liquidity factor on the large drawdown
portfolios is very different. Table reveals that none of the large drawdown portfolios has
statistically significant loads to the liquidity factor and that the alphas are not affected
by the introduction of the new factor. Hence, we can conclude that none of the results
obtained in this paper are driven by liquidity considerations.
3.7.5 Controlling for the Backfilling Bias
It is well known that hedge funds typically undergo an incubation period to build
a good track record. Then the manager enters the fund into databases to attract new
investors. The incubation period performance is backfilled at the entry date, what gen-
erates a clear bias in hedge fund performance as it is reported in databases. In order
46We thank Lubos Pastor and Robert Stambaugh for providing the liquidity factors on
their web sites: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/liq data 1962 2008.txt and
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/∼stambaugh/liq data 1962 2010.txt, respectively.
144
Table 3.12: Controlling for Withdrawal Restriction Periods
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the drawdown based portfolios are
regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors after controlling for withdrawal restriction periods.
For brevity, 3-lag value-weighted portfolio results are reported. The funds that have withdrawal
restriction periods longer than 1, 2 or 3 years are eliminated from the sample, in respective studies.
Withdrawal restriction period is given by the sum of the lockup period and restriction period. The
sample period is January 1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation.
Factors are described in the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in
percentage form. Standard errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Low Drawdown Portfolio High Drawdown Portfolio HFR Portfolio
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
Intercept 0.08 0.06 0.12 1.17*** 1.23*** 1.22*** 0.14 0.14 0.18*
(0.80) (0.58) (1.25) (2.85) (3.23) (3.23) (1.35) (1.36) (1.82)
SNP 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.33*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(4.21) (4.96) (5.09) (3.23) (4.85) (4.88) (5.86) (6.86) (7.04)
SizeSpr 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.27*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(2.80) (2.90) (3.07) (2.59) (4.24) (4.29) (3.61) (4.02) (3.99)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04* 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.23) (1.07) (1.06) (1.78) (1.65) (1.67) (1.57) (1.39) (1.37)
ComOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.01
(1.54) (1.49) (1.42) (1.03) (0.45) (0.53) (1.72) (1.57) (1.58)
BdOpt -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.30) (-1.61) (-1.67) (0.72) (0.69) (0.66) (-1.31) (-1.60) (-1.67)
Bd10Yr 0.10** 0.09* 0.08* -0.22 -0.11 -0.12 0.09** 0.08* 0.08*
(2.14) (1.82) (1.70) (-1.04) (-0.61) (-0.70) (2.19) (1.95) (1.86)
CredSpr 0.15* 0.15 0.14 -0.09 0.04 0.02 0.17** 0.17** 0.17**
(1.74) (1.63) (1.63) (-0.34) (0.15) (0.09) (2.54) (2.49) (2.47)
Adjusted R2 34.0% 41.8% 44.2% 10.4% 25.2% 25.4% 44.4% 54.1% 56.0%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 3.13: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Lowest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Controlling for the Liquidity Factor
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the lowest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors and liquidity factor. Liquidity factor is
the traded liquidity factor series from the study of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), multiplied by
negative one so that a positive shock can be interpreted as an improvement to market liquidity. The
sample period is January 1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation.
Factors are described in the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in
percentage form. Standard errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.31***
(0.52) (0.53) (0.55) (1.33) (1.38) (1.38) (1.54) (3.24)
SNP 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21** 0.29***
(6.26) (6.09) (6.08) (7.84) (8.63) (8.56) (8.73) (12.97)
SizeSpr 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.22***
(3.23) (3.10) (3.47) (4.39) (4.50) (4.64) (4.63) (6.89)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01*
(1.53) (1.60) (1.28) (1.49) (1.48) (1.41) (1.00) (1.79)
ComOpt 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.02** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01*
(1.94) (1.80) (1.54) (1.66) (2.28) (2.03) (1.92) (1.79)
BdOpt -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(-1.95) (-1.87) (-1.82) (-1.79) (-1.41) (-1.31) (-1.14) (-0.20)
Bd10Yr 0.10** 0.09** 0.08* 0.08** 0.11** 0.10** 0.09** 0.07*
(2.13) (2.02) (1.89) (2.02) (2.27) (2.15) (1.96) (1.74)
CredSpr 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.14** 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.14**
(1.03) (1.28) (1.30) (2.20) (0.77) (1.06) (1.01) (2.13)
Liquidity -0.07** -0.06** -0.06** -0.05* -0.07** -0.06** -0.06* -0.04
(-2.16) (-2.07) (-2.06) (-1.79) (-2.16) (-2.01) (-1.94) (-1.52)
Adjusted R2 44.0% 44.3% 46.3% 56.9% 51.6% 53.0% 52.9% 69.6%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 3.14: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Highest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Controlling for the Liquidity Factor
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the highest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors and liquidity factor. Liquidity factor is
the traded liquidity factor series from the study of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), multiplied by
negative one so that a positive shock can be interpreted as an improvement to market liquidity. The
sample period is January 1996-December 2009. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio formation.
Factors are described in the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the intercepts in
percentage form. Standard errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.65** 0.96*** 1.24*** 0.14 0.81*** 1.03*** 1.05*** 0.31***
(2.46) (3.56) (3.09) (1.33) (3.19) (3.75) (2.98) (3.24)
SNP 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.47*** 0.21*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.50*** 0.29***
(7.75) (9.15) (4.81) (7.84) (10.39) (8.89) (6.44) (12.97)
SizeSpr 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.15*** 0.35*** 0.47*** 0.81*** 0.22***
(2.98) (4.26) (4.21) (4.39) (4.61) (4.87) (6.58) (6.89)
FXOpt 0.01 0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01*
(0.49) (1.18) (1.65) (1.49) (1.30) (1.33) (1.32) (1.79)
ComOpt -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01* -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01*
(-1.05) (0.46) (0.55) (1.66) (-0.65) (0.56) (0.09) (1.79)
BdOpt 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02* 0.04** 0.03 0.03 -0.00
(0.69) (0.97) (0.61) (-1.79) (2.31) (1.58) (1.08) (-0.20)
Bd10Yr -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 0.08** -0.15 -0.16 -0.06 0.07*
(-0.78) (-0.87) (-0.69) (2.02) (-1.55) (-1.42) (-0.43) (1.74)
CredSpr 0.21 -0.14 0.02 0.14** 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.14**
(1.16) (-0.86) (0.09) (2.20) (1.19) (0.23) (0.30) (2.13)
Liquidity 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05* 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04
(0.21) (-0.61) (0.12) (-1.79) (0.12) (-0.28) (-0.60) (-1.52)
Adjusted R2 47.2% 44.4% 24.8% 56.9% 57.3% 52.8% 44.0% 69.6%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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to correct the bias some of the early history of hedge funds performance must be dis-
regarded. In general, researchers eliminate from one to two of the first years of data of
hedge funds. We take a conservative approach in the present robustness check and elim-
inate the first two years. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 report the performance of our drawdown
portfolios. Again all of our previous results remain true. Indeed, the results improve
qualitatively as in this case, while the HFR portfolio stops exhibiting outstanding perfor-
mance, our large drawdown based portfolios continue exhibiting positive and significant
alphas.
3.7.6 Structural Breaks Analysis
In this section we perform a structural breaks analysis for our drawdown based
portfolios along with the HFR portfolio. The significance of structural breaks in hedge
fund return series was first suggested by the study of Fung and Hsieh (2004), where they
use HFR Funds of Funds index returns for the period January 1994-December 2002 to
proxy for a typical hedge fund portfolio. They identify two structural breaks: September
1998, which they attribute to the LTCM debacle, and March 2000, which they attribute
to the end of the internet bubble. Following this finding, they divide their whole sample
into three sub-samples: January 1996-September 1998, October 1998-March 2000 and
April 2000-December 2002. They find that the alpha vanishes in the first sub-period and
reduces to less than half (of that of the full period) in the last sub-period. They conclude
that full period regression creates an alpha illusion, “in that any apparent value added
by the average fund of funds manager beyond systematic bets took place during the bull
market run of October 1998 to March 2000”. They also note that “this finding may
be uncomfortable for institutional investors in hedge funds because bull market alphas
are a redundant feature, at best, of an alternative investment” (Fung and Hsieh (2004),
p.73).
These two breakpoints suggested by Fung and Hsieh (2004) are confirmed and em-
ployed by other studies that use different sample period and return series.47 The liter-
47See for instance, Fung et al. (2008) and Loviscek and Xu (2010).
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Table 3.15: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Lowest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Controlling for the Backfilling Bias
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the lowest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors after controlling for the backfilling bias.
The sample period is January 1996-December 2009. The first 24 months data of each fund is
eliminated in order to control for backfilling bias. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio
formation. Factors are described in the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the
intercepts in percentage form. Standard errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.23** 0.24** 0.23** 0.35**
(1.03) (1.26) (1.21) (1.57) (2.07) (2.29) (2.25) (3.62)
SNP 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.28***
(5.87) (5.85) (5.99) (7.48) (6.89) (7.22) (7.38) (11.46)
SizeSpr 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.22***
(3.16) (3.05) (3.72) (4.28) (3.89) (4.12) (4.14) (6.61)
FXOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01*
(1.37) (1.48) (1.08) (1.43) (1.48) (1.50) (1.17) (1.95)
ComOpt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02**
(1.61) (1.41) (1.15) (1.50) (2.29) (1.97) (1.89) (1.98)
BdOpt -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-1.40) (-1.33) (-1.28) (-1.55) (-0.48) (-0.21) (-0.29) (0.40)
Bd10Yr 0.09* 0.08* 0.07 0.08* 0.13** 0.12** 0.11** 0.09**
(1.83) (1.68) (1.51) (1.83) (2.31) (2.19) (2.01) (2.06)
CredSpr 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.18** 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.18**
(1.36) (1.50) (1.40) (2.53) (1.31) (1.61) (1.57) (2.52)
Adjusted R2 43.8% 43.4% 45.9% 58.2% 47.1% 48.7% 49.0% 67.5%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 3.16: Risk-adjusted Performance of the Highest Drawdown Status Port-
folios: Controlling for the Backfilling Bias
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when excess returns of the highest drawdown status
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors after controlling for the backfilling bias.
The sample period is January 1996-December 2009. The first 24 months data of each fund is
eliminated in order to control for backfilling bias. See Table 3.2 for the description of portfolio
formation. Factors are described in the text. All return series are multiplied by 100 to make the
intercepts in percentage form. Standard errors are white heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Intercept 0.55** 0.82*** 1.05** 0.16 0.80*** 1.20*** 1.48*** 0.35***
(2.04) (2.72) (2.53) (1.57) (3.27) (4.00) (3.23) (3.62)
SNP 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.50*** 0.22*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.51*** 0.28***
(7.70) (8.47) (4.36) (7.48) (10.41) (8.15) (4.39) (11.46)
SizeSpr 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.16*** 0.37*** 0.54*** 0.92*** 0.22***
(3.25) (4.58) (2.94) (4.28) (4.84) (5.94) (4.84) (6.61)
FXOpt 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01*
(0.67) (1.28) (1.40) (1.43) (1.59) (1.35) (0.72) (1.95)
ComOpt -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.02*
(-0.17) (0.97) (0.41) (1.50) (0.28) (-0.33) (-0.03) (1.98)
BdOpt 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00
(0.51) (0.96) (0.16) (-1.55) (1.49) (1.47) (0.27) (0.40)
Bd10Yr -0.09 -0.15 -0.17 0.08* -0.12 -0.20 -0.11 0.09**
(-0.87) (-0.96) (-1.02) (1.83) (-1.21) (-1.61) (-0.65) (2.06)
CredSpr 0.13 -0.06 -0.14 0.18** 0.18 0.01 -0.17 0.18**
(0.72) (-0.29) (-0.61) (2.53) (0.96) (0.05) (-0.77) (2.52)
Adjusted R2 45.7% 41.7% 18.0% 58.2% 55.4% 47.8% 27.9% 67.5%
Number of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
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ature has also suggested various alternative or complementary breakpoints. Analyzing
HFR hedge fund return indices for the period January 1994-December 2002, Kosowski
et al. (2007) document a structural break in December 2000, which coincides with the
height of the bull market in the late 1990s. Loviscek and Xu (2010), by using a longer
sample period of January 1994-December 2008, suggests two complementary breakpoints
in median CISDM hedge fund returns: February 2003 and January 2007. February 2003
is associated with a significant upturn in stocks following the significant decline in major
equity indices from 2000 through 2002 whereas January 2007 marks the start of the
global financial crisis.
All above breakpoints suggested by the literature are identified by using proxies
for a typical hedge fund. However, note that the return characteristics of our lowest
and highest drawdown status portfolios already point to a divergence from a typical
hedge fund. Hence, we further analyze the return series of lowest and highest drawdown
portfolios, along with HFR portfolios, for possible breakpoints. June 2008 stands for a
clear breakpoint in the HFR and the lowest drawdown status portfolios. September 1998
and March 2000 are confirmed as breakpoints for all HFR and lowest drawdown status
portfolios, but not for all highest drawdown status portfolios. For the highest drawdown
status portfolio returns, September 1997, February 1999 and August 2008 are identified
as breakpoints.48
Table 3.17 reports the chi-squared statistics values for Chow tests regarding each
breakpoint-return series combination. The lowest drawdown status portfolios show very
similar patterns to HFR portfolios. What is striking is that, almost none of the break-
points suggested in the literature significantly applies to the highest drawdown status
portfolios. For these portfolios, significant statistics are obtained using different break-
points, though never being as strong as the lowest drawdown status portfolios statistics.
This implies that there are no extreme changes in the risk structure of the highest
48We have analyzed various breakpoints for both lowest and highest drawdown, and HFR portfolios,
without constraining ourselves to the exact number of three breakpoints. However, the above mentioned
separation of periods gives the maximum adjusted R-squared values overall. Including February 2003 in
the lowest drawdown status portfolio breakpoints increases adjusted R-squared values of value weighted
portfolio regressions, and decreases those of all others, with all effects being negligible. Hence, we opt
to leave February 2003 out in our basic structural break regressions.
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Table 3.17: Structural Breaks Analysis: Chow Test Results
This table reports the chow test Chi-squared statistics values for the drawdown status portfolio
regressions using the breakpoints separately. The breakpoints identified in the literature are:
September 1998, March 2000, December 2000, February 2003 and January 2007. Further breakpoints
identified from our analysis are: June 2008 for lowest drawdown status portfolios and September 1997,
February 1999 and August 2008 for highest drawdown status portfolios. The sample period is January
1996-December 2009. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of test statistics at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Lowest DS P.
Sep. 1998 34.61*** 26.07*** 18.64*** 39.02*** 16.02** 14.16** 10.99 16.97**
Mar. 2000 26.43*** 20.40*** 17.85** 23.94*** 19.36*** 19.89*** 19.35*** 12.37*
Dec. 2000 36.27*** 30.56*** 28.36*** 26.62*** 34.39*** 34.21*** 33.16*** 17.85**
Feb. 2003 25.60*** 25.79*** 28.10*** 20.76*** 24.19*** 28.67*** 32.10*** 17.94**
Jan. 2007 47.57*** 49.46*** 49.97*** 35.91*** 53.95*** 56.92*** 59.40*** 37.07***
Jun. 2008 50.60*** 53.69*** 55.25*** 43.20*** 52.90*** 57.88*** 57.90*** 47.51***
Highest DS P.
Sep. 1997 4.27 19.42*** 24.62*** 11.78 18.39** 30.28***
Sep. 1998 19.36*** 12.17* 17.44** 12.18* 10.12 16.55**
Feb. 1999 26.57*** 14.18** 27.22*** 18.51*** 14.15** 18.06**
Mar. 2000 10.04 3.18 5.78 2.71 4.43 1.91
Dec. 2000 11.46 5.87 4.11 2.59 6.62 7.74
Feb. 2003 12.04* 5.70 5.08 3.60 3.92 8.11
Jan. 2007 7.38 7.98 7.64 7.59 6.82 13.36*
Aug. 2008 11.13 6.03 12.08* 14.41** 11.59 18.06**
drawdown status portfolios, which is further proof for robustness of their outstanding
performance.
In Table 3.18, we present the alphas for subperiods obtained from each portfolio’s
regression after allowing for structural breaks. Let us first analyze the lowest drawdown
status portfolios. Note first that using the structural breaks in the regressions improves
the adjusted R-squared substantially; there is more than 20% increase in its value for
each portfolio. Note also that Chi-squared test statistics are very high, indicating a
strong rejection of the null hypothesis that the slope coefficients are the same across the
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four subperiods.49 Not surprisingly, the alphas of the lowest drawdown status portfo-
lios are significantly positive only in good market conditions, and significantly negative
during the recent financial crisis. The negative coefficients are higher than the positive
coefficients in absolute terms, and substantially higher than their full period counter-
parts. This is exactly the alpha illusion mentioned in Fung and Hsieh (2004). Note also
that unlike lowest drawdown status portfolios, HFR portfolios do not have significant
coefficients in the last period, supporting the insurance seller hypothesis.
On the contrary to lowest drawdown status portfolios, the value and significance
level of the alphas of the highest drawdown status portfolios do not change dramatically.
Alphas are negative only for the very short period of October 97 to February 99, and
these are not significant except one-lag and 3-lag highest drawdown status value-weighted
portfolios, perhaps due to some large funds having losses.50 Alphas are significantly
positive for the longest period of March 1999 to August 2008, and more importantly
very similar to their full sample values. This also indicates that alphas are not driven
by some subperiods, such as the recent financial crisis, where the highest drawdown
portfolios perform extremely well.
As a final step, to remove any suspicion on our results, we estimate a regression with
four structural breaks for each of our portfolios. We use the breaks suggested in the
prior literature, with the exception of replacing January 2007 by June 2008. The Chow
test results make it clear that June 2008 is a more appropriate choice for our sample
period which is longer than the ones used in the literature.51 We report the results of
this analysis in Table 3.19. As can be seen, all previous results are further confirmed by
these regressions. Lowest drawdown status portfolios do not provide significant alphas
for the period March 2003 to June 2008, right after the end of the bubble. It is clear
that lowest drawdown portfolios perform well only during bull market conditions. On
the contrary, highest drawdown status portfolios continue providing positive significant
49Similar results are obtained in Fung et al. (2008) for equally weighted portfolio of funds in their
sample.
50Such a short period in structural break regression is usually ignored in analysis in the literature.
See, for instance, Fung and Hsieh (2004).
51Using both January 2007 and September 2008 as breaks improves the R-squared negligibly at the
expense of having very short periods that are not suitable for analysis. In any case, our results hold with
five breakpoints.
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alphas for both periods.
3.8 Drawdown Status and Performance: Regression Anal-
ysis
In this section we put our theory in the context of the more traditional regression
analysis methodology. Our main reference in this section is Agarwal et al. (2009) for
two reasons. First, because it provides the most comprehensive setting we are aware of
for the testing of hedge funds characteristics. Second, because it analyzes throughfully
managerial incentives (total delta), the only hedge fund characteristic that we could not
control for in the portfolio sorts methodology.
Following Agarwal et al. (2009), we regress fund returns on a set of controls that
include all the hedge characteristics identified as predictive of performance in the existing
literature. To be more precise, we estimate the following regressions:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Total Deltai,t−1 + α2Hurdle Ratei + α3High-water Mark i + α4Lockupi
+α5Restrictioni + α6Sizei,t−1 + α7Flow i,t−1 + α8Volatility i,t−1 + α9Agei,t−1
+α10Management Feei + α11Returni,t−1 +
3∑
s=1
α11+sI Strategy i,s + ξi,t(3.3)
Returni,t = α0 + α1Option Deltai,t−1 + α2Managerial Ownershipi,t−1 + α3Hurdle Ratei
+α4high-water Mark i + α5Lockupi + α6Restrictioni + α7Sizei,t−1 + α8Flow i,t−1
+α9Volatility i,t−1 + α10Agei,t−1 + α11Management Feei + α12Returni,t−1
+
3∑
s=1
α12+sI Strategy i,s + ξi,t(3.4)
where Returni,t is the net annual return of fund i in year t ; Total Deltai,t−1 is the total
expected dollar change in the manager’s compensation for a 1% change in the fund i ’s
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Table 3.18: Structural Breaks Analysis: Regression Results
This table reports OLS intercepts in percentage form when excess returns of drawdown based
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors allowing for structural breaks, where
breakpoints are identified separately and specifically for highest and lowest drawdown based portfolios.
The breakpoints for lowest drawdown status portfolios are: September 1998, March 2000 and June
2008. The breakpoints for highest drawdown status portfolios are: September 1997, February 1999 and
August 2008 for highest drawdown status portfolios. Standard errors are white
heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Lowest DS P.
Jan. 96 - Sep. 98 -0.14 -0.07 0.05 -0.18 0.07 0.15 0.24** 0.01
(-0.82) (-0.43) (0.34) (-1.01) (0.48) (1.13) (2.09) (0.07)
Oct. 98 - Mar. 00 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.68*** 0.99*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.94***
(4.16) (4.37) (4.51) (4.04) (5.05) (3.89) (4.30) (4.32)
Apr. 00 - Jun. 08 0.22** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.25** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28***
(2.35) (2.69) (2.61) (2.76) (2.38) (2.78) (2.74) (3.12)
Jun. 08 - Dec. 09 -0.87** -0.91*** -0.86** -0.16 -1.05*** -1.09*** -1.14*** 0.07
(-2.54) (-2.61) (-2.33) (-0.83) (-2.98) (-3.40) (-3.47) (0.39)
Adjusted R2 68.4% 69.1% 69.0% 74.2% 71.4% 72.7% 72.7% 79.9%
Chi-sq.(21) 121.40*** 118.15*** 105.57*** 121.46*** 92.79*** 94.56*** 88.35*** 88.75***
Highest DS P.
Jan. 96 - Sep. 97 0.82 1.16 1.26 0.73* 1.11 2.10**
(1.15) (1.29) (1.53) (1.65) (1.64) (2.05)
Oct. 97 - Feb. 99 -2.01** -2.73 -3.32* -0.46 -0.76 -2.39
(-2.21) (-1.58) (-1.69) (-0.74) (-0.62) (-1.34)
Mar. 99 - Aug. 08 0.83*** 1.05*** 1.26*** 0.85*** 1.07*** 1.03***
(3.36) (4.18) (3.44) (3.43) (3.98) (3.24)
Sep. 08 - Dec. 09 3.12*** 3.23*** 1.64* 3.48*** 3.26*** 2.73***
(6.48) (3.13) (1.88) (6.20) (4.68) (3.84)
Adjusted R2 63.1% 56.5% 44.9% 68.2% 64.4% 61.3%
Chi-sq.(21) 60.42*** 42.83*** 71.30*** 49.69*** 50.11*** 83.31***
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Table 3.19: Structural Breaks Analysis: Regression Results with Traditional
Breakpoints
This table reports OLS intercepts in percentage form when excess returns of drawdown based
portfolios are regressed on Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors allowing for structural breaks
traditionally employed in the literature. The breakpoints are adopted from the previous literature,
with the exception of replacing January 2007 with June 2008. The breakpoints for all portfolios are:
September 1998, March 2000, February 2003 and June 2008. Standard errors are white
heteroscedasticity-consistent. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Value Weighted Portfolios Equally Weighted Portfolios
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 HFR
Lowest DS P.
Jan. 96 - Sep. 98 -0.14 -0.07 0.05 -0.18 0.07 0.15 0.24** 0.01
(-0.82) (-0.43) (0.34) (-1.01) (0.48) (1.13) (2.09) (0.07)
Oct. 98 - Mar. 00 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.68*** 0.99*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.94***
(4.16) (4.37) (4.51) (4.04) (5.05) (3.89) (4.30) (4.32)
Apr. 00 - Feb. 03 0.23** 0.27*** 0.24** 0.17* 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.28**
(2.07) (2.62) (2.47) (1.67) (2.77) (3.08) (3.37) (2.43)
Mar. 03 - Jun. 08 0.20 0.22 0.22* 0.24* 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.28**
(1.42) (1.58) (1.66) (1.84) (1.38) (1.53) (1.51) (2.06)
Jul. 08 - Dec. 09 -0.87** -0.91*** -0.86** -0.16 -1.05*** -1.09*** -1.14*** 0.07
(-2.54) (-2.61) (-2.33) (-0.83) (-2.98) (-3.40) (-3.47) (0.39)
Adjusted R2 67.9% 68.8% 68.9% 73.3% 71.8% 73.6% 73.7% 79.3%
Chi-sq.(28) 124.62*** 123.53*** 112.96*** 120.86*** 103.94*** 109.69*** 104.84*** 90.28***
Highest DS P.
Jan. 96 - Sep. 98 -0.49 -0.42 -0.90 -0.48 -0.40 -0.52
(-0.84) (-0.51) (-0.86) (-1.18) (-0.64) (-0.52)
Oct. 98 - Mar. 00 1.10 2.11** 4.84*** 1.55 3.01*** 2.49**
(1.03) (2.44) (3.96) (1.23) (2.88) (2.50)
Apr. 00 - Feb. 03 0.52 1.24** 1.51*** 0.38 0.96** 1.37***
(1.13) (2.54) (2.90) (0.89) (2.14) (2.71)
Mar. 03 - Jun. 08 0.64** 0.64** 0.58** 0.50*** 0.60*** 0.48**
(2.57) (2.37) (2.01) (2.91) (2.84) (1.96)
Jul. 08 - Dec. 09 3.08*** 2.99*** 1.50 3.42*** 3.19*** 2.73***
(5.63) (3.15) (1.46) (5.86) (4.50) (3.20)
Adjusted R2 55.7% 48.1% 37.2% 66.6% 59.8% 57.0%
Chi-sq.(28) 52.36*** 32.04 43.79** 55.89*** 44.84* 68.04***
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NAV at the end of year t-1; Option Deltai,t−1 is the manager’s delta from investors’ assets
in fund i at the end of year t-1; Managerial Ownershipi,t−1 is the ratio of the manager’s
investment in the fund to the AUM of the fund i at the end of year t-1; Hurdle Ratei is
an indicator variable that takes value one if fund i has a hurdle rate, and zero otherwise;
High-water Mark i is an indicator variable that takes value one if fund i has high-water
mark, and zero otherwise; Lockupi and Restrictioni are, respectively, the length of the
lockup and restriction periods applied by fund i ; Sizei,t−1 is the natural logarithm of
the AUM of fund i at the end of year t-1; Flow i,t−1 is the total dollar flows into (or
out of, if negative) fund i during year t-1, scaled by AUM of fund i at the end of year
t-1; Volatility i,t−1 is the annualized standard deviation of the monthly returns of fund i
during year t-1; Agei,t−1 is the age of fund i at the end of year t-1; Management Feei is
the management fee charged by fund i ; Returni,t−1 is the net annual return of fund i in
year t-1; each I Strategy i,s is a dummy variable that takes value one if fund i belongs to
strategy s, and zero otherwise; and ξi,t is the error term.
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As in Agarwal et al. (2009), the analysis in the present section is performed on an
annual basis. In order to avoid suspicions on our analysis being biased because of the use
of a different data set and sample period to the ones in Agarwal et al. (2009), we first
corroborate that their main results hold in our sample. In Table 3.20 we first restate
Agarwal et al. (2009) estimation results (for the period 1994-2002). Columns (A) and
(B) report their results using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) regression methodology
(FMB) for equations (3.3) and (3.4), respectively. Column (C) collects their results
after excluding the first two years of data of each fund from the analysis to control
for the well-known backfilling bias.53 In columns (D) to (F) we replicate the previous
exercises using the HFR data set for the period 1996-2009.54 Note that in Column (F)
the significance level of managerial ownership decreases substantially and option delta
52We have constructed all the variables using the method of Agarwal et al. (2009). For a detailed
explanation on the construction of option delta and managerial ownership, see Appendix A in their
paper. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level in order to limit the effect of outliers.
53See Table VII, row 12, in Agarwal et al. (2009). Backfilling bias occurs because when a fund enters
the database, the database providers typically request the full performance history for that fund. Since
the choice of entering database typically follows a period of good track-record, this back-filled return
history tends to be upward biased. See Ackermann et al. (1999) for a detailed explanation.
54In order for the results to be comparable to portfolio analysis and among each other, for all regressions
we fix the period at 1996-2009.
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even looses significance at conventional levels. Our replication supports the findings of
Agarwal et al. (2009) in that: 1) both option delta and managerial ownership have a
significant positive effect on performance; and, 2) the importance of these variables on
performance deteriorates, both in terms of the size of the coefficient and its significance
level, when we eliminate the first two years of data of each fund. This last observation is
critical for the purposes of the present paper. The result corroborates that as hedge funds
get older, variables that proxy managerial incentives loose their importance. Columns
(G) and (H) in table 3.20 further corroborate this conjecture. Here, equations (3.3)
and (3.4) are replicated using HFR filtered data set (the first three years of data of
each fund are excluded from the analysis in order to define 3-lag drawdown variables).
Notice that total delta looses its significance at conventional levels. Hence, it cannot be
that incentives are behind our results, as these do not play a very significant role in the
context of our filtered data set.
Now we analyze if drawdown status is a hedge fund characteristic related to perfor-
mance. We focus on equation (3.4) as this is the base model in Agarwal et al. (2009).55
First of all, we re-estimate the equation after introducing Drawdowni,t−1, which is one
minus the ratio of the fund’s NAV at the end of year t-1 to the maximum NAV reached
over the fund’s entire history, into the analysis:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Drawdowni,t−1 + α2Option Deltai,t−1 + α3Managerial Ownershipi,t−1
+α4Hurdle Ratei + α5High-water Mark i + α6Lockupi + α7Restrictioni
+α8Sizei,t−1 + α9Flow i,t−1 + α10Volatility i,t−1 + α11Agei,t−1
+α12Management Feei + α13Returni,t−1 +
3∑
s=1
α13+sI Strategy i,s + ξi,t.(3.5)
55Our equation (3.4) is referred as the base model (Model 2) in Agarwal et al. (2009) as it includes all
available proxies for managerial incentives: manager’s option delta, managerial ownership, hurdle rate,
and high-water mark.
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Table 3.20: Regression Analysis: First Results
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) coefficient estimates when Returns are regressed on a set
of controls using various data sets. Column (A) restates results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions
obtained by Agarwal et al. (2009) using the model:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Total Deltai,t−1 + α2Hurdle Ratei + α3High-water Mark i + α4Lockupi
+α5Restrictioni + α6Sizei,t−1 + α7Flow i,t−1 + α8Volatility i,t−1 + α9Agei,t−1
+α10Management Feei + α11Returni,t−1 +
3∑
s=1
α11+sI Strategy i,s + ξi,t.
In Column (B), Agarwal et al. (2009) results are restated when Total Delta is replaced by Option Delta
and Managerial Ownership:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Option Deltai,t−1 + α2Managerial Ownershipi,t−1 + α3Hurdle Ratei
+α4High-water Mark i + α5Lockupi + α6Restrictioni + α7Sizei,t−1 + α8Flow i,t−1
+α9Volatility i,t−1 + α10Agei,t−1 + α11Management Feei + α12Returni,t−1
+
3∑
s=1
α12+sI Strategy i,s + ξi,t.
To control for backfilling bias, Agarwal et al. (2009) excludes first two years’ data of each fund from the
regression and their results are restated in Column (C).
Columns (D) and (E) report the results of these regressions obtained using HFR data set, where sample
period is 1996-2009. In Column (F), as in Agarwal et al. (2009), first two years’ data of each fund
is excluded from the regression. Finally, Columns (G) and (H) report the results of the regressions
using HFR filtered data set (which consists of funds with 3-lag drawdown defined). To save from space,
coefficients on lag Size, Flow, Volatility, Age, Return and Management Fee are not reported. Size is the
natural logarithm of the AUM of the fund at the end of the year. Hurdle rate is an indicator variable
that takes value one if the fund has a hurdle rate, and zero otherwise. High-water mark is an indicator
variable that takes value one if the fund has high-water mark, and zero otherwise. See Table 3.1 for the
definition of variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are Newey-West
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Agarwal et al. (2009) HFR Data Sets
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Intercept 0.117*** 0.113*** Yes 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.052** 0.053**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.019)
Total Deltai,t−1 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.000) (0.420)
Option Deltai,t−1 0.015** 0.009* 0.007* 0.004 0.005
(0.017) (0.083) (0.094) (0.420) (0.412)
Man. Own.i,t−1 0.126*** 0.117** 0.040*** 0.043** 0.036**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019) (0.032)
Hurdle Rate 0.004 0.008 0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.362) (0.156) (0.257) (0.541) (0.576) (0.576) (0.534) (0.580)
High-water Mark 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.014*** 0.012**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.174) (0.230) (0.167) (0.007) (0.011)
Lockup 0.029* 0.029* 0.028 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.005
(0.096) (0.095) (0.112) (0.286) (0.256) (0.204) (0.406) (0.369)
Restriction 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.012 -0.006 0.010 0.010
(0.157) (0.147) (0.140) (0.408) (0.403) (0.591) (0.499) (0.507)
Adjusted R2 13.6% 13.8% 13.0% 2.5% 2.6% 1.8% 1.2% 1.4%
Number of obs. 16,901 16,901 14.221 21,739 21,739 16,923 13,556 13,556
We report the results of the FMB regression in Table 3.21 Column (A). Note that
drawdown variable is not only highly significant and positively related to performance,
but also decreases the effect and significance of option delta and managerial ownership.
Next, we want to analyze how funds in our portfolios perform in regression analysis.
For this, we define two indicator variables: Low Drawdowni,t−1 that takes value one if
fund i has been in the lowest decile in the last three years (from t-1 to t-3), and zero
otherwise; and High Drawdowni,t−1 that takes value one if fund i has been in the highest
decile in the last three years, and zero otherwise. Then we estimate equation (3.4), but
this time including the Low Drawdown and High Drawdown variables. More specifically,
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we estimate the following regression:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Low Drawdowni,t−1 + α2High Drawdowni,t−1 + α3Option Deltai,t−1
+α4Managerial Ownershipi,t−1 + α5Hurdle Ratei + α6high-water Mark i
+α7Lockupi + α8Restrictioni + α9Sizei,t−1 + α10Flow i,t−1
+α11Volatility i,t−1 + α12Agei,t−1 + α13Management Feei
+α14Returni,t−1 +
3∑
s=1
α14+sI Strategy i,s +
13∑
s=1
α17+sI Year i,s + ξi,t(3.6)
In Table 3.21 Column (B), we report the results of this FMB estimation.56 The
variable High Drawdown has a significant positive effect on performance whereas Low
Drawdown does not have a significant effect. In the remaining columns, we report the
results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of these equations under different
alternative specifications.57 In Column (C) we report results from OLS estimation of
equation (3.5). Notice that here drawdown has a much stronger effect. Further, the effect
of proxies of managerial incentives decrease significantly. In particular, option delta has a
significant negative coefficient. This result seriously questions the relationship between
incentives and performance. Indeed, according to the incentives theory it should be
positive and significant. The negative sign is indeed consistent with our drawdown based
theory of performance. Funds with large (small) option delta are funds that tend to be
close to (far from) their high-water mark. That is, they tend to be funds in the low (high)
drawdown decile. Many of them are just insurance sellers (surviving talented managers).
Our analysis suggests that these should exhibit poor (outstanding) performance. Hence,
the negative sign of option delta is consistent with our theory and inconsistent with the
incentives theory.
In Column (D) we include the two new variables simultaneously in OLS regression,
while in Columns (E) and (F) we include them separately. As we can observe, the High
Drawdown variable always has a highly significant positive coefficient.
56Since the number of funds in high drawdown decile portfolios are very few for first three years, we
exclude these years from FMB regression and use a sample period of 1999-2009 to get meaningful results.
57We focus on pooled OLS regressions because the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions deliver very
low R2. In return, year dummies are included in OLS regressions. As in Agarwal et al. (2009), the OLS
methodology delivers the strongest results.
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Table 3.21: Regression Analysis: Drawdown Variables
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates when Returns are regressed on various sets of controls using
HFR filtered data set. Columns (A) and (C) use the model:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Drawdowni,t−1 + α2Option Deltai,t−1 + α3Managerial Ownershipi,t−1
+α4Hurdle Ratei + α5High-water Mark i + α6Lockupi + α7Restrictioni
+α8Sizei,t−1 + α9Flow i,t−1 + α10Volatility i,t−1 + α11Agei,t−1
+α12Management Feei + α13Returni,t−1 +
3∑
s=1
α13+sI Strategy i,s + ξi,t.
Columns (B) and (D) use the model:
Returni,t = α0 + α1Low Drawdowni,t−1 + α2High Drawdowni,t−1 + α3Option Deltai,t−1
+α4Managerial Ownershipi,t−1 + α5Hurdle Ratei + α6high-water Mark i
+α7Lockupi + α8Restrictioni + α9Sizei,t−1 + α10Flow i,t−1
+α11Volatility i,t−1 + α12Agei,t−1 + α13Management Feei
+α14Returni,t−1 +
3∑
s=1
α14+sI Strategy i,s +
13∑
s=1
α17+sI Year i,s + ξi,t.
The type of regressions are also different. Columns (A) and (B) report Fama and and MacBeth (1973)
coefficient estimates with Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Columns (C), (D), (E) and (F) report OLS regression results after correcting standard errors for within-
cluster correlation, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is 1996-2009, except in
Column (B) where it is set as 1999-2009 for meaningful regression results. Low Drawdown is an indicator
variable that takes value one if the fund has been in the lowest decile in the last three years, and zero
otherwise. Similarly, High Drawdown is an indicator variable that takes value one if the fund has been
in the highest decile in the last three years, and zero otherwise. To save from space, coefficients on lag
Size, Flow, Volatility, Age, Return and Management Fee are not reported. See Tables 3.1 and 3.20 for
the definition of variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The p-values are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance of coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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FMB OLS
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Intercept 0.047** 0.045* 0.134*** 0.146*** 0.150*** 0.146***
(0.030) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drawdowni,t−1 0.181** 0.369***
(0.014) (0.000)
Low Drawdowni,t−1 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006
(0.360) (0.410) (0.181)
High Drawdowni,t−1 0.070* 0.049*** 0.050***
(0.079) (0.008) (0.007)
Option Deltai,t−1 0.004 0.006 -0.013** -0.011** -0.010* -0.012**
(0.456) (0.513) (0.019) (0.039) (0.063) (0.033)
Man. Ownershipi,t−1 0.035** 0.041** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.045***
(0.036) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Hurdle Rate -0.011 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.391) (0.862) (0.253) (0.110) (0.111) (0.115)
High-water Mark 0.013*** 0.011** 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.033) (0.202) (0.120) (0.280) (0.257)
Lockup 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.407) (0.715) (0.181) (0.203) (0.163) (0.163)
Restriction 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.007 0.014* 0.014*
(0.441) (0.879) (0.194) (0.265) (0.082) (0.088)
Adjusted R2 2.9% 2.5% 25.0% 23.6% 23.5% 23.6%
Number of obs. 13,556 12,673 13,556 13,556 13,556 13,556
In summary, the results derived in this section clearly establish that drawdown status
is a genuine hedge fund characteristic related to performance. These results together
with those derived in the portfolio sorts methodology further corroborate that drawdown
status is also a very relevant characteristic in quantitative terms. Finally, we reiterate
that our analysis severely questions the role played by incentives in hedge funds’ perfor-
mance.
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3.9 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces drawdown status analysis as a new way of thinking about
hedge fund performance. The analysis combines hedge fund management meritocracy
with investors revealed preferences and establishes drawdown status as a key hedge fund
characteristic related to performance.
The analysis delivers four, we believe, completely new insights on hedge funds. First,
the presence of insurance selling in the industry is large enough to make portfolios of
low drawdown funds weak performers in general and bad performers in times of turmoil.
Second, the market operates a Darwinian selection process according to which funds
running large drawdowns for a prolonged period of time are managed by truly talented
traders who deliver outstanding future performance. Third, a completely new dimension
of risk arises as a distinctive feature of hedge funds: risk conditional on survival is
tantamount to outstanding performance. Fourth, drawdown status analysis raises serious
concerns about the role played by other hedge fund characteristics –such as total delta–
on fund performance and casts doubt on the validity of some performance evaluation
measures –such as the Calmar and Sterling ratios– that are widely used in practice.
As a premier on drawdown status analysis, this paper leaves many issues unad-
dressed. First, our analysis focuses only on the analysis of the two extreme drawdown
deciles; naturally, a more comprehensive analysis is a fruitful topic for future research.
In particular, the analysis of the portfolio of funds that survive after hitting the largest
drawdown decile, irrespectively of whether they stay in the largest drawdown decile (an-
alyzed here) or move to lower deciles (not analyzed here) deserves special attention as
it fits closer the Darwinian dichotomy between death and survival. Second, we believe
that much could be learned by comparing the role played by drawdown status in hedge
funds versus mutual funds. Some of our results here depend critically on the high-water
mark clause, which is ubiquitous in the hedge fund industry but nearly absent in the
world of mutual funds; hence, mutual funds are a good control group for testing our
hypothesis. This also seems to be a good venue for future research. Third, the present
analysis is short to fully account for the seemingly paradoxical situation of an investment
community sophisticated enough to sort talented managers among those suffering large
drawdowns, but naive when investing in low drawdown funds. Finally, we open but
do not address the debate on the Darwinian mechanism operating in other markets. In
particular, we suggest that it can have some bearing on the anomalous pricing of distress
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stocks. The analysis of these two last issues is also a top priority in our research agenda.
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Chapter 4
What Do Outside Directors Learn
At Board Meetings?
4.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, outside directors have been at the focus of a debate on their
monitoring and advising roles both in the corporate and the academic world. An outside
director is a director who has never worked at the company or any of its subsidiaries. On
the one hand, outside directors are better positioned for their duties related to monitoring
the executives as their incentives are better aligned with those of the shareholders. On
the other hand, since they are less informed about the firm’s daily activities with respect
to their executive counterparts, they have a disadvantage in performing their advising
duties. Moreover, the information they obtain on the firm is provided mainly by the
CEO and other executives, hence might be biased towards those individuals’ interests.
The question that follows from this argument is: Do the outside directors know enough
about their firms so as to perform their duties satisfactorily? One way to deal with this
question is to analyze how well they get informed during the board meetings as these
constitute outside directors’ primary information source regarding firm’s activities. This
paper is a first attempt to evaluate the informational content of board meetings for
outside directors by analyzing their trades the around meeting dates.
Board meetings are important events for two reasons. First, prior to a board meeting,
relevant information will be collected by the executives in preparation for the meeting
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and communicated to the directors in advance. Second, during the board meeting,
there will be discussions among board members and important decisions will be taken
(Mishraa, Rowe, Prakash, and Ghosh 2009; Vafeas 1999). If firm’s executive officers and
directors act on the information gathered before and during the board meetings, one
would expect to observe them trading extensively both shortly before and after these
events. Directors, officers and large stockholders (beneficial owners of more than 10% of
any class of firm equity) are considered as insiders and are required to file their trading
activity with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Using this data, along
with the annual board meeting dates of 3,042 distinct firms obtained from Riskmetrics
database, I find that the overall level of insider trading hikes on the day of the meeting
and the day following it. What is more interesting is the trading behavior of the outside
directors as compared to that of the executives. Executives purchase frequently both
prior and posterior to the meetings, whereas outside directors significantly increase their
trading frequency right after the board meetings. This is consistent with the view that
executives trade on the information they collect before (and during) the board meetings
whereas outside directors trade on the information acquired during the meetings. Not
surprisingly, no significant pattern is observed regarding trades of insiders who do not
contribute to the board meetings.
An interesting question arises from the previous analysis. Are board meetings useful
in bridging the information gap between the inside and outside members of the board? In
a more general context, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) compare the trading performance of
independent directors and executives. They find that independent directors earn positive
abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the difference
from the same firm’s executives is relatively small. They use this evidence to argue
that independent directors have enough information to monitor the company executives.
However, they relate this phenomenon to the incentives of independent directors for
collecting relevant information while serving on the firm’s board. On the contrary, I
focus directly on the information they gather via the board meetings, which is mostly
prepared by the company officers. This subject deserves special attention as it is crucial
in understanding whether the outside directors are kept in the dark by their executive
counterparts or not.
Analyzing the trading behavior of insiders with respect to the date of the board
meetings provides interesting results. First of all, outside directors earn substantial
abnormal returns for their purchases around the board meetings at most horizons.1
1Following Ravina and Sapienza (2010), I consider positions mimicking that of the insiders trades
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This effect is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and controlling for transaction
size and individual’s holdings. This is also consistent with the previous studies that
demonstrate the profitability of insiders trades without constraining to specific periods
(Finnerty 1976; Jaffe 1974; Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003; Lakonishok and Lee
2001; Lin and Howe 1990; Marin and Olivier 2008; Ravina and Sapienza 2010; Rozeff
and Zaman 1988; Seyhun 1986, 1998). Second, outside directors earn higher returns
when their trade is initiated after the board meetings as compared to when it is initiated
before attending the meetings. This provides evidence on that board meetings constitute
an important source of information for outside directors. Moreover, when I compare
the trading performance of outside directors vis-a`-vis their firm’s executives, I find that
directors earn significantly higher market adjusted returns in the subsample of purchases
initiated after the board meetings. This does not hold for the subsample of purchases
prior to the board meetings. This finding suggests that outside directors are adequately
informed about the firm by the executives during the board meetings; an observation
that underlines meetings’ importance for directors’ advising and monitoring duties.
I perform a similar analysis for outside directors sales, however I find only modest
corresponding evidence regarding these. This is consistent with the literature which
documents that unlike purchases, sales can be driven by diversification or liquidity rea-
sons, thus, are not necessarily information driven (Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003;
Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ravina and Sapienza 2010). Moreover, analyzing a period
around the board meetings introduces further noise since awards and grants are more
likely to be transferred to insiders during the board meetings, which may result in an
increased selling pressure around meeting dates.
This paper contributes to the literature on the board of directors by supporting a
positive attitude towards outside directors. Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992)
and Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) demonstrate evidence on the monitoring
role of outside directors. Nevertheless, many early studies regarding the composition of
board of directors do not find a significant effect of outside directors on firm’s perfor-
mance (Bhagat and Black 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Klein 1998). However,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) note that endogeneity of board composition may be
playing a role in failing to find a relationship.2 Recent literature provides theoretical
background (Adams and Ferreira 2007; Harris and Raviv 2008) and empirical evidence
(Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Duchin, Mat-
and holding it for 0, 30, 60, 90 and 180 trading days.
2Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide an excellent review of the literature on boards of directors.
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susaka, and Ozbas 2010; Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008) on that the boards of directors
are endogeneously determined according to the firm’s monitoring and advising needs.
This study contributes to this literature by showing that board meetings of large firms
tend to diminish informational disadvantage of outside directors, enhancing their advis-
ing capabilities. It would be interesting to further analyze the relationship between the
board characteristics of the firms and performance of their directors trades.
This paper further contributes to the literature by identifying information driven
insider trading through focusing on the period around the board meetings. There is
recent work that tries to uncover the informativeness of insider trades. For example,
Scott Jr. and Xu (2004), by using a variable for shares traded as a percentage of
insiders’ holdings, separates information driven sales from sales driven by liquidity or
diversification motives. They find that large insider sales that also accounted for large
percentages of insiders’ holdings had significant predictive power whereas small sales
didn’t. Similarly, Jenter (2005) controls for recent changes in manager’s equity holdings
to sort out diversification or rebalancing driven insider trading. Most recently, Cohen,
Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) show that there is predictable, identifiable routine insider
trading that is not informative. By filtering out routine trades, they can attribute all
available abnormal returns solely to the remaining transactions, those of whom they
call opportunistic traders. However, these studies uncover informativeness of insiders
trades by using proxies for the motives behind trading that sort out the non-information
driven insider trading. On the contrary, this study focuses directly on information
driven trades since the exact date of the informational event, the board meeting date, is
observable. In that, this paper is more related to Damodaran and Liu (1993) who analyze
insider trading around reappraisals of real estate investment trusts and demonstrate the
information contained in these events.
Finally, this paper sheds new light on the significance of board meetings. Vafeas
(1999) provides the first study to point out the role of the board meetings by analyzing
the relation between board meeting frequency and firm performance. He finds that
the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to the firm value, but the
effect is driven by increased frequency of board meetings following share price declines.
He suggests that board activity is an important element in board’s efficacy through
enhancing monitoring and advising contributions from firm’s directors. Mishraa, Rowe,
Prakash, and Ghosh (2009) analyze the spread behavior around board meetings for firms
with concentrated insider ownership. They find that for such firms, the bidask spread
significantly changes around the meeting date and they relate this to the increased insider
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trading activity during the same period. They make the point that board meetings are
important informational events. However, their work is constrained to a sample of firms
that have concentrated ownership (a sample of only 40 firms) and they do not distinguish
among the insider groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the data and offers descriptive
statistics. Distribution of insider trading around board meetings is reported in Section
4.3. Section 4.4 analyzes the trading performance of insiders transactions. Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Corporate insiders are defined broadly to include all individuals “that have access
to non-public material, insider information”, and these individuals are required to re-
port their trading activity with the SEC. TFN Insider Filing database covers all insider
trading information reported on SEC Forms 3, 4 and 5. Form 4 is the most important
insider document as it reports any change in an insider’s ownership position. It could be
a purchase, sale, option grant, option exercise , gift, etc. Form 3 is the initial statement
of beneficial ownership for all officers. Form 5 is the annual statement of change in
beneficial ownership which contains activity for exempt transactions not required on a
Form 4. TFN Insider Filing database provides the name of the insider, the position she
holds with respect to the firm (CEO, chairman of the board, director, large shareholder,
etc.), transaction date and price, shares bought/sold, and shares held by the insider as
a result of the transaction. Following the literature (Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ravina
and Sapienza 2010), I only analyze open market purchases and sales of insiders with a
minimum of 100 shares traded to focus on meaningful events.3
The insiders include company executives, directors, large shareholders (who own at
least 10% of the company shares), affiliates, controllers, etc. The focus of this study is on
outside directors, who are defined as nonexecutive directors. However, following Ravina
and Sapienza (2010), I also divide this group into two: independent directors who are
outside directors that are not large shareholders, and outside blockholders who are out-
3As advised in Thomson Reuters Insider Trading overview, observations with cleanse code S or A are
excluded from the analysis. The data with a cleanse code of S have a different security from the one
they have been entered under. Cleanse code A flags cases where several of the data elements are invalid
or missing.
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side directors that also own a minimum of 10% share in the company. Due to their large
ownership, outside blockholders may have different incentives and better information
regarding the firm than the independent directors, hence it would be interesting to ana-
lyze their trades separately. Executives are the biggest group of insiders, and note that
they include directors who also hold executive positions in the firm. All the remaining
insiders will be classified as other insiders throughout the study.
My source of board of directors data is Riskmetrics Directors database. This database
covers mainly S&P 1500 companies from the year 1996 onwards and provides data on
the identity and characteristics of board directors. Riskmetrics obtains information
from annual board meetings of companies, and the relevant date of the board meeting
is provided in the data set. The directors data consists of 3,374 distinct firms, 34,044
distinct individuals, and spans the period from 1996 to 2010. I merge the insider trading
data with this database. A total of 3,265 firms, which is 96.8% of the whole sample,
have some of their insiders trading in the period 1996-2010 with the data being available
in the TFN Insider Filing database.
To capture the trading that is driven by information released around the board
meetings, I focus on open market purchases and sales transactions that take place within
one month window of the board meeting date. To be more precise, I consider all trades
executed between 15 days before and 14 after the board meeting date [D-15,D+14],
where D denotes the day of the annual board meeting. The choice of the window follows
from Mishraa, Rowe, Prakash, and Ghosh (2009) who analyze the bidask spread around
meeting dates in the same manner. It is important to include days prior to the meeting
dates, because the directors typically receive company financial reports prior to the
board meetings. Even though the period of communicating company information to the
directors will show variety for companies, 15 days window will most probably capture all
the information released to directors prior to the meetings. The analysis in this paper
will draw its conclusions by analyzing the change in trading behavior and performance
of outside directors after the board meeting dates [D,D+14] to sort out the value of the
information acquired by the outside directors during board meetings.
The final sample consists of 145,298 transactions in the period 1996-2010, which
covers insider trading within one month window of a total of 17,163 board meetings of
3,042 distinct firms. Table 4.1 reports the distribution of the annual board meetings
with respect to meeting months and years. It is important to note that with regard to
Riskmetrics data set, annual meetings almost always take place in the same month of
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every year for each company.
Restricting attention to insider transactions around board meetings of large public
companies covered in Riskmetrics database induces some sample characteristics in the
data. To demonstrate its effects clearly, Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the insider
purchases and sales along with the insider types for various insider trading samples. I
start by analyzing the whole insider trading sample for the period 1996-2010 obtained
from TFN Insider Filing database. Panel A reports a total of 659,982 purchases which is
almost equally shared across groups of executives, outside directors and other insiders.4
Sales show a different pattern in the sense that out of 2,344,548 transactions, almost
half of them (1,506,708) are executed by the executives.
Panel B of Table 4.2 compares this whole TFN Insider Filing sample with the sub-
sample of transactions that belong to the firms covered in the Riskmetrics database.
Note that these are large public firms. This sample contains 224,962 purchases (around
one third of the whole sample) with a distribution among the insider types very similar
to that of the whole sample. 1,508,315 sale transactions in this sample exhibit a simi-
lar pattern, with even a higher ratio of executive sales. Overall, the sample covered in
Riskmetrics is a good representation of the whole sample.
Panel C of Table 4.2 reports the characteristics of the final sample, where only the
transactions executed within 15 days of the board meetings are considered. Contradict-
ing with previous samples, the biggest portion of 11,971 insider sales pertain to outside
directors, followed by executives, and other insiders. Nevertheless, insider sales show a
similar pattern to the whole sample since the majority of a total of 134,277 insider sales
have been initiated by the executives.
4.3 Distribution of Insider Trading Around Board Meet-
ings
In this section, I analyze the distribution of insider transactions with respect to the
annual board meeting dates. Board meetings are important events for not only the
decisions taken during them, but also for the substantial information gathering taking
place in advance (Mishraa, Rowe, Prakash, and Ghosh 2009; Vafeas 1999). If firm
4In panels A and B, to have a meaningful comparison, observations where share price is less than 2
dollars are excluded as in other studies.
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Table 4.2: Insider Trading Samples by Transaction and Insider Types
This table presents the distribution of the insider trading data. The insiders include company
executives, directors, large shareholders (who own at least 10% of the company shares), affiliates,
controllers, etc. The first group consists of executives who hold executive positions in the firm along
with possible directorship positions. The second group denotes the outside directors who are
nonexecutive directors of the firm. This group consists of two subgroups: independent directors who
are outside directors that are not large shareholders, and outside blockholders who are outside directors
that own a minimum of 10% share in the company. All the remaining insiders are classified as other
insiders. Panel A presents the whole insider trading sample that contains all open market purchases
and sales of insiders for the period 1996-2010. Panel B presents the sample obtained by merging the
whole sample by Riskmetrics database, which basically consists of S&P 1500 companies. Panel C
presents the final sample that contains all insider trades executed between 15 days before and 14 after
the annual board meeting dates obtained from Riskmetrics database. The statistics regarding
transaction values are calculated over the total transactions by each insider group, whereas those
regarding number of transactions are calculated by individual, firm, and year.
Panel A: TFN Insider Filing Sample
Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. Total
Purchases: Transaction in Numbers
Executives 1 958 2.97 1 8.92 214,198
Independent Directors 1 705 2.68 1 6.31 206,556
Outside Blockholders 1 776 7.67 2 30.42 24,546
Other Insiders 1 5,664 14.82 2 98.06 214,682
Purchases: Value in Dollars
Executives 200 2,221,536 mil. 18,434,479 12,000 5,005 mil. 3,936,996 mil.
Independent Directors 200 4,500,000 mil. 22,040,118 13,870 9,916 mil. 4,538,700 mil.
Outside Blockholders 200 41,666 mil. 2,639,277 14,625 269 mil. 64,559 mil.
Other Insiders 200 624,099 mil. 6,928,614 21,093 1,647 mil. 1,483,361 mil.
Sales: Transaction in Numbers
Executives 1 11,833 8.97 2 64.09 1,506,708
Independent Directors 1 2,031 7.09 2 34.08 460,894
Outside Blockholders 1 6,064 20.26 2 165.97 82,691
Other Insiders 1 5,677 12.15 2 81.56 294,255
Sales: Value in Dollars
Executives 200 414,011 mil. 663,062 35,640 338 mil. 998,728 mil.
Independent Directors 200 7,350 mil. 578,258 35,062 14 mil. 266,386 mil.
Outside Blockholders 200 14,000 mil. 1,936,922 27,479 55 mil. 160,067 mil.
Other Insiders 200 807,142 mil. 5,343,762 41,900 1,489 mil. 1,570,676 mil.
Table continues to next page.
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Panel B: TFN Insider Filing - Riskmetrics Merged Sample
Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. Total
Purchases: Transaction in Numbers
Executives 1 958 2.81 1 11.16 67,222
Independent Directors 1 705 2.57 1 7.30 66,938
Outside Blockholders 1 509 9.39 2 33.67 4,966
Other Insiders 1 5664 25.37 3.00 191.06 85,836
Purchases: Value in Dollars
Executives 204 884 mil. 210,025 21,845 5 mil. 14,104 mil.
Independent Directors 200 836 mil. 214,618 23,760 4 mil. 14,360 mil.
Outside Blockholders 217 375 mil. 1,114,587 30,095 11 mil. 5,521 mil.
Other Insiders 200 26,511 mil. 1,823,527 20,730 110 mil. 156,480 mil.
Sales: Transaction in Numbers
Executives 1 11,833 9.58 2 75.02 1,023,294
Independent Directors 1 1,612 7.41 2 32.73 271,899
Outside Blockholders 1 6,064 34.31 3 258.14 52,328
Other Insiders 1 5,677 17.59 2 124.72 160,794
Sales: Value in Dollars
Executives 203 10,443 mil. 415,393 48,600 16 mil. 425,015 mil.
Independent Directors 202 7,350 mil. 642,813 53,434 16 mil. 174,743 mil.
Outside Blockholders 500 14,000 mil. 2,021,599 41,232 67 mil. 105,780 mil.
Other Insiders 216 6,188 mil. 2,598,982 50,490 42 mil. 417,851
Panel C: Final Sample - Insider Trading Around Board Meetings
Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. Total
Purchases: Transaction in Numbers
Executives 1 116 2.09 1 5.08 3,845
Independent Directors 1 114 1.76 1 3.46 5,343
Outside Blockholders 1 20 3.81 2.50 4.20 99
Other Insiders 1 1,028 10.44 2 65.80 2,684
Purchases: Value in Dollars
Executives 125 10 mil. 161,347 30,856 0.518 mil. 620 mil.
Independent Directors 382 91 mil. 192,106 27,074 1.584 mil. 1,026 mil.
Outside Blockholders 1,540 34 mil. 1,075,551 66,960 4.967 mil. 106 mil.
Other Insiders 594 7,044 mil. 5,850,077 16,345 190 mil. 15,701 mil.
Sales: Transaction in Numbers
Executives 1 1,706 5.51 2 24.79 92,888
Independent Directors 1 414 4.85 2 14.96 25,552
Outside Blockholders 1 1,396 22.47 3 116.09 3,573
Other Insiders 1 692 13.59 2 53.14 12,314
Sales: Value in Dollars
Executives 198 773 mil. 418,867 54,264 5 mil. 38,907 mil.
Independent Directors 478 378 mil. 606,685 64,218 6 mil. 15,502 mil.
Outside Blockholders 1,146 897 mil. 970,564 63,138 17 mil. 3,466 mil.
Other Insiders 414 1,479 mil. 1,522,729 59,555 21 mil. 18,750 mil.
executives and directors act on the information gathered before and during the board
meetings, one would expect to see insider trading both prior and posterior to the board
meetings.
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Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of open market purchase transactions of the in-
siders around the board meeting dates. More specifically, the meeting date is considered
as point 0 on the x-axis. All transactions to the left of this point has been executed
before the meeting took place. These purchases may be driven by the data collected in
preparation of the meeting and its communication to directors and other insiders. All
purchases on the meeting date and after that are more likely to be driven by the infor-
mation provided at the board meetings, along with the new decisions taken regarding
firm’s future actions.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Insiders Purchases Around Board Meetings. This figure presents
the distribution of open market purchase transactions of all insiders, executives, outside directors and
other insiders, respectively, around the board meeting dates. All insiders are classified into three groups:
executives, outside directors who are nonexecutive directors, and other insiders. Difference refers to days
with respect to the date of the annual board meeting obtained from Riskmetrics database, and takes
value between -15 to +14. The sample period is 1996-2010.
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An interesting picture emerges from analyzing the behavior of various insider groups
in Figure 4.1. First of all, notice that the overall level of insider trading hikes at the
day of the meeting and the day following it. Executives trade heavily within 10 days
window around the board meetings, with no significant difference in their behavior prior
vs. posterior to the meeting. However, the outside directors significantly increase their
trades right after the board meetings. This is consistent with the idea that executives
trade on the information they collect before the board meetings whereas outside directors
get informed during the board meetings and use this information in trading. Consistent
with the significance of board meetings in information acquisition, there is no increase
in the trading of other insiders who do not attend the meetings; if any, there is a slight
decrease.
Complementing the previous analysis, Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of open
market sale transactions of the insiders around the board meeting dates. Unlike insider
purchases, insider sales do not exhibit a clear pattern. Outside directors trade more
frequently after the board meetings but the difference with respect to those before the
meetings is not substantial. This is consistent with the idea that unlike purchases,
sales can be driven by portfolio rebalancing needs, hence are not necessarily information
driven. Moreover, analyzing a period around the board meetings introduces further noise
since awards and grants tend to be transferred to insiders during the board meetings
and as a result selling pressure may increase.
Table 4.3 provides a numerical representation of the distribution of the sale and pur-
chase transactions of insider groups with respect to board meeting dates. Panel A splits
the transactions into two categories as before or after the meeting date. Independent
directors increase their purchase (sale) transactions by 115% (28%) from 1,696 to 3,647
as compared to the executives who only increase by 17% (20%) from 1,771 to 2,074 after
the board meetings. For a better comparison, I compute the differences in mean number
of transactions for each group. On average, a firm’s independent directors together exe-
cute 1.64 purchase transactions after the board meetings. This compares to an average
of 0.76 before the meetings. The difference, which is 0.88 transactions, is statistically
significant at 1% level. Even though the cumulative sales are not so different among
prior vs. posterior periods, a similar difference (0.81 transactions) is reported for the
average number of sales with the same significance level. In contrast, we do not observe
a significant change in the trades of executives after the board meetings. Average sales
are significantly higher but the difference is negligible.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Insiders Sales Around Board Meetings.This figure presents the
distribution of open market sale transactions of all insiders, executives, outside directors and other
insiders, respectively, around the board meeting dates. All insiders are classified into three groups:
executives, outside directors who are nonexecutive directors, and other insiders. Difference refers to
days with respect to the date of the annual board meeting obtained from Riskmetrics database, and
takes the value between -15 to +14. The sample period is 1996-2010.
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Panel B of Table 4.3 presents the distribution of the transactions on each day with
respect to the board meeting date. The hike of executives and independent directors
transactions on and after the board meeting date is very clear in this Panel. What
can be also seen in this analysis is that the majority of the purchase transactions are
attributed to the independent directors whereas those of outside blockholders constitute
a very small portion of outside directors’ sales. Therefore, in un-tabulated results we find
the same pattern regarding the outside directors trades as of the independent directors.
4.4 Performance of Insider Trading Around Board Meet-
ings
We have seen that outside directors significantly increase their trades after the board
meetings. This is evidence in favor of that the outside directors trade on the information
they obtain at the board meetings. However, this does not necessarily imply that the
information they obtain is accurate or valuable. Indeed, Harris and Raviv (2008) note
that “when outsiders control the board, insiders may not provide full or completely
accurate information” (p. 1798). One way to understand whether the information
obtained during board meetings is valuable or not is to analyze the trading performance
of outside directors.
In analyzing trading performance, I first separate the trades into purchases and
sales. This is important because, as mentioned before, purchases are more likely to
be information driven whereas sales can be driven by liquidity or portfolio rebalancing
motives. Therefore, purchases will be the main focus of the analysis. The whole analysis
will be based on the final sample where only trades within one month window of the
board meeting dates are considered [D−15,D+14]. This sample will be split into two
15-day periods based on the meeting date: Trades prior to the meeting date [D−15,D−1]
and trades posterior to the meeting date [D,D+14]. I will address two questions: 1. Is
there a difference between the trading performance of positions taken before and those
after the board meetings? 2. Is there a difference between the trading performance of
positions taken by the outside directors with respect to those of other insider groups?
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4.4.1 Market Adjusted Returns for Insiders Purchases
In this section, I analyze whether outside directors profit when they purchase their
company’s stock around the board meetings by using a regression analysis. Following
Ravina and Sapienza (2010), for each transaction made by an outside director, I calculate
the market adjusted returns of holding the position for 30, 60, 90 and 180 trading days.
I also report the results of 0 days holding period for demonstrative motives, however I
will not be considering those cases in performance evaluation. As in most of the previous
literature, market adjusted returns are computed by compounding the daily returns of a
portfolio that goes long 1 dollar in the company stock mimicking the insider’s purchase
and short 1 dollar in the value weighted market index. In the regressions, I control for
firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm specific characteristics. This also
allows me to compare outside directors and executives belonging to the same firm.
In the basic specification, I consider outside directors purchases and I regress the
return on a dummy taking value one if the trade is initiated after the board meeting.
Table 4.4 reports the results of this exercise. The positive and significant intercept (in
columns 1 to 5) is consistent with the literature, demonstrating that outside directors
earn abnormal returns from their purchases. On average, mimicking the outside direc-
tors’ buys yields a market adjusted return of 1.77% in 30 days, 1.75% in 60 days and
3.2% in 90 days, with 1% significance level. This effect is robust to controlling for the
transaction size and the directors’ holdings (in columns 6 to 10) to account for individ-
uals’ incentives and constraints. For a horizon of 180 days, the return is a significant
2.4%, however the significance does not persist after introducing the controls.
In order to see if there is a difference between the trading performance of positions
taken before and those after the board meetings, I analyze the coefficient on the dummy
variable. Table 4.4 demonstrates that in most specifications, the dummy variable has a
significantly positive coefficient. This suggests that outside directors earn higher returns
when they trade after attending the board meetings. The coefficient on the dummy
variable is higher and more significant in the specifications with control variables, and
the results get stronger as we increase the holding period. For 90 days holding period,
the outside directors earn an additional 2.79% when they initiate the trade after the
board meeting date, with the effect being significant at 5% level. For a horizon of 180
days, the outside directors do not gain significant returns for the trades initiated before
the meetings in contrast to a significant 4.34% abnormal return for purchases after the
meetings. These results are consistent with the view that outside directors
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obtain valuable information during board meetings.
Next, I analyze the trading performance of outside directors as compared to other
insider groups. The main question is how outside directors perform vis-a`-vis their ex-
ecutive counterparts. If we find that outside directors have significantly worse trading
performance than the executives, the evidence would be in favor of the argument that
outside directors are kept in the dark by the executives of their firms. The analysis in
this paper is especially important since I am focusing on a period around the board
meetings, which constitute the basic means of bridging the informational gap between
outside and inside members of the board. If the outsiders are not kept in the dark, we
would expect them to perform at least as well as their executive counterparts after the
board meetings.
Table 4.5 reports the results of this exercise, where I consider purchases of all insiders:
executives, outside directors, and other insiders. I regress the return on a dummy taking
value one if the trade is initiated by an outside director, and another dummy taking
value one if the trade is initiated by a nonexecutive non-director (other) insider. The
executives’ coefficient is therefore captured by the intercept. In Panel A, I consider all
transactions within one month window around the meeting dates. When transaction
size and holdings are controlled for, executives on average earn 5.53% return in 180 days
and the outside directors in the same firm obtain an amount 1.56% less over the same
horizon, but the difference is not significant. Interestingly, over shorter horizons, outside
directors earn higher market adjusted returns than those of the executives. However, the
difference is not significant, except for the holding period of 90 days where mimicking
the buys of the outside directors yields 1.84% higher return than that of the executives.
A deeper analysis where I split the sample into two subperiods with respect to the
board meeting date reveals the reasons behind outperformance of the outside directors’
buys. In the subperiod where only purchases prior to the meetings are considered (re-
ported in Panel B), outside directors do not earn significantly different returns than their
executive counterparts. However, the picture is altered when we constrain ourselves to
trades initiated after the board meetings. Panel C reports the results in this subsample.
Interestingly, executives do not earn significant market adjusted returns whereas outside
directors do, with the exception of 180 days horizon. For instance, on average, an ex-
ecutive earns an insignificant 0.2% market adjusted return from her purchases whereas
an outside director earns a significant 4.03% for 90 days horizon. For 180 days holding
period, both insider groups obtain positive abnormal returns. These results suggest that
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high returns of outside directors are due to the information they obtain during board
meetings. Therefore, board meetings help reducing the informational asymmetries be-
tween inside and outside board members.
So far I have focused on outside directors as a group. Ravina and Sapienza (2010)
note that outside blockholders (nonexecutive directors who own more than 10% of the
equity) should be distinguished from the rest of the outside directors that constitutes
the independent directors group. Their reasoning is that outside blockholders “might
have better access to information or more incentives to trade optimally, given their large
stake in the company” (p. 966). In order to replicate the regressions in Ravina and
Sapienza (2010), I consider only the purchases of executives and outside directors, and
I use different dummies for independent directors and outside blockholders.
Table 4.6 demonstrates the results obtained from replicating the regressions in Ravina
and Sapienza (2010) with the sample around the board meeting dates. As can be seen,
the results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.5. The reason is that the trades
made by large outside blockholders are very few with respect to other insider groups.
Consistent with the previous analysis, independent directors obtain higher market ad-
justed returns than the executives of the same firm. The difference is not significant
in the overall sample, however is significant for the subsample of purchases posterior to
the board meeting date. This contradicts the findings of Ravina and Sapienza (2010)
where independent directors obtain significantly less market adjusted returns than the
executives. The result is driven by the outperformance of mimicking the independent
directors’ purchases initiated after the board meetings. This suggests that when we
constrain ourselves to a more informative period (i.e., around board meetings), the in-
dependent directors do not perform worse than their executives counterparts.
As a final robustness check, I re-run the regressions of market adjusted returns for
insiders purchases excluding the firm fixed effects. Even though introducing firm fixed
effects is important in capturing firm specific characteristics, there is one caveat. Insiders
are shown in the literature to be contrarian investors (Jenter 2005; Lakonishok and Lee
2001; Ravina and Sapienza 2010). Using firm fixed effects may inflate abnormal returns
if outside directors trade after price declines and price run-ups; the level of the returns
may not be positive whereas the difference with respect to an average firm is. To account
for this, Table 4.7 reports the results of the specifications where firm fixed effects are not
introduced. As can be seen, the results are similar to the basic case where fixed effects
are included. Mimicking buys of outside directors executed after the board meetings
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continue yielding higher market adjusted returns as compared to the executives when
transaction size and holdings are controlled for. The effect is significant for most hori-
zons. Overall, results indicate that outside directors learn a lot about their firms at the
board meetings, and this effect is robust to many specifications.
4.4.2 Market Adjusted Returns for Insiders Sales
In this section, I analyze whether outside directors profit when they sell their com-
pany’s stock around the board meetings by using the same method as in the previous
section. Market adjusted returns are computed by compounding the daily returns of a
portfolio that goes short 1 dollar in the company stock mimicking the insider’s sale and
long 1 dollar in the value weighted market index.
In the basic specification, I consider outside directors sales and I regress the return
on a dummy taking value one if the trade is initiated after the board meeting. Table 4.8
reports the results of this exercise. The negative and significant intercepts are consistent
with Ravina and Sapienza (2010) which documents that independent directors obtain
significantly negative abnormal returns from their sales. On average, mimicking the
outside directors’ sells yields a market adjusted return of -0.75% in 30 days, -1.50%
in 60 days and -2.07% in 90 days and -6-09% in 180 days; all with high statistical
significance (in columns 1 to 5). This effect is robust to controlling for the transaction
size and the directors’ holdings (in columns 6 to 10) to account for individuals’ incentives
and constraints. Nevertheless, the fact that the sale is executed after the board meetings
increases the abnormal returns. Indeed, for 90 days horizon, mimicking outside directors’
sells initiated after the meetings yields a significant 0.82% market adjusted return when
controls are included. This demonstrates that the informativeness of the board meetings
is even documented in outside directors’ sales which may be driven largely by other
motives.
Finally, I analyze the trading performance of outside directors’ sales vis-a`-vis their
executive counterparts. Considering sales transactions of all insiders, I regress the return
on a dummy taking value one if the trade is initiated by an outside director, and another
dummy taking value one if the trade is initiated by other insider. The executives’
coefficient is therefore captured by the intercept. No matter the trade is initiated before
or after the meeting, executives always obtain significantly positive market adjusted
returns from their sales transactions, except for 180 days horizon. This is in contradiction
195
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with Ravina and Sapienza (2010) where they are shown to obtain negative abnormal
returns. This suggests that around the board meetings, executives sells are informative.
This may be due to the fact that executives gather information around the board meet-
ings, hence their sales in these periods are more likely to be information driven. However,
outside directors obtain significantly lower returns than their firms’ executives, even after
the board meetings.
Overall, the findings in this section is consistent with the literature which documents
that sales may be driven by diversification or liquidity motives rather than information
(Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ravina and Sapienza
2010). This seems to be the case especially for outside directors. One caution is that
analyzing a period around the board meetings introduces further noise since awards and
grants are more likely to be transferred to insiders during the board meetings. Insiders
may opt to sell these stocks right after the meetings due to the previously mentioned
motives.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the information content of the board meetings from the point of
view of the outside directors. I focus on insider purchases, since these trades have proven
to be information driven in the literature. The first finding is that insider trading signifi-
cantly increases around board meetings. The executives trade extensively shortly before
and after the board meetings, whereas outside directors increase their trading frequency
significantly after the meetings. Consistent with the literature, abnormal returns to out-
side directors purchases are positive around the board meetings. Interestingly, outside
directors earn significantly higher returns when they trade after acquiring information
at the board meetings. As compared to the performance of their executive counterparts,
outside directors who purchase company stock before the board meetings do not perform
better, however those who trade after the meetings gain significantly higher abnormal
returns. Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that board meetings are
important in outside directors’ information acquisition: Outsiders do learn a lot about
their firms at annual board meetings.
Many interesting extensions of this study are available. First of all, as in the rest
of the literature, this paper fails to associate insider sales with consistently well trading
performance. One reason could be the awards and grants granted during the board
200
meetings. If one could classify the individuals as those who receive awards and options,
and those who don’t, transactions of the non-receivers might provide relevant information
on the future of the firm. This is open to investigation since the TFN Insider Filing
database provides this information. Second, one can try to understand information
content of board meetings during bad times for the company. Just as Vafeas (1999)
demonstrates that the frequency of board meetings is higher in bad times, so would
be the information contained in each meeting. Moreover, it might be possible that the
outside directors not only use this information for their own (insider) trading; but also
share it with outsiders to be used in further (outsider) trading. This subject deserves
attention. Finally, I have only focused on insider trading around the board meeting
dates to evaluate the information content of the meetings. There are other manners
to explore this subject, such as analyzing trading volume or bidask spread of company
stocks around the board meeting dates.
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